Essays in educational and intergenerational inequality by Mattioli Mello, Ursula
Essays in Educational and
Intergenerational Inequality
Ursula Mattioli Mello
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Economics
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Advisors:
Jan Stuhler and Ricardo Mora
July 2019
This thesis is distributed under license “Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial
– Non Derivatives”.
A Deus, pela vida e por tantas maravilhas.
Às minhas origens, à minha família, em especial aos meus avós, por todo esforço para que
que eu chegasse até aqui.
Aos meus pais e à Ingrid, por todo amor que existe nesse mundo.
Ao Tomás, por caminhar ao meu lado e por construir sonhos comigo.
Aos meus futuros filhos, que, mesmo do mundo mental, já movem forças inigualáveis dentro
de mim.
i
Acknowledgements
“... to reach this stage (of great achievements), he must create many inner defenses, become
valiant in the face of all adverse circumstances, and come to know that struggle is the law of
life, which must be confronted not once but a thousand times, and not with vacillation but by
being fully conscious of what is inescapable.” From the Logosophical Bibliography
These past six years were, definitely, the most challenging and enriching of my life so far.
The journey towards a PhD thesis led me to great achievements, but also presented many
struggles. Interestingly, most of these battles happened inside of me. During this time, while
learning to be a research economist, I had to face fears, develop inner defenses and work even
harder to build key virtues for academic and life success: patience, bravery, humility, self-
confidence, kindness towards myself and others. Today, I am very happy to have produced
a thesis about topics I care about. Yet, there are no words to describe how joyful I feel to
realize how much I have grown and changed. Of course, there is no way I could have gotten
this far without the help of many.
I am extremely grateful to my supervisors, Jan Stuhler and Ricardo Mora. Thank you
for an impeccable guidance that went far beyond improving my research output. Thank
you for believing in me and in my work more than I did myself. Thank you for all the time
devoted to me. Thank you for giving me the perfect balance between the freedom I needed to
discover my own path inside academia and the incentives that helped me expand my limits
and persist. You were true examples of how academic excellence can meet an extremely
generous and kind heart. I hope that, one day, I get to be half the mentor you were to me.
I am also grateful to the faculty, my fellow PhD friends and the administrative personnel
at UC3M. You have created a warm and helpful environment, in which I could grow and learn
daily. I am especially thankful to Matilde Machado and Nazarii Saalish, who generously took
their time to review my dissertation chapters and give me great advice on how to improve
my work. Moreover, I am grateful to the UC3M Applied Faculty and PhD students, whose
comments, generosity and example helped build my skills and motivate my work. Thank
you for being such great peers and role models. I would also like to say a special thank
you to Pedro, Bea, Ana and Conchi, who kindly took care of me during the first two very
ii
challenging years of this experience.
I am grateful to my friends who accompanied me during this, in addition to many other
experiences of my life. To my friends who happen to be economists, thank you for all the
insightful conversations that have inspired many of my research questions. To my forever-
friends, thank you for always receiving me with your whole heart after so many months apart.
To my friends from the Logosophical Foundation, thank you for being my family in Spain,
for filling my life with joy and for helping me find purpose within myself.
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my loving family, especially, to my parents, Carlos and
Sandra, to my sister, Ingrid, and to my love, Tomás. Tomás, thank you for being my best
friend, my favorite economist and my life partner through all these six years. Your loyalty,
your grit, your insightfulness and your strength do not seize to surprise and inspire me.
Thank you for walking by my side every day. Daddy, mommy e sis, thank you for always
loving, supporting and trusting me. Thank you for being so close, no matter how far. Thank
you for your example of happiness, courage, determination and goodness of heart. Your love
makes me brave and my home will always be wherever you are. Muito obrigada por tudo.
Vocês são o melhor de mim. Eu amo muito vocês e espero, um dia, ser para meus filhos tudo
o que vocês são para mim.
iii
Other Research Merits
This thesis has been possible thanks to the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of
Education and Culture, grant number FPU14/07116.
iv
Abstract
In this dissertation, I study different dimensions of socioeconomic inequality. My objective
is to produce empirical evidence to help governments design better policies in the fields of
education and the labor market. The two first chapters are focused on educational inequality
and the effect of policies that aim to tacke this issue, while the third chapter aims to present
useful solutions to an important conceptual issue for measuring intergenerational mobility.
In the first chapter, ‘Affirmative Action, Centralized Admissions and Inequality in Access
to Higher Education: Evidence from Brazil ’, I analyze how two major reforms, introduced
to democratize access to public higher education in Brazil, impacted enrollments of students
from a low-socioeconomic status. The first policy centralized applications in a nationwide
platform and the second expanded affirmative action quotas to a uniform share of fifty percent
of all vacancies offered by each major and institution. Their progressive adoption generates
cross-sectional and time variation, allowing the separate identification of their causal effects.
Results show that the affirmative action reform increases enrollments of public school, black
and low-income students, while the centralized admission system acts in the opposite direc-
tion, decreasing their participation. Moreover, the interaction between both policies has a
positive and significant effect on enrollments of the vulnerable groups. I then shed light on
some mechanisms behind these results. I find that centralization disproportionately increases
enrollments of high-SES out-of-state students in the least prestigious degrees, crowding-out
low-SES students with mobility constraints. On the other hand, the expansion of affirmative
action does not only mechanically improve equity, but also changes application behavior.
In the second chapter, ‘Does Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education Impact High
Schools? ’, I delve into the analysis of unintended consequences of affirmative action initiatives
in higher education, which have been implemented in different countries to improve access of
vulnerable groups and to reduce inequality in educational attainment. A growing empirical
literature has investigated how such policies impact college students’ outcomes and pre-college
human capital accumulation. Yet, little is known about how they affect students’ choice of
high school and, consequently, school quality and peer interaction. I study this question in the
context of Brazil, one of the most unequal countries in the world, and where the government
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approved, in 2012, the "Quota Law (QL)”. It established that fifty percent of all vacancies in
each major and federal higher education institution, including some of the best universities
in the country, has to be reserved to students that attended secondary education integrally in
a public school. I show that the adoption of QL increases strategic mobility from private to
public schools by 29 percent and that the movers come disproportionately from low-SES and
low-quality private schools. Nevertheless, this exogenous influx of private school students
increases public school quality, while it also raises inequality within the public school system.
Finally, in the third chapter, ‘Correction Methods for Intergenerational Mobility Esti-
mates ’, co-authored with Martin Nybom and Jan Stuhler, we study another dimension of
socioeconomic inequality: the transmission of economic status between generations. The
estimation of standard measures of intergenerational mobility ideally requires the complete
income history for two generations to determine their lifetime incomes. However, empirical
applications are typically based on snapshots of income over a limited number of observa-
tions in the life cycle. If those snapshots do not mimic lifetime outcomes, the estimates are
subject to attenuation and lifecycle bias. The literature has followed two different strategies
to address this problem. The first models the income processes itself, the second the relation
between annual and lifetime incomes over the life cycle. In this paper, we use uniquely long
income series from Sweden to study how well these methods approximate the intergenera-
tional elasticity of income. All methods are biased to some degree, because neither accounts
for three key components of the income process: (i) income growth explained by observ-
able characteristics, (ii) transitory noise, and (iii) unexplained income growth that correlates
within families. We propose a lifecycle estimator that addresses all three components, and
which can improve estimates of the intergenerational elasticity in a wide range of settings.
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Chapter 1
Affirmative Action, Centralized
Admissions and Inequality in Access to
Higher Education: Evidence from Brazil
1.1 Introduction
Inequality in access to higher education is a growing concern in both developed and developing
economies. In the U.S., Haveman and Wilson (2007) find a gap of almost 50 percentage points
in college attendance between students in the top and bottom quartile of family income.
In Brazil, according to the population Census of 2010, the share of college enrollment for
individuals aged 18 to 22 is equal to 3.7 percent in the lowest quartile and 34.2 percent in the
top quartile of family per capita income. Higher education is an important indicator of future
labor market outcomes.1 Therefore, the barriers to college attendance faced by disadvantaged
students contribute to the perpetuation of income inequality and to lower social mobility.2
In this context, a wide range of policies have been implemented to improve access of vul-
nerable groups to higher education in different countries. Examples of such policies include:
the expansion of financial aid, the reduction of tuition costs, the enlargement of the public
and technical postsecondary systems, the practice of affirmative action in elite colleges and
the reduction of application costs. Following the spread of these interventions, a recent grow-
1Although highly heterogeneous, the literature has found consistent average positive returns to higher
education (e.g. Rodriguez et al. 2016; Zimmerman 2014).
2According to Haveman and Wilson (2007), the increase in U.S. income inequality over the past three
decades has increased inequality in educational attainment between those with high and low incomes. This
creates a vicious circle which perpetuates inequality. In this line, Chetty et al. (2017) explore the role
of colleges in the transmission of inequality across generations in the U.S. They find that the fraction of
students from low-income families fell sharply at colleges with the highest rates of bottom-to-top-quintile
mobility between 2000-2011.
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ing body of the economic literature has investigate how such initiatives affect the structure
of higher education systems in terms of equality and diversity of the student body.
In this paper, I add to the literature by analyzing how two large governmental inter-
ventions affected enrollments of disadvantaged individuals in elite public higher education
institutions in a particularly interesting institutional context. On the one hand, Brazil is one
of the most unequal countries in the world; returns to higher education are relatively high,3
while access is extremely unequal, especially for the elite colleges. On the other hand, most
of these top institutions are public. Moreover, governmental expenditure in higher educa-
tion is substantial compared to the primary and secondary levels, reinforcing the cycle of
inequality.4
To reduce this problem, the government of Brazil recently adopted a set of policies that
aimed to expand enrollments of disadvantaged groups to public colleges. The most important
ones were the implementation of a centralized admission system in 2010 - the Sistema de
Seleção Unificada (SISU) - and of a national Affirmative Action Policy (AA) in 2013. The
SISU centralized applications in a nationwide online platform available for undergraduate
degrees of federal and state institutions, based exclusively on grades of a national standardized
exam. By reducing application costs, SISU created a more efficient market (Machado and
Szerman, 2018). Yet, little is known about how it affected equality in access to public
higher education. The AA, in contrast, determined that fifty percent of all vacancies in
undergraduate degrees at federal institutions have to be reserved to students that attended
public schools during all 3 years of secondary education,5 with a certain percentage destined to
race and economic-based minorities. By prioritizing equality, AA does not only mechanically
increase enrollments of students of low socioeconomic status (hereafter low-SES), but also
impacts incentives differently for each demographic group. In spite the large magnitude
of these reforms, to the best of my knowledge, no academic papers tried to uncover their
distributional effects. I try to fill this gap by investigating: (i) how SISU and AA changed
the demographic composition of elite higher education institutions; (ii) if and how the two
policies interact; (iii) the mechanisms behind the results.
My identification strategy relies on the progressive adoption of both policies, which gen-
3Brazil is the 11th most unequal country according to its Gini Index (World Development Indicators, 2019).
Earnings of workers with a tertiary degree are 2.5 times higher than the ones of workers with upper-secondary
education. The OECD average is 1.56 (OECD, 2017).
4Brazil spends 3.8 thousand USD annually per student in primary education, while the OECD average is
8.7. In contrast, Brazil spends 11.7 thousand USD per student in tertiary education, similarly to European
countries such as Italy (11.5) and Spain (11.8). The OECD average is 16.1, due to countries with substantially
higher average spending, such as the US (29.3) and the UK (24.5) (OECD, 2017).
5According to data from ENEM 2016 (a National Standardized Exam), among the top 10 percent of
high-schools in Brazil, 88% are private. Since attending a better (private) school is correlated with a higher
socioeconomic status, the AA policy targets public school students as a proxy for low-economic status.
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erates cross-sectional and time variation. Under a common trend assumption, this allows
for the identification of their causal effect. The main specification includes time and degree-
university fixed effects, in addition to a degree-level control for the number of vacancies and
a municipality trend. The main identifying assumption for causal interpretation of the es-
timates is that trends in the outcome variable for treated and control units are parallel in
absence of treatment. However, the existence of time-varying unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with the outcome could be a potential threat for identification. In order
to provide suggestive evidence that trends between controls and treated units are parallel, I
conduct a series of placebo experiments, including both one and two lead variables, and find
that coefficients for trends in pre-periods are close to zero and insignificant.
Results show that the full adoption of AA – from zero to fifty percent of reserved vacan-
cies – increases enrollments of public school students (PS), non-white public school students
(PSNW) and low income public school students (PSLI) by, respectively, 9.9, 7.0 and 2.4 per-
centage points, an increase of 18, 29 and 34 percent for the average program. These average
effects mask remarkable heterogeneity. The full adoption of AA increases participation of PS
by up to 28 p.p. and of PSNW by 15 p.p. for degrees in the lowest decile of PS participation
share in the baseline year. Full adoption of SISU acts in the opposite direction, decreasing
enrollments of these groups by 3.8, 2.8 and 4.1 percentage points, representing a negative
effect of 7, 12 and 59 percent for the average program. Finally, the interaction between both
policies creates an additional effect that increases enrollments of all vulnerable groups.
I present, then, suggestive evidence to shed light on the mechanisms behind these results.
The full adoption of SISU substantially increases the average number of applications, enroll-
ments of out-of-state students and average grades of enrollees. This suggests that centraliza-
tion creates a more efficient market, as shown by Machado and Szerman (2018). Although
the centralized system increases competition across all degrees, I find that it displaces low-
SES students in the least competitive programs only. I then show that this pattern can be
explained by the heterogeneous effects of SISU on the composition of out-of-state students
in different degrees. In the least competitive programs, SISU disproportionately increases
enrollments of high-SES out-of-state students, displacing the low-SES ones. Instead, in the
most competitive programs, SISU disproportionately increases enrollments of low-SES out-
of-state students, leading to no crowding-out effect. This suggests that mobility constraints
are an obstacle for low-SES students accepted in degrees with lower expected future returns,
but not to high-SES students or to low-SES students accepted in the most prestigious degrees.
The expansion of AA also increases the average number of applications. In addition, it
increases enrollments of public school students in programs in which their participation was as
high as 67 percent in baseline. This suggests that the positive effects of AA on enrollments of
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low-SES individuals are probably not only driven by the mechanical change in the admission
rule, but also by a change in application behavior.
Finally, I discuss two potential channels behind the positive effects observed in the inter-
action of the two policies: one driven by the availability of additional information and another
by the extra protection in face of higher competition. The effect of AA is higher when SISU
is large. The full adoption of a centralized system induces all interested applicants to join
the SISU platform. Once in the system, the low-SES students benefit from the information
channel. By providing low-SES students with additional information regarding their own
grades and cutoff scores, the platform enables them to better target their applications, lead-
ing to more enrollments. In parallel, the effect of SISU is larger when AA is fully adopted.
This creates an additional protection channel that prevents the crowding-out effect. Thus,
the joint adoption of the policies leads to more enrollments of low-SES students, displacing
both local and out-of-state high-SES students.
My paper broadly contributes to the empirical literature that studies the impact of in-
terventions that aim to democratize access to higher education. To cite a few examples,
this literature has studied the effect of expanding financial aid and reducing tuition costs
(e.g. Solis 2017; Rojas et al. 2013; Deming and Dynarski 2010), the enlargement of access
to community colleges or technical postsecondary education (e.g. Goldhaber and Peri 2007;
Denning 2017) and the effect of initiatives that aim to change low-SES students’ aspirations
and perceived value of attending college (e.g. Kaufmann 2014; Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013;
Jensen 2010). Specifically, my paper adds to the strands within this literature that investi-
gate the impact of affirmative action policies in undergraduate education and the effect of
reducing application costs on enrollments of low-SES students.
Most of the studies related to affirmative action in higher education focus on the US
experience and investigate how the practice of a racial preference has impacted minorities’
overall enrollment, graduation attainment, major choice and labor market outcomes.6 More
closely related to my paper are the contributions of Hinrichs (2012) and Backes (2012), who
study how affirmative action affects college enrollments and the demographic composition of
universities. The lasting effects of such policies on long-term labor market outcomes begin
by their differential effects on enrollments. Therefore, understanding the short-term impact
of affirmative action on matriculation of minority groups (and displacement of the majority),
and consequently on the composition of students at undergraduate degrees, is an essential
step to learning the extent of its effect. Both Hinrichs (2012) and Backes (2012) explore the
variation across time and state on U.S. colleges and find that the ban of affirmative action has
6Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2016) and Arcidiacono et al. (2015) offer a comprehensive updated review
of this literature.
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no impact for the typical student and the typical college, but decreases under-representative
minority enrollment at selective colleges. Although much can be learned from the evidence
of affirmative action in the U.S., the structure of such policies in the Brazilian undergraduate
higher education is more similar to the one in India, where institutions have precise quotas
and admissions depend solely on grades.7 Bertrand et al. (2010) and Bagde et al. (2016) study
the effect of caste-based quotas in higher education in engineering colleges in India, and find
that affirmative action substantially increases the probability of admission and attendance
of disadvantaged casters.
Previous evidence on affirmative action in Brazil focused on the localized adoption of
policies by specific institutions. Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2012) find that the racial quo-
tas introduced by the University of Brasilia increased the proportion of black students and
of students from a lower socioeconomic background. Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2018) con-
clude, then, that this policy increased the average years of education, college completion and
labor earnings of the targeted group. Estevan et al. (2019) show that racial preferences in
admissions at the University of Campinas leads toward a shift of admission to students of
families of lower socioeconomic status. These papers find little evidence of behavioral effects
on pre-college human capital accumulation.
I expand on this literature in different dimensions. First, I study the impact of affirmative
action on the demographic compositions of universities in an institutional context that is
remarkably different from both the United States and India.8 Second, I analyze the effect of
an affirmative action reform that was both nationwide, as it affected all federal universities
of Brazil (17 percent of all undergraduate enrollment) and highly advertised and debated by
the public, which differs from most of the experiences in the U.S., India or Brazil, in which
affirmative action policies were analyzed in localized (mostly state-level) contexts.
7In the U.S., multiple factors play a role in college admissions, AA is expressed in form of a "racial
preference" that is not precisely quantifiable and depends on specific college policies. In Brazil and India,
institutions have precise quotas and admissions depend solely on grades. However, the demographic structure
of the Brazilian population is more comparable to the US. Both countries have a diverse mixed-race population
composed by descendants of Indigenous, Africans and European immigrants. Also, both the U.S. and Brazil
endured a long period of slavery, which is historically one of the main sources of the current racial and social
inequality in both countries.
8Brazil and India are among the most unequal countries in the world nowadays. According to Assouad
et al. (2018), in both countries, the top 10% income share is greater than 50% of total pre-tax national
income, compared to around 45% in the United States, and less than 40% in Western Europe. Also, while
the middle 40% income share comprises 40% of income in the US, this share falls to 30% in Brazil and India.
The sources and dynamics of inequality are, however, very different in both countries. In Brazil, the legacy
of racial inequality from the almost 400 years of slavery is still very persistent. In India, inequality has its
roots in the caste system. Moreover, while inequality in Brazil has been at stable high levels in the past 15
years, in India, it has persistently grown since 1980. Furthermore, AA in higher education is a relatively new
policy in Brazil (starting in the early 2000s and expanding nationally in 2013). In India, the Constitution of
1950 already mandates affirmative action for lower-castes (Bagde et al., 2016).
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The literature that studies the impact of application costs on students’ decisions to apply
and enroll in higher education has shown that more informed students attend higher quality
colleges and that financial constraints and information are important drivers of mismatch
(e.g. Dillon and Smith 2017; Hoxby and Turner 2015). Although application costs affect
decisions of all students, the low-income individuals are usually the ones who benefit more
from policies that reduce these costs. Bettinger et al. (2012) find that low-income individuals
who receive assistance to complete the application for federal aid increase their likelihood
of college assistance and persistence. Similarly, Carrell and Sacerdote (2017) show that
providing high-school students at the margin of failing to apply with a college mentoring ap-
plication program and application waivers increases their matriculation in higher education,
especially for students at disadvantaged schools. Hoxby and Turner (2015) find that provid-
ing low-income high ability students with semi-customized information on applications and
application waivers leads to more applications and admissions, especially to better-quality
colleges. Bulman (2015) presents evidence that variation in access to SAT testing centers
or mandatory in-school administration policies improves college-going, especially for high-
ability students at the margin of attendance. Finally, Pallais (2015) shows that even a small
reduction in monetary costs is capable of widening students’ applications, leading the low-
income ones to attend more selective colleges. In sum, this set of studies finds that relatively
small and cheap interventions that reduce application costs can impact important decisions
of low-income students and increase their investments in higher education.
I add to this literature by investigating how a much larger change in application costs im-
pacts low-SES students’ enrollments. In my context, the introduction of SISU represents an
expressive reduction in applications costs in several dimensions: financial constraints, effort
provision and information. The previous literature, instead, has focused on smaller-scale in-
terventions: application assistance, financial waivers or provision of information to low-SES
students. Thus, it is not clear whether the reduction of applications costs caused by the
implementation of a centralized assignment should have similar effects as the policies previ-
ously studied. One key difference is that the introduction of a centralized system represents
a large decline in costs for all students, not only the low-SES group. Thus, understanding
its heterogeneous impacts on students’ behavioral responses is essential for uncovering its
distributional effects.
These are very relevant questions, both for the economic literature and for policy mak-
ers. Centralized assignments are largely adopted in different countries and educational levels.
Plenty is known, especially theoretically, about its effects on improving allocation and co-
ordination in different contexts. The empirical evidence, though, is still scarce, especially
in the field of education. The paper by Machado and Szerman (2018), which explores the
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gradual implementation of SISU, is the first to provide empirical evidence on how the in-
troduction of a centralized admission system improves allocation in an educational market.
They find a positive impact on average grades of admitted students of institutions and pro-
grams that adopted the centralized system, interpreting it as an increase in the quality of
matching between college and student. They also find that the adoption of SISU increases
migration to attend higher education and drop-out rates after a year of enrollment. Yet, they
do not explore the heterogeneous and distributional impacts of the introduction of centralized
assignments and my paper fills this gap.
Additionally, the unique institutional context analyzed in my paper creates an opportu-
nity to test whether the adoption of centralized admissions and of affirmative action quotas
simultaneously creates interactions that change the effects that each would have had alone.
This provides new evidence for both above-mentioned strands of the literature. Finally, I
add to the literature in educational policy in Brazil and other middle-income countries, by
quantifying how these interventions contributed to the changes observed in the student body
in the recent period.
The remainder of this paper is divided as following. In section 2, I present an overview
of the Brazilian higher education system and the institutional context of the reforms. In
section 3, I describe the data sources and my main sample of analysis. In section 4, I explain
the identification strategy and provide evidence in its support. In section 5, I show the main
results, while in section 6, I discuss the potential mechanisms behind them. Finally, in section
7, I discuss the main issues regarding the internal validity of my empirical strategy and, in
section 8, I present some policy implications of my findings.
1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 Brazilian Higher Education System
According to the Census of Higher Education of 2014, the Brazilian Higher Education System
is comprised of 2368 institutions, 298 public and 2070 private. The public system is a mix
of Federal (107), State (118) and Municipal (73) institutions, which correspond, respectively,
to 17, 9 and 2 percent of the total undergraduate enrollment of around 6.5 million students.9
Federal and State institutions are, by law, free of any charge, while Municipal schools usually
charge some tuition. Private institutions, on the other hand, are a mix of profit (998) and
non-profit (1172) organizations and although submitted to federal regulations and education
standards, have complete independence regarding tuition fees and administration.
9Considering only undergraduate on-campus programs and students with an active enrollment status.
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Public institutions (especially Federal) are widely recognized in the country by their
average superior quality. For instance, the Federal institutions scored, on average, 3.6 in
a scale of 0 to 5 of the Índice Geral de Cursos 2014 (IGC), a quality index elaborated by
the Ministry of Education based on performance evaluations of undergraduate and graduate
programs. State institutions scored 2.8, and private institutions 2.6. Furthermore, among
the universities only, 24 out of the best 25 are public, being 5 of the State administration
and the other 19 Federal. On an alternative ranking - Ranking Universitário Folha 2014,
elaborated by Folha de São Paulo, the newspaper of the highest circulation in Brazil - a
similar pattern appears. Among the top 25 universities, 17 are Federal, 6 are State and 2
are private. Therefore, due to their high quality and free tuition, public institutions usually
attract a large number of applicants. In spite of the high demand for their undergraduate
degrees, competition is highly heterogeneous by institution and field of study.
Before 2010, the admission system for higher education was decentralized. Institutions
organized their own admission exams, the so-called Vestibular, some months prior to the
beginning of the academic year or semester. Once the application period was open, students
had to opt for a particular degree and pay an inscription fee that would allow them to take
the admission test of that specific program-institution. Furthermore, they had to be present
on a certain date, time and location and exams were usually offered only in the city of the
school. Exams were institution-specific and had a variety of structures and content that
often required specific preparation. Because of both high costs of application and moving,
the higher education market in Brazil used to be highly localized.
1.2.2 Centralization of Admissions
For the admission process of 2010, the Ministry of Education implemented a centralized
admission system called SISU - Sistema de Seleção Unificada. This consists of an online
platform, where universities offer their vacancies, and students, using only their grades in the
national standardized exam, apply to the offered spots.
Only Federal and State institutions could adopt the SISU and they were free to choose if
and how to do so. For instance, they could choose to adopt the system for all the available
vacancies, partially or only for some degrees. Institutions adopted the system progressively.
Although the adoption of SISU decreased costs of admission processes for both schools and
students, many institutions were cautious about how the system would effectively work in
the first years of implementation. Table 1.1 shows the gradual expansion of SISU adoption.
While in 2010, the system was adopted by 55 institutions offering a total of 17 percent of
all undergraduate vacancies in the Brazilian public higher education market, in 2015, the
system reached 108 institutions and 59 percent of vacancies. It is also clear from Table 1.1
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that the adoption of the centralized system is higher among Federal than State institutions.
Since Federal institutions are funded by the national government, they are expected to follow
the guidelines of the Ministry of Education. Indeed, by 2015, all but two federal institutions
adopted SISU (fully or partially).10 State institutions, on the other hand, had incentives to
adopt the centralized system in form of additional resources to be used in student assistance.11
The SISU admission system is solely base on the score students obtained in the so-called
ENEM - Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio. This is a national standardized exam handled
by the Ministry of Education and available once a year across the whole country. The ENEM
exam was created in 1998 as a means of testing the performance of high-school graduates.
The importance of the exam has increased over time, as the number of takers went from
157.221, in 1998, to nearly 8.7 million, in 2015.12 As shown in Figure 3.1 from Machado and
Szerman (2018), the evolution of the number of test takers has two jumps. First, in 2004,
the exam became a mandatory requisite for PROUNI, a government scholarship targeted at
public school and low income students. Second, in 2010, the exam became mandatory for
the SISU application.
In order to be used in admission processes, the Ministry of Education reformulated the
exam in 2009. It was announced it would become more rigorous and more similar to the
admission exams handled by public universities. It consists of 180 multiple-choice questions
in four areas - Mathematics, Humanities, Sciences and Languages - and a written essay. Item
Response Theory is used for grading, so the scores are comparable across years. Students
had to pay a small fee (68 reais or about 20 dollars in 2016), which can be waved in case of
financial need. High school graduates had incentives to take the ENEM exam before 2009,
as its grade was used fully or partially in some admissions processes of private institutions
and in a limited number of public institutions. There were also incentives for high-schools,
as national rankings of institutions were elaborated by the Ministry of Education and spread
nation-wide every year based on these grades. However, with the adoption of SISU in 2010,
incentives increased, especially for students interested in pursuing higher education in public
institutions.
Students take the ENEM exam around October or November of the year before starting
higher education. The SISU opens its inscriptions in January and July and institutions can
10The two exceptions are UNIR and UFOPA.
11These additional resources could potentially be a confounder of the effect of SISU. Yet, I show that this
is not the case. Although I include both Federal and State institutions in my main specification, results
are robust when including only Federal institutions, which do not receive additional resources by adopting
SISU. Due to the magnitude of the SISU reform, these additional resources in student assistance might play
a marginal role in the enrollment decisions only.
12Since the number of test takers increase from 2010 to 2015, and some of the outcomes of analysis come
from the ENEM dataset, this creates a potential selection problem, which I discuss in Section 7 of the paper.
9
Chapter 1. Affirmative Action, Centralized Admissions and Inequality in Access to Higher
Education: Evidence from Brazil
choose if they want to offer all their spots in January or split their vacancies between the two
yearly editions. Students pay no fee to participate in the system. The SISU is open for 4 or
5 days and students have to submit two choices of institution-major combination (program
or degree) at the end of the application period. At the end of every day, the system updates
cutoff scores of the programs depending on the people that have already applied. Based on
that information, students are able to update their preferences and choose other options for
which they might qualify. Only the two choices submitted when the system is closed count
for their offers of admission. Candidates are accepted to their most preferred choice. In case
they do not qualify, they become part of a waiting list.13
1.2.3 Affirmative Action
Access to public higher education in Brazil has historically been unequal. According to the
Census of 2010, 85 percent of students aged 16 to 18 enrolled in high school attended a
public institution,14 while only 51 percent of incoming students in public higher education
institutions are graduates from public high schools. Moreover, from the high-school enrollees
aged 16 to 18, 47.5 percent were non-white and attended a public institution, while only 23
percent of first-year students in public universities were graduated from a public high school
and also non-white. The lack of representation of economic and ethnic vulnerable groups
in the public tertiary education created a social pressure for more equity in access to this
governmental service.
The first public universities to implement affirmative action policies in their admission
process were the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and the State University of
Bahia (UNEB) in 2003. Since then, many other public institutions adopted some type of
affirmative action. However, there was not a national initiative that obliged them to do so
and many of the country’s best federal institutions were still resistant to adopt quotas. On
13This mechanism of applications is denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism. The specific case
of Brazil has recently been studied theoretically by Bó and Hakimov (2016). They find that participants
following the simple strategy of choosing the most preferred college in each period is a robust equilibrium
that yields the Student Optimal Stable Matching. However, students may not always follow this strategy.
Using data from SISU 2016, the authors show that from day 1 to 2, 5.8 percent of programs have their cutoff
reduced. The iterative nature of the system might benefit students who are unaware of their true ability, as
they are able to update their preferences and apply to programs they first believed to be out of reach. In
spite of the positive "feedback feature", SISU is shown to produce some instabilities. For example, around
10 percent of programs have their cutoff reduced after the last update of preferences. This means that, for
applicants with grades close to cutoff scores, there might be incentives for strategic applications. The authors
conclude that the system could be improved with a combination of an iterative phase and second stage in
which unmatched students would submit a list of preferences among the still available options.
14Note that the individuals of 16 to 18 years old that attend high school in Brazil belong to an already
selective group. Around 30 percent of the youth aged 16 to 18 is out of education and other 28 percent is in
age-distorted grades, i.e., still in primary or middle school.
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August 29th 2012, the Brazilian government approved Law 12.711/2012 - the AA Expansion
-, stating that 50 percent of the spots in all majors in federal institutions should be reserved
to individuals that studied the 3 years of their high school in public institutions.15 The other
50 percent remained open to everyone. Among these reserved vacancies, 50 percent goes to
students with family gross per capita income of 1.5 minimum wages or less. Furthermore,
a minimum share of the reserved spots is destined to black, mixed and indigenous students
(non-white), according to the percentage of these ethnic groups in the population of each
state (defined according to the last available population Census). Figure 1.2 contains an
example of how the law would be applied to a specific case. Since the state of Bahia has 76.8
percent of non-white, 76.8 percent of the reserved spots or 38.4 percent of total spots have
to be reserved to them.
Federal institutions had 4 years to implement the law, i.e., they had to reserve a minimum
of 12.5 percent of places in 2013, 25 percent in 2014, 37.5 percent in 2014, reaching 50 percent
in 2016, the latest. However, they could adjust to the 50 percent share immediately. Table
1.2 shows the gradual increase in vacancies reserved to affirmative action in Brazilian public
higher education institutions from 2010 to 2015. Although reserved spots for quotas increase
in every year from 2010 to 2015, it is evident that the adoption of AA, from year 2013 onwards,
is responsible for a clear jump in the percentage of reserved undergraduate vacancies offered
by institutions. Other interesting aspect is that the increase in reserved spots is driven mostly
by the shift in quotas for non-white public school students (ethnic), rather than the vacancies
destined to public school students independent of race (non-ethnic).
1.3 Data
This paper uses data from different sources. First, it uses the Census of Higher Education
(CES) from 2010 to 2015, which contains information on the universe of students enrolled in
undergraduate degrees in all Brazilian institutions. The student level module includes data
regarding which program (combination of institution and major) he or she is enrolled in, and
demographic information about the student, such as gender, age, ethnicity, place of birth and
type of school attended in high school. The CES also comprises modules with data about the
institutions and programs, such as number of vacancies and degrees, resources, installations
and information regarding professors.
15Note that only federal institutions were required, by law, to adopt the AA policy. State institutions are
not required to do so, as they are not under the federal government administration. Although in my main
specification I include both Federal and State institutions, in order to provide results comprehensive for the
whole public higher education system, my results are robust when including only Federal institutions, which
can be argued to be the most exogenous sample.
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I restrict the CES 2010-2015 student-level sample to incoming (or first-year) students only.
I also keep only individuals from undergraduate on-campus programs (excluding all online
learning degrees) and students that are reported to have been selected through a regular
selection process for first year-students (excluding transfers and special programs). Finally,
I maintain in the sample only students from Federal institutions and State universities,
excluding individuals that attend State centers and institutes.16 My final sample of incoming
students comprises 2,282,078 individuals, distributed along the 2010-2015 period, as specified
by Table 1.3.
Second, I use data from the National Exam of High School (ENEM) Microdata from
2009 to 2014. This dataset contains information on test scores of all students that took
the exam in each year with their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. A unique
individual identifier (social security number) is used to link information from the ENEM
dataset of year t-1 with the CES data of incoming students of year t. The matched sample
comprises 1,829,037 individuals and the matching rate increases from 65 percent in 2010
to 89 percent in 2015. Students from the CES sample that are not found in the ENEM
Microdata probably did not take the exam in the year before, either because they were not
high school graduates or because they were selected to programs that did not have the ENEM
exam as a requirement. The increasing number of matches reflects the growing adoption of
the ENEM grade as a requirement for admission in public institutions. Both datasets are
only available for researchers upon approval of research projects at the headquarters of the
National Institute for Educational Studies and Research (INEP), of the Brazilian Ministry
of Education, in Brasilia.
Table 1.3 contains descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis of this
paper. It shows an overall increase in the participation of public school, non-white and low-
income individuals in the student body, while the share of out-of-state students remained
stable. The dummy variables of whether individuals attended a public high school and their
ethnicity are based on the information individuals provide in the ENEM questionnaire.17
When the variables are missing, the information is complemented with the answer contained
in the CES dataset.18 The variable of low income is defined as whether individuals come
16These individuals correspond to only 5.7 percent of incoming students in public institutions. They are
excluded because the information regarding the adoption of AA in these institutions is missing.
17This might raise concerns about the strategic manipulation of the variables in the self-reported data.
First, students have no incentives to lie when filling the ENEM questionnaire, as the individual students’
answers are not shared with institutions by any means and cannot be used in the admission decisions.
Second, to qualify for AA, students need to have attended all three years of high school at a public secondary
institution. This information is not easy to be manipulated, as it needs to be proven with school certificates.
In the ENEM questionnaire, high school students need to specify which school they are graduating from.
18By adopting this procedure, I reduce considerably the number of missing values for these two character-
istics. However, the missing values are still a problem, especially in early years. I use the ENEM dataset as
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from families with total income of less than one minimum wage and it comes from the ENEM
questionnaire.19 The student is defined as from out-of-state if the reported state of residence
at the ENEM questionnaire (during the final year of high school) is different from the one
where the individual is enrolled in higher education, reported in the CES. The information on
grades is an average of the four multiple-choice sections of the ENEM exam: Math, Science,
Humanities and Languages. It was standardized to have mean zero and variance one based
on all the test takers of that year. Finally, the variables for the number of spots and number
of applications per program comes from the CES dataset.
Although the CES dataset contains information on the complete population of first-year
students enrolled in Brazilian public higher education institutions, I do not observe individual
outcomes for all incoming students, as shown in Table 1.3. For instance, in 2010, I observe the
type of school attended in high school for 70 percent of the individuals. This share reaches
97 percent in 2015. This selection problem could be an issue for my empirical strategy if
the existence of missing values is correlated with the implementation of the treatments. In
Section 7, I characterize this problem with detail and show that although the introduction
of SISU increases the availability of information, the results of my empirical model remain
stable after a series of robustness tests.
In addition to those two administrative datasets, two smaller ones were also used. First,
the data of SISU was provided by the Ministry of Education of Brazil (MEC). It contains
information on the number of vacancies of each program and institution offered through the
centralized admission system from 2010 to 2015. Second, information on the AA expansion
was gathered by the author using public documentation of the admission processes, as well as
information provided directly by the institutions. The resulting dataset contains the number
of vacancies destined to each category of affirmative action of each public institution in the
country, from 2010, before the federal law, to 2015, when the law was nearly completely
implemented. Additional detailed information regarding data sources, sample restrictions
and constructions of each variable are available in the Data Appendix.
the primary source, because studenst answer whether they attended a public high school during all 3 years
of secondary, a requirement for qualifying to the AA law. In the CES, in contrast, the type of school refers
to the the institution where students graduated from in high school.
19Note that the income criteria used in the AA law is different: family per capita income of less than 1.5
minimum wage. My definition of low-income here includes only individuals that are substantially poorer.
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1.4 Empirical Methodology
In order to study the causal effects of the implementation of SISU and of the AA Expansion
on enrollments of low-socioeconomic status students, I use the following baseline model:
Yiput = β1SISUput + β2AAut + β3SISUput ∗ AAut + γXput + αpu + αt + αm ∗ t+ εiput, (1.1)
where Yiput is the outcome of student i, of program p, institution u and time t. The
treatment variable SISUput ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the percentage of spots
of program p, institution u, at time t that is offered through the centralized system. The
treatment variable AAut also ranges from 0 to 1 and defines the percentage of vacancies
at institution u and time t reserved to AA policies. The variable acquires the value one
when a share of fifty percent of quotas are adopted, i.e., when the national law is completely
implemented. Both variables are demeaned. The inclusion of the interaction between both
policies captures the additional effect on the outcome observed when the policies are adopted
simultaneously. The vector Xput identifies program controls, which, in baseline, is only the
number of vacancies by degree. Finally, I include program fixed effects αpu (which also
absorb institution fixed effects, since every program defines major-institution combinations),
time-fixed effects αt and a local linear trend αm ∗ t, defined at the municipality level.20
The main identifying assumption for causal interpretation of parameters β1, β2 and β3
is that dynamics in the outcome variable for treated and control units are equivalent in
absence of the treatment. This is analogous to the parallel trends assumption required for
exogeneity in a differences-in-differences framework. In this setting, however, the model has
multiple periods, multiple treatment and control units and a continuous treatment variable.
Yet, the identification assumption is similar. In this type of specification, the presence of
program-institution fixed effects absorbs all unobservable time-invariant characteristics at
program or institution that might be correlated with the outcome. However, the existence
of time-varying unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the outcome could still
be a threat to causal identification.
Since the treatment variables are continuous, any binary definition of control and treat-
ment group would be arbitrary. Therefore, for illustrative purposes, I present in Table B.1
Panel A, regressions of the main outcomes and covariates used in the analysis in year 2010 on
the total treatment jump from 2010 to 2015. Although most of the coefficients are insignif-
icant, the point estimates suggest that there might exist some differences in levels between
treated and control groups in the baseline. These differences are somewhat expected. In 2010,
some institutions or programs had already adopted both of the policies and, therefore, are
20The subscript m is omitted in the other variables for the sake of simplicity.
14
Chapter 1. Affirmative Action, Centralized Admissions and Inequality in Access to Higher
Education: Evidence from Brazil
expected to have different characteristics if compared to the ones that had not yet adopted
them. This difference in levels does not invalidate the exogeneity assumption required to my
specification, as long as trends in the outcomes do not change differently between treated and
controls. As in a simple differences-in-differences framework, the parallel trends assumption
cannot be directly tested. Nevertheless, I run a placebo experiment to provide suggestive
evidence that, in pre-periods, this assumption is valid.
Table 1.4 shows results of this exercise for the main outcome variables analyzed in the
paper: proportion of public school students (PS), non-white public school students (PSNW),
low-income public school students (PSLI) and out-of-state students. As it is usual in the em-
pirical literature for fixed effects models (e.g. see Autor 2003), in addition to the treatment
variables SISUpu,t and AAu,t, I include the lead variables SISUpu,t+1 and AAu,t+1, which cap-
ture the existence of possible trends for the outcomes. Unlike the coefficients for SISUpu,t and
AAu,t, the coefficients for the lead variables are close to zero in magnitude and insignificant,
providing suggestive evidence that, despite differential levels, in absence of treatment, trends
in the outcome variables between treated and control units would likely have been parallel.
Additionally, Figure 1.3 presents evidence of an equivalent experiment using two pre-periods
instead of one. Results are analogous and confirm that treated and control units had similar
pre-trends for the outcomes also when one additional period is included in the placebo test.
These exercises show that institutions do not adopt SISU or AA as a response to changes
in the outcomes observed one or two years before the implementation of the policies. This
means that the adoption of both policies is orthogonal to previous changes in the observed
demographic characteristics of the student body. Unfortunately, due to the lack of additional
data besides the years 2010 to 2015, used for analysis, the inclusion of additional periods
could only occur at the expense of reducing the data sample for testing.21 Yet, the absence
of trends is confirmed by more flexible placebo tests, including either a state-linear trend or
no linear trend at the local level, as shown in Table B.2.
1.5 Main Results
1.5.1 Enrollments of Low-SES students
Table 1.5 presents the main results of this paper. The adoption of SISU crowds out students
from all vulnerable groups. A full adoption of SISU reduces the enrollments of PS, PSNW
21Note that for the placebo experiment with one lead variable, I use the data from period 2010 to 2014 to
test the treatment implementation from years 2011 to 2015. For the experiment with two lead variables, I
use data from 2010 to 2013 to test implementation from periods 2012 to 2015. Therefore, the lack of data
from periods before 2010 prevents the testing of parallel trends with multiple pre-periods.
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and PSLI by 3.8, 2.8 and 4.1 percentage points, respectively. This represents a decrease of 7,
12 and 59 percent for the average program, when compared to baseline shares. On the other
hand, the expansion of AA increases the enrollment of these categories of students. More
specifically, the full adoption of the national affirmative action policy (from zero to 50 percent
of quotas) increases participation of PS, PSNW and PSLI by 9.9 p.p., 7.0 p.p. and 2.4 p.p,
on average, an increase of 18, 29 and 34 percent, compared to baseline shares. The policies
act in opposite directions. While SISU hurts the most vulnerable groups, AA increases their
enrollments in the public higher education system. Interestingly, the full adoption of AA in
the average program more than compensates the crowding out generated by SISU for the PS
and PSNW groups. Yet, the effect of AA is comparatively lower for the PSLI. This possibly
reflects the lack of effectiveness of the current income criteria used in the national AA law.22
For example, 75 percent of the incoming students in federal institutions in 2012 belong to
families with per capita income that fit the AA law target of 1.5 minimum wages or less.
Therefore, it seems that this current income rule is excessively broad and does not benefit
the poorer individuals among the public school students.
Finally, since the policies act in opposite directions, it is unclear if and how the simul-
taneous adoption of both would impact enrollments. The inclusion of a term of interaction
between them in the main specification helps clarifying this question. According to Table
1.5, the simultaneous adoption of SISU and AA creates additional effects on enrollments that
helps the vulnerable groups. For instance, the effect of SISU on PS enrollment at the mean
level of adoption of AA is -3.75 p.p. At the full adoption of AA, it becomes approximately
zero.23 This means that, when AA is fully adopted, the interaction between the policies
creates an additional effect, which eliminates the negative impact of SISU on enrollments of
PS. Similarly, when SISU is fully adopted, the effect of AA becomes equal to approximately
14 p.p.24 Therefore, when SISU is fully adopted, the effect of AA is 40 percent higher than
when it is adopted at the mean.
1.5.2 Heterogeneity of Results
Table 1.5 presents the results on enrollments for the average program and university. Yet,
since programs and institutions can be very different regarding their initial characteristics,
results are expected to be highly heterogeneous. On Table 1.6 and Figures 1.4 and B.1, I
analyze how some of these effects change depending on the initial share of enrollments of
22Remember that I define PSLI as individuals that attended a public school and belong to a family of
total income of less than one minimum wage. In the AA allocation, the income criteria used is considerably
broader, encompassing individuals of family income of less than 1.5 minimum wages per capita.
23Here, the effect of SISU is equal to β1 + β3 (AA-A¯A)= -0.0375 + 0.0686 x (1-0.4).
24Here, the effect of AA is equal to β2 + β3 (SISU- ¯SISU)=0.0988 + 0.0686 x (1-0.4).
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PS in the baseline year. Programs with less public school students in 2010 tend to be more
competitive. Therefore, it is expected that AA affects their structure the most. Table 1.6
presents results for the baseline specification, with additional interactions of dummies for
each quartile of initial share of PS and variables SISU, AA and SISUxAA.
The effect of AA on enrollments of group PS decreases as the initial baseline share in-
creases. In the first quartile of PS participation at baseline year, the full adoption of AA
increases enrollments by 23 p.p., in the second by 11 p.p., in the third by 4 p.p. and in
the fourth it has a negative effect of 3 p.p. The adoption of SISU seems to have little effect
in the first quartile and effects in the order of negative 3, 7 and 6 percentage points in the
following quartiles. Finally, the effect of the interaction of the policies is positive, signifi-
cant and of relevant magnitude in all four quartiles. Although the effect of AA is highly
heterogeneous depending on the initial share of public school students, due to its mechanical
component, the effect of the interaction between both policies does not seem to be related to
this characteristic. Regardless the initial share of PS, the interaction of both policies creates
an additional positive effect on enrollments that is not related to the mechanical effect that
explains the heterogeneity observed for AA. A similar pattern is observed for the group of
PSNW.
In Figure 1.4, I plot results analogous to Table 1.6, but instead of obtaining coefficients
for different quartiles, I estimate coefficients for deciles of initial shares of PS enrollments
and plot them against the median share of PS participation in the corresponding decile.
The graph presents a pattern very similar to the one shown in Table 1.6. The effect of AA
on enrollments of PS decreases remarkably as the baseline share increases. The effect of
SISU also becomes more negative, while the impact of the interaction is relatively stable.
Figure B.1 plots the coefficient of AA on both enrollments of PS and PSNW. Both are highly
heterogeneous and decrease remarkably with the initial share of PS, although the coefficients
for PSNW are flatter and do not turn negative in the later deciles.
1.6 Potential Mechanisms
The main results presented in Section 5 raise a number of questions related to the mechanisms
behind them. Why centralizing admissions crowds out low-SES students from public higher
education? It is clear that the AA policy increases enrollments for benefited groups and that
this effect is highly heterogeneous depending on initial shares of enrollments of public school
students. However, is the effect of AA purely mechanical or is there evidence of any effect
on students’ behavior? The interaction between AA and SISU is highly positive, of relevant
magnitude and does not seem to be driven by the mechanical component of the effect of AA.
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Why the interaction between centralizing admissions and expanding AA creates an additional
enrollment-effect for vulnerable groups? Most of these questions cannot be answered with
precision with this data and a reduced-form approach, as effects possibly include changes
in application behavior and effort provision that induce general equilibrium and spillover
effects. Yet, I will try to provide some additional suggestive evidence on the mechanisms
behind them.
1.6.1 Why centralizing admissions crowds out low-SES students
from the public higher education?
Results from Table 1.5 present clear evidence that centralizing admissions crowds out the low-
SES students. This is not an obvious result. On the one hand, the reduction of application
costs and better access to information benefit low-SES students disproportionately (Bettinger
et al. 2012; Pallais 2015; Hoxby and Turner 2015). If this effect had prevailed, the adoption
of SISU would likely have increased enrollments of low-SES students. On the other hand,
theory predicts that centralization creates more competitive markets. This is confirmed in
Table 1.7, which shows that SISU remarkably increases the average number of applications.25
By lowering application costs and providing a nationwide online platform, SISU expands the
market of public higher education as a whole. In this line, Machado and Szerman (2018)
found that SISU improved the quality of matching between students and institutions, raising
the average grades of admitted students and enrollments of students from out of state. Similar
results are shown in Tables 1.7 and 1.8. A full adoption of SISU increases average grades
of enrollees by 0.3 standard deviations and raises the participation of out-of-state students
by 5 p.p. If this effect had prevailed, the implementation of SISU would likely have reduced
enrollments of low-SES students, who, on average, have lower average grades than their
high-SES counterparts.
In spite the sizeable displacement effects, the impact of SISU on enrollments of low-SES
students is not uniform across the distribution of programs. Table 1.9 shows that the full
adoption of SISU decreases enrollments of PS, PSNW and PSLI by 6.4, 5.2 and 7.9 p.p. in
programs in the lowest quartile of competitiveness. In contrast, SISU has no crowding out
effects in the top quartile. Meanwhile, SISU increases enrollments of out-of-state students in
all quartiles of competitiveness. The effect is higher in the top quartile: 7.2 p.p. compared
25The average number of applications is defined at the major level and comprises the total number of
applications from both SISU and the decentralized entrance mechanisms. In SISU, individuals can only apply
to two programs. Therefore, one could expect that centralization would reduce the number of applications.
Yet, SISU can increase the number of applications through two channels: increasing the number of applicants
and creating the possibility of one additional application in the same institution. Before centralization,
individuals could only choose one major in the same institution and, with SISU, they can now choose two.
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to 5 p.p. in the bottom one. Taken together, these results suggest that the creation of
a more efficient market alone is not sufficient to explain the heterogeneous pattern of the
crowding-out effect.
In Table 1.10, I explore this matter further. I estimate the model separately for out-
of-state private and public school students and find considerable differences. For the least
competitive degrees (Quartile 1), SISU increases enrollments of out-of-state private school
students by 6.6 p.p. and of out-of-state public school students by 4.3 p.p. This represents
an increase of 372 and 114 percent respectively, if compared to baseline shares. On the other
hand, for the most competitive degrees (Quartile 4), the effect is 7.5 p.p. and 6 p.p., an
increase of 78 and 214 percent, respectively. Therefore, in Quartile 1, SISU increases enroll-
ments of high-SES out-of-state students by 3.3 times more than of their low-SES counter-
parts. This is probably an important driver of the displacement effect observed. In contrast,
in Quartile 4, SISU increases enrollments of out-of-state public school students by 2.7 times
more than of the private school ones, with no overall effect on enrollments of low-SES stu-
dents. This suggests that these extra out-of-state public school students displace local public
school students with lower average grades.
This pattern is corroborated with results from Table 1.11. In Quartile 4, SISU increases
average grades of private school students by 0.15 standard deviations and of public school
students by 0.26. Meanwhile, it has no impact on the demographic composition of enrolled
students. Thus, for the most competitive degrees, SISU is able to attract better students in
general. Yet, it is able to attract even better low-SES students, increasing efficiency with
no cost for equity. In contrast, for the least competitive degrees, SISU displaces low-SES
students, increasing efficiency through enrollments of high-SES out-of-state students, but
decreasing equity in access.
In sum, the crowding out effect observed is due to the creation of a more efficient nation-
wide market combined with the existence of mobility constraints that affect low-SES students
only. For the most competitive and more prestigious degrees, SISU is able to attract better
students from out of state of different socioeconomic backgrounds. Due to the higher ex-
pected future returns of these programs, low-SES students are especially willing to endure
the mobility costs of attending college out of their home state. On the other hand, for the
least prestigious degrees, costs of mobility become higher than expected returns of attending
college out of state for the low-SES students only. Therefore, in this case, SISU attracts
out-of-state students that are disproportionately from a higher socioeconomic background,
crowding out the PS, PSNW and PSLI groups from public higher education.
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1.6.2 Is the effect of AA on enrollments purely mechanical or is
there evidence of any effect on students’ behavior?
From Table 1.5, we learned that the full adoption of AA increases the average enrollments
of PS students by 10 p.p. We have also learned that this effect is highly heterogeneous
regarding the initial share of PS students. For example, in programs in the first decile, the
median share of PS enrollment is 16 percent and the effect of AA is 28 p.p; while in the 8th
decile, the median share of PS enrollment is 77 percent and the effect of AA is zero. From
this, it is evident that the effect of AA has a large mechanical component. This means that,
by construction, AA will have an effect that is larger the lower the initial share of PS is.
However, it is still unclear if, in addition to the mechanical effect, there is also a behavioral
component.
The behavioral effect comes from the changes in the application behavior and the com-
position of applicants. The change in incentives caused by AA could impact not only the
number and the pool of applicants, but also their effort and their grades. Hence, the be-
havioral effect can be described as the impact of AA on enrollments after the policy had
been announced, but before the change in admission rules resorts applicants according to
their demographic group. The mechanical effect, on the other hand, is the result of the AA
policy implementation, had the applicants’ behavior stayed the same. Without individual
application data, it is not possible to precisely quantify these two different effects. Yet, with
my dataset, some indirect evidence can be drawn.
In Table 1.7, I investigate how AA impacts the average number of applications. This
effect is, a priori, unclear. Although the introduction of AA can encourage benefited groups
to apply, it can also discourage the groups that would not benefit from the policy. The
net effect could be positive, negative or zero. According to Table 1.7, results show that the
encouragement effect that AA exerts on the benefited groups more than outweigh possible
negative effects it would have on other categories. This result shows that the implementation
of AA impacts at least one dimension of behavior: the average number of applications.
Nothing can be said about the composition of applications with the current data, but it is
more likely that these additional applications come from the groups benefited from AA.26
Another question is whether changes in application behavior explain changes in the en-
rollment pattern. Results suggest that there is evidence of a behavioral effect of AA also
on enrollments, although it is not possible to quantify this effect. In programs with a PS
26There is also the possibility of re-sorting in the applications. For example, private school students could
not only apply less, but change their behavior and concentrate their applications in the least competitive
programs. However, I do not find any evidence in support of this claim. The effect of AA on the average
number of applications of the bottom quartile of competitiveness is zero. The positive effect found is stable
and concentrated in the top three quartiles only.
20
Chapter 1. Affirmative Action, Centralized Admissions and Inequality in Access to Higher
Education: Evidence from Brazil
share in baseline higher than 50 percent, had these shares remained constant in absence of
treatment, a pure mechanical effect would not explain positive results on PS enrollments. If
the announcement of AA had not impacted the composition and quality of applicants, AA
would have zero effect for programs with 50 percent of PS students already. Yet, results from
Figures 1.4 and B.1 and Table 1.6 show that this is not the case. For example, in the 5th,
6th and 7th deciles, the median share of PS students in the baseline is 51, 58 and 67 percent.
Yet, a full introduction of AA still has a relevant positive effect of 9, 6 and 3 p.p. This can be
due to behavioral changes such as more and better-targeted applications from PS students
or an increase in effort provision from this group.
Finally, I investigate if there is evidence of any behavioral effect induced by AA on average
enrollees’ grades. Column 3 of Table 1.8 shows that the full adoption of AA decreases average
grades of incoming students by 0.05 standard deviations. Yet, by including, as controls,
dummies for PS, NW and LI, this effect vanishes. This suggests that the negative effect on
enrollees’ grades induced by the adoption of AA can be fully explained by the changes in
composition. This result masks important between group heterogeneity. In Column 5, we
see that the adoption of AA increases the average grades of private school students by 0.13
s.d., while it decreases average grades of public school students by 0.1 s.d. This is consistent
with the fact the AA decreases enrollments of private school students - only the best ones
of the group end up being accepted - and increases enrollments of public school students. In
practice, this means that AA increases the variance of grades of the incoming cohort. While
behavioral effects on grades induced by changes in effort and incentives are likely, this cannot
be confirmed with the current dataset and empirical strategy.
1.6.3 Why does the interaction between SISU and AA creates an
additional enrollment-effect for vulnerable groups?
According to Table 1.5, the simultaneous adoption of SISU and AA creates an additional
effect on enrollments of PS, PSNW and PSLI students. For example, the full adoption of
SISU reduces enrollments of PS students by 4 p.p., when AA is adopted at the mean. In
contrast, its effect is negative 6.5 p.p., when AA is not adopted, and zero when AA is adopted
at its maximum. Alternatively, while the full adoption of AA increases enrollments of PS
by 10 p.p. at the mean of SISU, it increases enrollments by 14 p.p., when SISU is adopted
fully, and by 7 p.p., when SISU is not adopted. According to Tables 1.7 and 1.8, there is no
evidence that the interaction of the policies increase the average number of applications, the
enrollment of out-of-state students or average grades.
Table 1.9 shows how the interaction effect changes across the distribution of program-
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competitiveness. In the least competitive programs (Quartile 1), the interaction is not statis-
tically different from zero. In the top three quartiles, the interaction is higher in magnitude
and significant. In Quartiles 2 and 3, SISU reduces enrollments of public school students by
5 and 3 p.p. at the mean of AA, while it has zero and a small positive effect (1.4 p.p.) when
AA is adopted fully. From another angle, AA has a positive effect of 3 and 10 p.p. at the
mean adoption of SISU. This effect reaches 8 and 14 p.p. if SISU is adopted fully. Finally,
in the most competitive programs (Quartile 4), SISU has no crowding-out effect at the mean
of AA, but increases enrollments of public school students by 4 p.p. at the maximum of AA.
Meanwhile, AA has an effect of 23 p.p. at the mean of SISU and of 27 p.p. at its maximum.
What are the potential explanations behind this positive complementary effect between
both policies? First, the adoption of SISU creates a national competitive market, displacing
local public school students in the bottom three quartiles of competitiveness, as described
earlier. Then, when AA is adopted at its maximum, it is able to further avoid that out-of-
state students with better grades take additional vacancies from local public school students.
AA creates, thus, an extra protection channel. This extra protection, for instance, reduces
enrollments of out-of-state private school students in Quartile 4, as shown in Table 1.10
(interaction effect of negative 4.5 p.p.). Second, the adoption of SISU centralizes application
data in a unique online easily accessible platform, creating the possibility of an information
channel. On average, low-SES students have worse information regarding their own ability
and the application procedure (Hoxby and Turner, 2015). Thus, the adoption of SISU, which
provides better information on programs, institutions and their cutoff scores, is likely to
benefit low-SES students the most. They can, then, better adapt their choices of major and
institutions, targeting their applications according to program cutoffs. By applying more
effectively, students that benefit from AA have an additional channel for increasing their
enrollment. Further research needs to clarify the importance of each of these channels in
explaining the results.
1.7 Robustness of Results and Extensions
1.7.1 Spillovers
The existence of multiple institutions and programs being treated simultaneously creates the
possibility of spillover effects that might bias the baseline results. Spillovers occur when the
outcomes of a certain unit of treatment are influenced not only by the changes observed in
that specific unit, but also by changes in treatment of other units. This would be a violation
of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires that the potential
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outcome of one unit is unaffected by the particular assignment of treatment on other units. In
the case of large reforms, such as the ones analyzed in this paper, the potential for spillovers
occur in different dimensions. For example, factors such as location, type of major and quality
of institution might be crucial in order to understand how treatment in one unit spills over
to the others. In this section, I investigate the possibility of existence of local spillovers and
spillovers across similar programs and institutions.
Since around 90 percent of students that attend public higher education in Brazil do it
within-state, location is one of the most important determinants of college choice. First, I
define a measure of treatment exposure at the municipality level. The idea is that treatment
units are more likely to be impacted by changes in other units in the same municipality than
by variations in institutions or programs outside of its locality. The constructed measures
are defined as:
SpilloverSISUput =
V acanciesSISUmt − V acanciesSISUput
TotalV acanciesmt − TotalV acanciesput
and
SpilloverAAut =
V acanciesAAmt − V acanciesAAut
TotalV acanciesmt − TotalV acanciesut ,
where m is the subscript for municipality.
Then, I run the baseline specification with these two additional measures of exposure.
Table 1.12 shows that there are sizable local spillovers for AA. A full adoption of the AA
policy by other schools in the same municipality of institution u decreases enrollments of PS
and PSNW and PSLI at such institution by 6 and 3 p.p., respectively. This means that, when
controlling by these negative spillovers, the estimates for the impact of AA on institution u
itself are higher than in the baseline specification. The impact of a full adoption of AA at
institution u increases from 9.9 to 13.0 for PS and from 7.0 to 8.7 for PSNW in comparison
to the specification without the spillover exposure measure. Therefore, the baseline estimates
for the AA policy may be downward biased and the estimates found in this section could be
seen as an upper bound. In addition, in Table 1.7, we observed that AA did not have any
impact on the share of students enrolled from out of state. Together, these results suggest
that AA impacts enrollments within local educational markets mostly.
On the other hand, Table 1.12 shows no evidence of local spillovers for SISU, while Table
1.7 shows that SISU has a large effect on enrollments of students from out of state. Hence, in
the case of SISU, treatment seems to be affecting individuals from outside the locality. If, in
absence of treatment, the affected individuals would have attended a public institution within
their state or municipality, this would consist of a violation of the STUVA. Although the size
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of the bias introduced in this case should not be large, since 90 percent of individuals attend
public university within-state, the analysis of other dimensions of spillovers is important to
rule out this possibility.
Therefore, I define a measure of spillover by field (or area of major) and by the level of
competitiveness of the degree. I split programs in sixteen groups g, which define combinations
between four different fields27 and four different levels of competitiveness. The rationale is
that treatment units are likely to be more impacted by programs within a similar field of
knowledge and a similar level of prestige. The measures of exposure are defined analogously to
the ones for local spillovers, just substituting the index m by the index g. Table 1.12 shows
that the adoption of SISU by similar programs decrease enrollments of low-SES students
at program p, while the adoption of AA at similar institutions increases enrollments at
university u. In spite the relevancy of the spillover measures, the inclusion of these variables
do not change the treatment effects of AA and SISU, nor the interaction. These results
remain robust for additional measures of spillovers considered (Table B.3): local spillovers
at the state level, spillovers across similar majors only and spillovers across similar majors
and across institutions of a similar quality. The only variable that changes the magnitude
of the baseline estimates of the treatment effects are the local spillovers measured at the
municipality level for AA, minimizing our concerns regarding the violation of the STUVA.
1.7.2 Dynamics
In this section, I investigate the existence of dynamic effects in the estimates. SISU was
adopted progressively and the size of the centralized system increased substantially from
2010 to 2015. Therefore, effects in the transition from a partially centralized system to a
fully centralized system might change as individuals adjust to the expanding new mechanism
of admissions. If low-SES students take longer to adapt and learn about SISU, its negative
effect on their enrollments could fade with time. This is not what we observe in Table 1.13.
Interestingly, the crowding-out effect generated by SISU is negative and relatively stable in
all years. If anything, the negative effect of SISU on enrollments of low-SES students is more
pronounced in 2014 and 2015 than in earlier years. This suggests that these negative effects
are persistent and do not vanish naturally as individuals learn about the centralized system.
In contrast, the AA expansion occurred abruptly in 2013, with the introduction of the
national AA law. In period 2010-2012, the expansion was restricted to minor changes in
specific institutions. The national expansion of AA in 2013 was highly advertised and debated
by the media, the politicians and the civil society. Therefore, it is not surprising that the effect
27i) Education; (ii) Humanities and Social Sciences; (iii) Sciences, Mathematics, Engineering and Computer
Science; and (iv) Health, Biology, Veterinary and Agriculture.
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of AA on enrollments of PS, PSNW and PSLI is higher in 2013-2015 than in period 2010-
2012. Finally, we observe that the interaction between both policies is small and insignificant
in period 2010-2012, while it is large and positive in period 2013-2015. Taken together,
these findings suggest that the joint expansion of AA and SISU during period 2013-2015 was
especially important for the sake of equality in access to higher education. It is likely that
the adoption of the national AA law was determinant to bring low-SES students to the SISU
system. Once in the system, these individuals benefit from the newly available information.
Thus, the interaction between both policies improves access of low-SES groups remarkably
in period 2013-2015.
1.7.3 Sample Selection
One of the most problematic internal validity issues of my empirical strategy concerns the
selection of outcomes, as I do not have data on PS, PSNW and PSLI status for all the
incoming students. This is so for two reasons. First, not all students take the ENEM exam
in the year before admission. The share of admitted students found in the ENEM data
increased from 65 percent in 2010 to 89 percent in 2015. Second, demographic characteristics
of students are reported with a considerable number of missing values in years 2010 to 2012
for the CES data.28 Information on PS status and ethnicity comes primarily from the ENEM
dataset. When unavailable, they are complemented with the CES dataset. Information on
low-income status is available in the ENEM data only.
First, I study whether the probability for the information to be missing is systematically
correlated with treatment status. I estimate the main empirical model using, as the dependent
variable, indicators that take the value 1 if information on these characteristics is available
for individual i. A full adoption of SISU is correlated with an increase in the availability
of information of the magnitude of 6 p.p. for PS and PSNW status, and of 10 p.p. for
PSLI (Table 1.14). This is expected, since individuals are required to take the ENEM exam
for applying to a SISU adopter-institution. As for AA, the relationship between treatment
adoption and sample participation is weaker, if any at all.
Having established that the selection of the outcomes is not random with respect to
treatment status, especially in case of SISU, I try to investigate whether this issue is biasing
my results. Using data from baseline year, I compute the share of missing values of each
outcome by program. Then, I create two restricted subsamples with programs in the bottom
of the missing variables’ distribution for each outcome. Sample 1 includes only programs in
28Some institutions failed to report these characteristics for the whole student body in these years. From
year 2013 on, INEP increased efforts to check the quality of the data and reports from institutions increased
substantially.
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the bottom one half of the missing values’ shares. The median program of this sample has
missing values for 6, 8 and 14 percent of individuals enrolled in 2010 for the outcomes of PS,
PSNW and PSLI respectively. Sample 2 includes programs in the bottom quartile and its
median program has zero, 4 and 9 percent of missing values for the analyzed characteristics
in the baseline year.
Then, I estimate the main empirical model in the restricted samples (Table 1.14). Pre-
sumably, in the samples with higher availability of information since the baseline year, the
selection of outcomes will have little impact on the results. Estimates from Sample 1 are very
similar to the ones in the full sample. Results from Sample 2, in contrast, are of a slightly
smaller magnitude for the AA treatment and of similar magnitude for the SISU treatment.
This suggests that the selection problem may be biasing my estimates upwardly. However,
this bias does not seem to be substantial. Therefore, results in Sample 2 could be interpreted
as a lower bound for my estimates of the effect of the policies.29
1.7.4 Additional Specifications
In order to check whether the results are robust, I run the analysis using different sample
selections. First, I run the complete set of results restricting the sample for federal and
state universities only. These institutions are relatively more comparable in terms of number
of students, types and number of degrees offered, structure and quality. Moreover, state
universities were not subject to the AA Expansion Law, which creates a comparison treatment
group of relatively the same size as the control group. Results are very similar when compared
to the whole sample. Second, I run results restricting the sample for federal institutions only
and then for federal universities only. This sample cut is also justifiable, since only federal
institutions are required to adopt the AA law. Again, results remain stable for different
outcomes and specifications. These are shown in Table B.4.
Additionally, using my main sample of analysis, I run additional robustness tests, by
deleting from the sample students that were not enrolled in the program by the end of the
academic year (first-year dropouts) and by deleting students enrolled in programs with less
than ten incoming students. Again, results remain stable for all outcomes and specifications.
This means that the estimates are not driven by short-term effects of temporary movers
nor from big shifts in small programs. I also run my results using only years 2011-2015, to
minimize concerns regarding the high number of missing values in year 2010. These results
are shown in Table B.5.
29This is a temporary work-around. For the outcomes of PS and PSNW status, I will be able to obtain
the information for the current missing values in my sample by linking my dataset with students records in
high school, in future visits to INEP. Furthermore, I will investigate this issue further for the PSLI as well.
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Moreover, I run a whole set of results by the program level. This means that instead
of considering the outcome at the individual level and clustering standard errors at the
institutional-level, I use the average outcome at the program-level instead. With the program-
level regressions, I obtain results using different program weights - unweighted, weighted by
incoming students and weighted by log of incoming students (Table B.6). Additionally, I
obtain results at the program level using different types of fixed effects and trends: state,
municipality and institution linear trend and municipality-time fixed effects. Results are
fairly stable and become even more precise in this last specification, as shown in Table B.7.
Finally, I run my analysis by institutional level, instead of program level (Table B.8).
This means that I include my SISU treatment at institutional level and add institutional
fixed effects, instead of program-institution fixed effects. Results are also stable to this
analysis that explores only the more aggregate form of variation in the sample.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyzed how the adoption of SISU - a nationwide online platform that
centralized admissions - and of AA - a policy that expanded affirmative action quotas to
a uniform share of fifty percent in every major - impacted the demographic composition
of Brazilian elite higher education institutions. I rely on cross-sectional and time variation
in the implementation of such interventions to identify their causal effects. To confirm the
exogeneity of my empirical strategy, I first show that pre-trends in the outcome variables are
parallel between treated and control units, indicating that the adoption of the policies was
not driven by changes observed in the student body in previous years.
There are some very special features in the context analyzed in my paper. First, I study
a nationwide affirmative action initiative, implemented at elite higher education institutions,
in a country with one of the highest levels of social and racial inequality in the world. Second,
the adoption of SISU is a unique opportunity to investigate empirically the impact of a large
reduction in different types of application barriers: financial, effort-related and information
costs. Third, AA was adopted simultaneously with the expansion of SISU, allowing the
investigation of the existence of complementarities between them. I find that SISU and AA
act in opposite directions. While SISU crowds out students from public schools (PS), non-
white from public schools (PSNW) and low-income from public schools (PSLI), AA increases
their enrollments. Moreover, the interaction of both policies creates an additional effect that
boosts enrollments of the benefited groups. Then, I show some possible mechanisms that
explain the observed results.
Adoption of SISU increases the number of applications, average grades of admitted stu-
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dents and enrollments of students from out of state. Therefore, centralization creates a more
efficient market, as it was previously shown by Machado and Szerman (2018). However, this
hurts low-SES students financially constrained to move outside of their state. Moreover, stu-
dents from a lower socioeconomic background are crowded out from degrees in the bottom
half of the competitiveness distribution only. This suggests that mobility constraints are an
obstacle for low-SES students accepted in programs with lower expected returns. Therefore,
increasing governmental student assistance to reduce these financial constraints emerges as
an important policy recommendation.
The adoption of AA, on the other hand, improves enrollments of PS, PSNW and PSLI.
Although a large portion of this effect is mechanical and comes from programs that initially
have shares of PS students lower than fifty percent - the minimum guaranteed by the AA
law -, there is reliable evidence suggesting the existence of behavioral effects. First, AA
increases the average number of applications. Second, enrollments increase even in programs
with initial shares of PS as high as 67 percent. In such programs, AA is only expected
to have an effect if it induces better applications of the targeted groups. Taken together,
these results suggest that AA has an important role in improving access to public higher
education. However, part of its effect could possibly be achieved by policies that enhance
low-SES students’ effort, confidence and beliefs, avoiding, thus, the stigma associated with
AA.
I also find that the AA income criteria is too broad to encompass the poorer individ-
uals among the public school students. Thus, the AA rules could target the lower-income
individuals more specifically in order to increase their enrollments. Moreover, I show that
AA increases the variance of grades of the incoming cohort. This has important policy im-
plications. Higher inequality in the distribution of ability of the student body might have
different implications for the learning environment, affecting the quality of teaching, inter-
actions, peer effects, grading and, finally, dropouts, achievement and graduation. This is an
important avenue for future research.
Finally, I discuss some potential mechanisms behind the positive effects found in the
interaction between AA and SISU. Results show that the crowding out effect generated
by SISU is persistent across all years, not fading away with time as individuals gradually
adapt to the changes of the introduction of the new centralized system. In contrast, the
introduction of the national AA policy in 2013 increases the magnitude of the AA effect and
establishes the existence of a complementarity effect between both policies. Thus, AA seems
to bring disadvantaged individuals to SISU, possibly by changing their beliefs regarding their
suitability for higher education. Once in the SISU system, low-SES students likely gain the
most from the availability of better information, as the centralized online platform provides
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easily accessible data on vacancies, programs, institutions and cutoffs. The second possible
channel behind the interaction effect is more straight-forward. The simultaneous adoption of
AA and SISU creates an additional form of protection, increasing the percentage of vacancies
that are not available for the crowding out.
In conclusion, the policies acted in opposite directions. While SISU improved efficiency
in detriment of equity, AA improved equity in detriment of efficiency. Therefore, the simul-
taneous adoption of these two interventions was particularly important to the achievement
of both objectives. Furthermore, the simultaneous adoption of them created synergies that
were particularly beneficial to lower-income students.
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1.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Evolution of Number of ENEM Test Takers
Notes: the number of ENEM test-takers increases from 157.221 in 1998 to 8.7 million students in 2015. In
2004, the exam became mandatory for the application to PROUNI, a government scholarship. In 2010, it
becomes a pre-requisite for the SISU application. Source: Machado and Szerman (2018).
Figure 1.2: Example of application of the AA law in the state of Bahia.
Notes: From every 100 vacancies offered by each major in a federal institution, 50 are reserved to students
that attended all three years of secondary education in a public school, while the other 50 are open for
regular competitive entrance. From the vacancies reserved to public school students, half are also reserved to
individuals from families of per capita income of less than 1.5 minimum wage. Finally, the State of Bahia has
77 percent of non-white individuals according to the Census of 2010. Therefore, 77 percent of the reserved
vacancies has to be destined to the non-white. Source: own elaboration based on Law 12.711/2012.
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Figure 1.3: Placebo Tests including 2 pre-periods
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Notes: In this figure, I use the dataset from years 2010 to 2013 to test trends of two pre-periods for my
main outcomes of interest: enrollments of public school, non-white public school, low-income public school
and out-of-state students. In the graphs, I plot the estimated coefficients of SISUpu,t and AAu,t, in time
0, and coefficients of the additional terms SISUpu,t+1, SISUput+2, AAu,t+1 and AAu,t+2, in times -1 and
-2, respectively. Note that I use data from 2010 to 2013 to test whether the adoption of SISU and AA
in periods 2012 to 2015 were correlated to changes in the outcomes observed one and two periods before
implementation. The lack of data from years before 2010 prevents me from extending the analysis to further
pre-periods. The estimation included time and program-institution fixed effects, a municipality linear trend
and a control for the number of vacancies by program. Standard-errors are clustered at the institutional level
and 95 confidence intervals are represented with dashed lines.
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Figure 1.4: Heterogeneity of Effect by Baseline Share of PS Enrollment
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Notes: In this Figure, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of AA, SISU and AAxSISU on enrollments
of public school students (PS), estimated by decile of the initial share of PS matriculation in baseline. Using
my main specification, I interacted dummies for each decile of PS in baseline with the treatment variables
SISUput, AAut - both demeaned -, and their interaction. The estimation included time and program-
institution fixed effects, a municipality linear trend and a control for the number of vacancies by program.
Standard-errors are clustered at the institutional level and 95 confidence intervals are represented with dashed
lines.
Table 1.1: Expansion of SISU in Brazilian Undergraduate Education
Public Institutions Federal Institutions Only
Institutions % Vacancies % Programs Institutions % Vacancies % Programs
2010 55 17.15 21.06 52 24.57 31.10
2011 73 27.57 37.06 68 37.93 51.68
2012 82 32.88 42.88 75 44.49 57.05
2013 88 40.54 50.35 77 50.25 63.27
2014 102 51.78 62.90 89 66.37 78.03
2015 108 58.95 72.24 92 72.54 86.28
Notes: This table shows the gradual adoption of SISU by Brazilian public institutions. In 2010, there are
131 public institutions, including both federal and state-owned. Out of these, 108 adopt SISU by 2015.
Considering the federal institutions only, there are 94 in 2010, out of which 92 adopt SISU by 2015.
Source: SISU and Higher Education Census Datasets (2010-2015).
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Table 1.2: Expansion of Affirmative Action in Brazilian Undergraduate Institutions
Public Institutions Federal Institutions Only
Institutions %Total %Ethnic %Non-ethnic Inst. %Total %Ethnic %Non-ethnic
2010 69 19.93 8.46 10.87 42 17.73 7.53 9.74
2011 80 22.68 8.77 13.17 52 21.25 7.75 12.87
2012 82 24.54 9.20 14.60 54 23.43 8.44 14.33
2013 123 32.78 17.92 14.23 94 35.23 20.56 14.13
2014 124 38.95 20.83 17.36 94 42.34 24.52 17.18
2015 126 43.50 23.50 19.19 94 47.72 27.72 19.25
Notes: This table shows the gradual adoption of AA by Brazilian public institutions. In 2010, there are 131
public institutions, including both federal and state-owned. Out of these, 126 adopt AA by 2015. Considering
the federal institutions only, there are 94 in 2010, all of which adopt AA by 2013, as required by federal law.
Column %Total refers to the total percentage of vacancies reserved to AA quotas. Column %Ethnic refers
to vacancies reserved to non-white and %Non-ethnic to vacancies reserved to public school students of every
ethnicity.
Source: Documents of College Admission and Higher Education Census (2010-2015).
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Incoming Students in Public Higher Education Institutions
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Public School 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.58
(0.499) (0.498) (0.496) (0.494) (0.490) (0.483) (0.494)
% Non-missing 69.8 88.3 89.3 97.1 96.8 97.4
Non-white PS 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.30
(0.426) (0.442) (0.452) (0.461) (0.474) (0.480) (0.460)
% Non-missing 74.1 87.9 88.5 94.0 95.8 97.1
Low-Income PS 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.12
(0.255) (0.321) (0.304) (0.340) (0.354) (0.363) (0.330)
% Non-missing 63.5 83.3 84.2 90.4 92.1 93.1
Out-of-State 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.301) (0.289) (0.293) (0.295) (0.298) (0.303) (0.297)
% Non-missing 73.1 79.3 80.2 85.4 88.9 90.9
Grades 1.13 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.29 1.29 1.21
(0.930) (0.879) (0.891) (0.948) (1.013) (0.961) (0.943)
% Non-missing 65.1 76.5 78.3 83.5 87.2 89.2
N Applications 9.23 13.25 16.07 17.63 19.87 19.77 16.09
(12.40) (16.74) (25.32) (22.25) (23.65) (22.76) (21.46)
Spots 91.53 97.87 95.36 98.52 95.60 92.93 95.31
(121.53) (139.86) (128.37) (132.35) (120.75) (115.40) (126.60)
Observations 362634 370123 392865 383410 381464 391582 2282078
Notes: Values correspond to the mean. Standard deviations in parenthesis. PS stands for students that
attended high school in a public institution, Low-Income for individuals from families of total income up to
1 minimum wage and Out-of-State for students that moved states to attend college. Grades is the average
of the student standardized grade at the ENEM exam, N Applications is the average number of applications
per program and Spots is the average number of vacancies per program. Observations are the total number
of first-year students in my main sample of analysis.
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Table 1.4: Placebo Experiment with Lead Variables
PS PS-NW PS-LI Out-of-State
SISUpu,t -0.0406*** -0.0304*** -0.0383*** 0.0554***
(0.0113) (0.0105) (0.00782) (0.00717)
SISUpu,t+1 -0.00142 -0.00394 -0.00602 -0.00341
(0.00916) (0.00686) (0.00619) (0.00889)
AAu,t 0.0944*** 0.0777*** 0.0293*** -0.00466
(0.0165) (0.0164) (0.00740) (0.00825)
AAu,t+1 0.0132 -0.0105 -0.00847 -0.00846
(0.0106) (0.00955) (0.00520) (0.00982)
SISUpu,t x AAu,t 0.0615*** 0.0408* 0.0155 -0.0142
(0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0123) (0.0109)
N 1585361 1580230 1494373 1473111
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. PS refers to students that attended high
school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income and Out-of-State to students that used
to live in a different state before enrolling in college. Treatment variables are demeaned. Results include
controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear
trend.
Table 1.5: Effect of SISU and AA on Enrollments of Low-SES Students
PS PS PS-NW PS-NW PS-LI PS-LI
SISUput -0.0421*** -0.0375*** -0.0319*** -0.0284*** -0.0427*** -0.0413***
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.00865) (0.00903) (0.00646) (0.00662)
AAut 0.115*** 0.0988*** 0.0806*** 0.0695*** 0.0287*** 0.0240***
(0.0170) (0.0151) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.00639) (0.00601)
SISUput x AAut 0.0686*** 0.0493*** 0.0193*
(0.0198) (0.0176) (0.0101)
Mean in baseline 0.54 0.54 0.24 0.24 0.07 0.07
N 2021455 2021455 2014838 2014838 1905968 1905968
R2-within 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. PS refers to students that attended
high school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income. Treatment variables are demeaned.
Results include controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a
municipality linear trend.
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Table 1.6: Effect of AA and SISU on Enrollments by Quartile of Baseline Share of Public-
School Enrollment in Baseline
PS PSNW
Quart 1 x SISUput -0.000926 -0.0101
(0.0129) (0.0120)
Quart 2 x SISUput -0.0327*** -0.0311***
(0.0119) (0.0116)
Quart 3 x SISUput -0.0744*** -0.0520***
(0.0139) (0.0131)
Quart 4 x SISUput -0.0653*** -0.0323***
(0.0130) (0.0109)
Quart 1 x AAut 0.234*** 0.132***
(0.0185) (0.0158)
Quart 2 x AAut 0.111*** 0.0814***
(0.0155) (0.0140)
Quart 3 x AAut 0.0384*** 0.0433***
(0.0137) (0.0156)
Quart 4 x AAut -0.0309*** 0.0121
(0.0115) (0.0167)
Quart 1 x SISUput x AAut 0.0545** 0.0598***
(0.0256) (0.0224)
Quart 2 x SISUput x AAut 0.0751*** 0.0451**
(0.0217) (0.0205)
Quart 3 x SISUput x AAut 0.102*** 0.0575**
(0.0271) (0.0240)
Quart 4 x SISUput x AAut 0.0844*** 0.0483**
(0.0225) (0.0243)
N 1703287 1701226
R2-within 0.012 0.011
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. PS refers to students that attended
high school in a public institution and PSNW to non-white public school students. Treatment variables
are demeaned and interacted with dummy variables for each quartile of public-school enrollment shares in
baseline. Quart 1 stands for the lowest baseline participation of PS. Controls for time and program-institution
fixed effects, program number of spots and municipality linear trend.
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Table 1.7: Effect on the Number of Applications and Enrollments of Out-of-State Students
Log. Number of Applications Out-of-State Students
SISUput 1.053*** 1.046*** 0.0548*** 0.0539***
(0.118) (0.119) (0.00710) (0.00666)
AAut 0.415*** 0.431*** -0.0130** -0.0104
(0.130) (0.133) (0.00602) (0.00659)
SISUput x AAut -0.0771 -0.0105
(0.162) (0.0101)
Mean in baseline 9.23 9.23 0.10 0.10
N 2229570 2229570 1873289 1873289
R2-within 0.359 0.359 0.004 0.004
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. Out-
of-state refers to students that moved out of state to attend college. The number of applications is averaged
by the number of vacancies. Results on number of applications are at the program level weighted by number
of students. Results include controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots
and a municipality linear trend.
Table 1.8: Effect of AA and SISU on Average Grades of Incoming Students
SISUput 0.324*** 0.292*** 0.320*** 0.291*** 0.262***
(0.0314) (0.0276) (0.0311) (0.0274) (0.0293)
AAut -0.0630*** -0.00729 -0.0526** -0.00387 0.129***
(0.0236) (0.0217) (0.0249) (0.0232) (0.0247)
SISUput x AAut -0.0415 -0.0136 -0.0172
(0.0367) (0.0334) (0.0396)
SISUput x PS 0.0453**
(0.0176)
AAut x PS -0.229***
(0.0208)
SISUput x AAut x PS -0.00509
(0.0393)
Mean in baseline 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13
N 1807688 1753605 1807688 1753605 1753605
Controls for PS, NW, LI Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. PS,
NW and LI refer to dummies that control for whether the individual comes from a public school, a non-white
background and a low-income family. Grades is a composite measure of the different multiple-choice sections
of the ENEM exam. Results are robust when grades include the essay component of the exam. Results
include controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality
linear trend.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneity of Effect on Enrollment of Out-of-State Students by Quartile of
Competitiveness of Degree and by Type of High School
Quart 1 Quart 2 Quart 3 Quart 4 All
Private School Students
SISUput 0.0662*** 0.0503*** 0.0457*** 0.0747*** 0.0630***
(0.0101) (0.00946) (0.00931) (0.0141) (0.00842)
AAut -0.0201 -0.0164 -0.0127 -0.000234 -0.0125
(0.0131) (0.0110) (0.0102) (0.0138) (0.00961)
SISUput x AAut -0.00609 -0.0175 -0.0134 -0.0451** -0.0230
(0.0149) (0.0168) (0.0131) (0.0226) (0.0143)
Mean in Baseline 0.018 0.046 0.072 0.096 0.062
Growth 372% 109% 63% 78% 101%
N 64106 135866 195759 283840 772971
Public School Students
SISUput 0.0426*** 0.0403*** 0.0361*** 0.0598*** 0.0435***
(0.00759) (0.00723) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.00595)
AAut -0.0116 0.00115 -0.00400 0.00205 -0.00350
(0.00784) (0.00620) (0.0101) (0.0166) (0.00541)
SISUput x AAut 0.00696 0.00744 -0.00329 -0.00155 0.00380
(0.00952) (0.0112) (0.0143) (0.0229) (0.00815)
Mean in Baseline 0.037 0.044 0.046 0.028 0.039
Growth 114% 91% 79% 214% 112%
N 257863 250234 204782 163385 1062281
Notes: In the first panel, results are estimated only for students that attended high school in a private
institution, while in the second only for students that attended a public high school. Standard errors in
parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. Controls for time and program-
institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear trend. Quart 1 stands for the
least competitive quartile, while Quart 4 for the most competitive one. Competition is measured in average
grades of incoming students in the baseline. Results are robust when competition is measured as the average
number of applications in baseline. Growth is computed relative to the baseline share, after adding the
respective point estimate.
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Table 1.12: Spillover of Treatment Effects on Public Higher Education Market
Public School Public School Non-white
SISUput -0.0375*** -0.0315*** -0.0294*** -0.0284*** -0.0244*** -0.0234**
(0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.00903) (0.00909) (0.00904)
AAut 0.0988*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.0695*** 0.0873*** 0.0865***
(0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0128)
SISUput x AAut 0.0686*** 0.0678*** 0.0650*** 0.0493*** 0.0484*** 0.0474***
(0.0198) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0174)
Spillover SISUput
Municipality -0.0151 -0.0171 -0.0113 -0.0123
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Field-Competition Level -0.128*** -0.0711***
(0.0193) (0.0144)
Spillover AAut
Municipality -0.0610*** -0.0609*** -0.0317** -0.0314**
(0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0129)
Field-Competition Level 0.127*** 0.0207
(0.0255) (0.0218)
N 2021455 1991984 1991679 2014838 1985963 1985662
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned.
Results include controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a
municipality linear trend. Spillovers are defined at two levels: municipality and across similar major fields
and competitiveness level of program.
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Table 1.13: Yearly Effects
PS PSNW PSLI Out-of-State
2010xSISUput -0.0528*** -0.0183 -0.0391*** 0.0794***
(0.0127) (0.0113) (0.00925) (0.0121)
2011xSISUput -0.0549*** -0.0348*** -0.0509*** 0.0567***
(0.0122) (0.0103) (0.00720) (0.00800)
2012xSISUput -0.0417*** -0.0287** -0.0431*** 0.0471***
(0.0135) (0.0116) (0.00869) (0.00799)
2013xSISUput -0.0325*** -0.0273*** -0.0332*** 0.0513***
(0.0113) (0.00973) (0.00629) (0.00932)
2014xSISUput -0.0560*** -0.0432*** -0.0453*** 0.0517***
(0.0137) (0.0109) (0.00784) (0.00693)
2015xSISUput -0.0647*** -0.0607*** -0.0520*** 0.0576***
(0.0220) (0.0153) (0.0103) (0.0176)
2010xAAut 0.0870*** 0.0506** 0.0128 -0.00804
(0.0213) (0.0229) (0.00824) (0.00968)
2011xAAut 0.0943*** 0.0580*** 0.0242*** -0.00642
(0.0161) (0.0151) (0.00707) (0.00717)
2012xAAut 0.0879*** 0.0639*** 0.0207*** -0.0104
(0.0151) (0.0139) (0.00679) (0.00652)
2013xAAut 0.118*** 0.0970*** 0.0335*** -0.0108
(0.0184) (0.0141) (0.00691) (0.00802)
2014xAAut 0.137*** 0.112*** 0.0404*** -0.0186*
(0.0232) (0.0158) (0.00845) (0.0102)
2015xAAut 0.137*** 0.130*** 0.0456*** -0.0259
(0.0352) (0.0240) (0.0117) (0.0199)
2010xSISUputxAAut 0.0127 0.0293 0.0223 -0.0283
(0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0152) (0.0198)
2011xSISUputxAAut 0.0194 0.0235 -0.00398 0.00638
(0.0242) (0.0199) (0.0124) (0.0125)
2012xSISUputxAAut 0.0465* 0.0313 0.00813 0.00397
(0.0251) (0.0232) (0.0131) (0.0102)
2013xSISUputxAAut 0.0810*** 0.0648*** 0.0235* -0.000429
(0.0293) (0.0212) (0.0130) (0.0206)
2014xSISUputxAAut 0.152*** 0.0932*** 0.0136 -0.00762
(0.0412) (0.0292) (0.0185) (0.0179)
2015xSISUputxAAut 0.165** 0.136*** 0.0550* -0.0228
(0.0641) (0.0432) (0.0284) (0.0461)
N 2021455 2014838 1905968 1873289
R2-within 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.004
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. PS refers to students that attended high
school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income and Out-of-State to students that used
to live in a different state before enrolling in college. Treatment variables are demeaned. Results include
controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear
trend.
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Appendix
1.A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Heterogeneity of AA Treatment by Baseline Share
−
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Median Share of Public School Participation in Baseline by Decile
Public School
PS Non−white
Notes: In this Figure, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of AA on enrollments of public school
students (PS) and non-white public school students (PSNW), estimated by decile of the initial share of PS
matriculation baseline. Using my main specification, I interacted dummies for each decile of PS in baseline
with the treatment variables SISUput, AAut - both demeaned -, and their interaction. The estimation
included time and program-institution fixed effects, a municipality linear trend and a control for the number
of vacancies by program. Standard-errors are clustered at the institutional level and 95 confidence intervals
are represented with dashed lines.
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Table B.1: Treatment and Control Units
Panel a: Differences between Treated and Controls in Baseline
AA Treatment SISU Treatment
Coefficent Std. Error Coefficent Std. Error
Public School -0.0812* (0.0437) -0.0460 (0.0413)
Non-white PS -0.0157 (0.0412) 0.0191 (0.0391)
Low Income PS -0.0178 (0.0157) 0.0124 (0.0138)
Out-of-State 0.0306 (0.0261) -0.0375* (0.0211)
Grades ENEM 0.112 (0.119) -0.224** (0.110)
Non-white 0.0311 (0.0649) 0.110* (0.0573)
Low Income -0.0229 (0.0183) 0.0206 (0.0163)
Gender -0.00898 (0.0182) 0.0179 (0.0135)
Age -0.312 (0.388) -0.284 (0.334)
Disability -0.00133 (0.00357) 0.00247 (0.00264)
Spots 4.391 (19.18) -2.493 (19.75)
Panel b: Distribution of 2010-2015 Jump in Treatment
Min 0.0 0.0
p(25) 0.0 0.0
p(50) 0.4 0.3
p(75) 0.8 1.0
Max 1.0 1.0
Mean 0.4 0.4
Std. Dev. 0.4 0.4
N individuals 362,634 309,404
Notes: In Panel 4a, I regress each covariate on a continuous variable equal to the total treatment jump from
2010 to 2015 of variables AAut and SISUput, separately. Standard errors are clustered at the university level.
In Table 4b, I present some descriptive statistics of the continuous treatment jump used in the regressions
in 4a. PS stands for Public School and Out-of-State for students that moved states to attend college. The
difference in the number of observations used in the regression of AA and SISU is due to programs that had
enrollments in 2010, but not in 2015. These individuals are excluded from the SISU regression, in which
treatment is defined at the program-level, but not from the AA one, in which treatment is defined at the
institutional level.
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Table B.2: Robustness of Placebo Experiment
PS PS-NW PS-LI Out-of-State
Panel A: State Linear Trend
SISUpu,t -0.0393*** -0.0264*** -0.0403*** 0.0556***
(0.0120) (0.00963) (0.00719) (0.00693)
SISUpu,t+1 -0.00191 -0.00130 -0.00959 0.00279
(0.0101) (0.00691) (0.00619) (0.00816)
AAu,t 0.0794*** 0.0647*** 0.0249*** -0.00346
(0.0170) (0.0135) (0.00725) (0.00770)
AAu,t+1 -0.00875 -0.0243*** -0.0173*** -0.0118
(0.0132) (0.00895) (0.00501) (0.00849)
SISUpu,t x AAu,t 0.0476 0.0337 0.00951 -0.0207*
(0.0306) (0.0218) (0.0114) (0.0109)
Panel B: No Linear Trend
SISUpu,t -0.0396*** -0.0236*** -0.0351*** 0.0523***
(0.0124) (0.00880) (0.00622) (0.00694)
SISUpu,t+1 -0.00854 0.00313 0.000162 0.00236
(0.0113) (0.00862) (0.00616) (0.00893)
AAu,t 0.0832*** 0.0740*** 0.0203** 0.00280
(0.0189) (0.0146) (0.00873) (0.00901)
AAu,t+1 -0.00602 -0.0163 -0.0105* -0.0115
(0.0138) (0.0101) (0.00588) (0.00789)
SISUpu,t x AAu,t 0.0518* 0.0381 0.0262* -0.0258**
(0.0306) (0.0246) (0.0134) (0.0110)
N 1585361 1580230 1494373 1473111
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. PS
refers to public school, NW to non-white, LI to low-income and Out-of-State to students that used to live in
a different state before enrolling in college. Results include controls for time and program-institution fixed
effects and program number of spots. Panel A includes a state linear trend and Panel B does not include
any linear trend. Results in Table 5 include a municipality linear trend.
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Table B.3: Robustness of Spillover Measures
Public School
SISUput -0.0315*** -0.0364*** -0.0313*** -0.0385*** -0.0371***
(0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0108)
AAut 0.130*** 0.0969*** 0.0984*** 0.0967*** 0.0960***
(0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.0153)
SISUput x AAut 0.0678*** 0.0661*** 0.0683*** 0.0670*** 0.0676***
(0.0190) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0195)
N 1991984 2021150 2021455 2021455 2021455
Public School Non-White
SISUput -0.0244*** -0.0278*** -0.0217** -0.0286*** -0.0271***
(0.00909) (0.00903) (0.00839) (0.00904) (0.00923)
AAut 0.0873*** 0.0690*** 0.0646*** 0.0688*** 0.0677***
(0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0132) (0.0129)
SISUput x AAut 0.0484*** 0.0484*** 0.0486*** 0.0486*** 0.0485***
(0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0174)
N 1985963 2014537 2014838 2014838 2014838
Public School Low-income
SISUput -0.0396*** -0.0415*** -0.0370*** -0.0407*** -0.0388***
(0.00671) (0.00661) (0.00643) (0.00657) (0.00642)
AAut 0.0340*** 0.0245*** 0.0225*** 0.0246*** 0.0270***
(0.00628) (0.00607) (0.00632) (0.00594) (0.00611)
SISUput x AAut 0.0181* 0.0198* 0.0190* 0.0191* 0.0195**
(0.00981) (0.0102) (0.00998) (0.00995) (0.00980)
N 1879188 1905713 1905968 1905968 1905968
Municipality Yes
Field-Competition Yes
State Yes
Field Yes
Field-Quality Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned.
Controls for time and program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and municipality trend. In
each column, I test a different measure of spillover. Municipality and State refer to local spillovers at the
respective levels. Field refers to spillovers measured at similar majors nationally; competition to programs
in a similar level of competition and quality for institutions of a similar quality index. Estimators of Table
13 contain spillover measures at municipality and field-competition.
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Table B.4: Robustness - Different Samples of Institutions
PS PSNW PSLI Out-of-State Grades
Panel A: Federal and State Universities
SISUput -0.0335*** -0.0269*** -0.0393*** 0.0534*** 0.300***
(0.0115) (0.0102) (0.00715) (0.00746) (0.0342)
AAut 0.110*** 0.0815*** 0.0248*** -0.0106 -0.0708***
(0.0190) (0.0159) (0.00609) (0.00796) (0.0253)
SISUput x AAut 0.0785*** 0.0579*** 0.00677 -0.00819 -0.000273
(0.0223) (0.0194) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0404)
N 1811266 1805614 1715665 1684964 1626165
Panel B: Only Federal Institutions
SISUput -0.0393*** -0.0330*** -0.0359*** 0.0487*** 0.299***
(0.00990) (0.00906) (0.00657) (0.00713) (0.0322)
AAut 0.0885*** 0.0684*** 0.0165** -0.00636 -0.0291
(0.0143) (0.0170) (0.00754) (0.00925) (0.0338)
SISUput x AAut 0.0657*** 0.0433** 0.0255** -0.0176 -0.0804*
(0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0417)
N 1478086 1477637 1423800 1410850 1377128
Panel C: Only Federal Universities
SISUput -0.0368*** -0.0342*** -0.0320*** 0.0463*** 0.266***
(0.0114) (0.0105) (0.00724) (0.00832) (0.0356)
AAut 0.0935*** 0.0825*** 0.0203** -0.00651 -0.0597*
(0.0196) (0.0235) (0.00849) (0.0126) (0.0350)
SISUput x AAut 0.0719*** 0.0465* 0.0153 -0.0176 -0.0523
(0.0221) (0.0246) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0451)
N 1267897 1268413 1233497 1222525 1195605
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. PS
refers to students that attended high school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income
and Out-of-State to students that used to live in a different state before enrolling in college. Grades is
a composite measure of the different multiple-choice sections of the ENEM exam. Controls for time and
program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear trend. Panel A includes
Federal and State Universities, Panel B Federal Universities and Institutes, Panel C Federal Universities only,
while baseline estimates contain all three type of institutions.
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Table B.5: Robustness - Different Sample Selections
PS PSNW PSLI Out-of-State Grades
Panel A: No first-year drop-outs
SISUput -0.0349*** -0.0272*** -0.0395*** 0.0493*** 0.302***
(0.0107) (0.00925) (0.00672) (0.00611) (0.0301)
AAut 0.104*** 0.0716*** 0.0254*** -0.0108* -0.0644***
(0.0157) (0.0138) (0.00601) (0.00608) (0.0243)
SISUput x AAut 0.0656*** 0.0490*** 0.0211** -0.00774 -0.0439
(0.0206) (0.0187) (0.0105) (0.00914) (0.0366)
N 1759779 1753761 1656371 1627609 1568136
Panel B: Programs larger than 10
SISUput -0.0377*** -0.0285*** -0.0413*** 0.0538*** 0.319***
(0.0103) (0.00900) (0.00662) (0.00667) (0.0316)
AAut 0.0988*** 0.0697*** 0.0240*** -0.0104 -0.0540**
(0.0152) (0.0131) (0.00602) (0.00659) (0.0253)
SISUput x AAut 0.0682*** 0.0488*** 0.0192* -0.0105 -0.0446
(0.0199) (0.0177) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0369)
N 2017909 2011235 1902948 1870622 1805246
Panel C: Drop 2010
SISUput -0.0468*** -0.0328*** -0.0477*** 0.0522*** 0.340***
(0.00861) (0.00762) (0.00651) (0.00677) (0.0335)
AAut 0.0984*** 0.0702*** 0.0231*** -0.0110** -0.0494**
(0.0147) (0.0104) (0.00621) (0.00558) (0.0236)
SISUput x AAut 0.0845*** 0.0548*** 0.0272*** -0.00447 -0.00588
(0.0189) (0.0136) (0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0400)
N 1773229 1751965 1679956 1613163 1575629
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. PS
refers to students that attended high school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income
and Out-of-State to students that used to live in a different state before enrolling in college. Grades is
a composite measure of the different multiple-choice sections of the ENEM exam. Controls for time and
program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear trend. In Panel A, I
delete all first-year dropouts; in Panel B, I keep only programs larger than 10 students and in Panel C, I
keep only years 2011-2015.
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Table B.6: Robustness - Results Collapsed at Program Level
PS PSNW PSLI Out-of-State Grades
Panel A: No Sample Weights
SISUput -0.0377*** -0.0270** -0.0410*** 0.0542*** 0.340***
(0.0116) (0.0104) (0.00770) (0.00623) (0.0322)
AAut 0.0807*** 0.0517*** 0.0183** -0.0105* -0.0403
(0.0143) (0.0131) (0.00711) (0.00577) (0.0284)
SISUput x AAut 0.0742*** 0.0592*** 0.0243* -0.00384 -0.0606
(0.0231) (0.0200) (0.0123) (0.0100) (0.0438)
N 40000 40071 39894 39820 39673
Panel B: Weight by number of students
SISUput -0.0366*** -0.0273** -0.0406*** 0.0540*** 0.328***
(0.0121) (0.0112) (0.00775) (0.00723) (0.0365)
AAut 0.0990*** 0.0673*** 0.0210*** -0.0115* -0.0472*
(0.0169) (0.0160) (0.00667) (0.00677) (0.0278)
SISUput x AAut 0.0666*** 0.0532** 0.0242** -0.00888 -0.0707
(0.0234) (0.0217) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0441)
N 40000 40071 39894 39820 39673
Panel C: Weight by log number of students
SISUput -0.0402*** -0.0289*** -0.0416*** 0.0547*** 0.338***
(0.0110) (0.0101) (0.00762) (0.00645) (0.0334)
AAut 0.0868*** 0.0584*** 0.0178** -0.0117** -0.0398
(0.0147) (0.0135) (0.00701) (0.00590) (0.0270)
SISUput x AAut 0.0680*** 0.0535*** 0.0238* -0.00498 -0.0709*
(0.0228) (0.0197) (0.0122) (0.00956) (0.0425)
N 39706 39774 39657 39613 39485
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. PS
refers to students that attended high school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income
and Out-of-State to students that used to live in a different state before enrolling in college. Grades is
a composite measure of the different multiple-choice sections of the ENEM exam. Controls for time and
program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear trend. Results at the
Program Level are estimated after the computation of averages of each outcome by program and year. In
each of the Panels, I test a different measure of program weight.
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Table B.7: Robustness - Collapsed at Program Level and Different Local Controls
UF Linear Mun Linear IES Linear UF-Time FE Mun-Time FE
Public School
SISUput -0.0325** -0.0366*** -0.0430*** -0.0261* -0.0290**
(0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0123)
AAut 0.0801*** 0.0990*** 0.0844*** 0.0792*** 0.127***
(0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0179) (0.0173) (0.0185)
SISUput x AAut 0.0555* 0.0666*** 0.0598** 0.0431 0.0617***
(0.0300) (0.0234) (0.0274) (0.0305) (0.0203)
N 40000 40000 40000 40000 40000
Public School Non-white
SISUput -0.0235** -0.0273** -0.0332*** -0.0150 -0.0186*
(0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.00933) (0.0112)
AAut 0.0556*** 0.0673*** 0.0779*** 0.0470*** 0.0717***
(0.0131) (0.0160) (0.0222) (0.0114) (0.0141)
SISUput x AAut 0.0424* 0.0532** 0.0391 0.0460** 0.0651***
(0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0273) (0.0194) (0.0172)
N 40071 40071 40071 40071 40071
Public School Low-income
SISUput -0.0439*** -0.0406*** -0.0353*** -0.0399*** -0.0385***
(0.00729) (0.00775) (0.00735) (0.00684) (0.00802)
AAut 0.0107 0.0210*** 0.0238*** 0.00775 0.0265***
(0.00690) (0.00667) (0.00788) (0.00737) (0.00734)
SISUput x AAut 0.0190* 0.0242** 0.0129 0.0201* 0.0323***
(0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0137) (0.0115) (0.0116)
N 39894 39894 39894 39894 39894
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned.
Controls for time and program-institution fixed effects and program number of spots. Results at the Program
Level are estimated after the computation of averages of each outcome by program and year. In each column,
I test a different type of local trend or local Fixed Effect. UF refers to State, Mun to Municipality, IES to
institution and FE to fixed effects.
51
Chapter 1. Affirmative Action, Centralized Admissions and Inequality in Access to Higher
Education: Evidence from Brazil
Table B.8: Robustness - SISU Treatment Collapsed at Institutional Level
PS PSNW PSLI Out-of-State Grades
SISUut -0.0410*** -0.0306** -0.0487*** 0.0533*** 0.329***
(0.0147) (0.0125) (0.00834) (0.00822) (0.0361)
AAut 0.0902*** 0.0635*** 0.0210*** -0.0110* -0.0475
(0.0163) (0.0142) (0.00658) (0.00635) (0.0340)
SISUput x AAut 0.101*** 0.0658*** 0.0271** -0.0117 -0.104**
(0.0262) (0.0231) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0481)
N 2054025 2048093 1932267 1896255 1829037
R2-within 0.093 0.132 0.097 0.075 0.267
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at university level. Treatment variables are demeaned. PS
refers to students that attended high school in a public institution, NW to non-white, LI to low-income
and Out-of-State to students that used to live in a different state before enrolling in college. Grades is
a composite measure of the different multiple-choice sections of the ENEM exam. Controls for time and
program-institution fixed effects, program number of spots and a municipality linear trend. Here, the SISU
treatment is collapsed at the level of the institution, instead of being included in the level of the program, as
in the baseline estimate.
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Chapter 2
Does Affirmative Action in
Undergraduate Education Impact High
Schools?
2.1 Introduction
Affirmative action (AA) policies in higher education have been adopted in different countries
to mitigate inequality in access, performance and graduation. These initiatives are partic-
ularly important in countries that still suffer from a legacy of long-term institutions rooted
in racial and economic inequality. As examples, we can cite India with the caste system,
South Africa with the apartheid, and the United States and Brazil with slavery. There is a
large and growing economic literature which investigates the effect of AA in undergraduate
education in different dimensions of students’ behavior and outcomes (e.g. the decision to
apply to college, the choice of institution and major, performance, graduation and future
labor market outcomes)1. In contrast, less is known about how these initiatives affect in-
dividual behavior before college. By creating heterogeneous incentive-schemes for different
demographic groups, these policies might influence multiple dimensions of individual behav-
ior even before university application. These might include, for example, students’ human
capital accumulation, choice of high school and social interactions. Assessing the impact
of AA on students before college is not straightforward, since researchers do not know how
middle and high school students are exposed to institutions they might be willing to attend
in the future. However, it is vital for a complete understanding of the overall impact of AA
and its welfare effects.
1See Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2016) and Arcidiacono et al. (2015) for updated literature reviews on
the topic.
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My paper aims to contribute to this literature by analyzing the case of Brazil. On August
29th 2012, the federal government approved the so-called "Quota Law” (hereafter QL). It
established that 50 percent of vacancies in each major of each federal institution has to be
reserved to students that attended all three years of secondary education in a public school.2
Furthermore, it stipulates subquotas, within these 50 percent, to racial and economic-based
minorities. Federal tertiary education institutions in Brazil are widely recognized in the
country by their high-quality and are free of any charge. Therefore, competition for a spot is
fierce.3 By reserving a substantial percentage of vacancies to certain demographic groups, the
federal government increased incentives for public school attendance in high school, especially
for non-white and low-income individuals. In this context, the objectives of this paper are to
understand and quantify whether QL: (i) increases mobility from private to public schools;
(ii) has heterogeneous effects by ethnicity and type of school of origin; (iii) impacts the quality
of public and private schools and, finally (iv) creates spillover effects for students in affected
schools.
The adoption of QL creates a differential impact on each of the 107 federal institutions
in Brazil, depending on their pre-reform levels of quotas. For example, some institutions
already reserved as much as 50 percent of their vacancies to public school students (e.g.
Federal University of Juiz de Fora - UFJF). Others, however, had no quotas whatsoever
(e.g. Federal University of Pernambuco - UFPE). In sum, QL exogenously imposes that all
institutions adjust their quota levels to 50 percent, creating cross-sectional variation across
institutions and a continuous treatment variable. Although the effect of QL in each federal
institution is clearly observed, I do not know how a student in middle school is exposed to
treatment in each tertiary institution. To circumvent this limitation, I construct a measure
of exposure to treatment for students in 9th grade (the final year of primary education)
based on factors that affect college choice, such as place of residence of the student and the
location, size and quality of the institution. Details for the construction of this measure
are presented in Section 3, but, essentially, higher education attendance in Brazil is highly
localized. Approximately, 86 percent of enrollees attend college in the same municipality in
which they resided before. This means that location of residence is a very important predictor
of which tertiary federal institution a 9th grader is exposed to.
Results show that a full exposure to QL increases mobility of 9th graders from a private
middle school to a public high school by 4.5 p.p. or 29 percent. This effect is stronger for
non-whites, who benefit from an additional subquota, and to individuals that attended a low-
socioeconomic status (SES) and low-quality private school. After determining that QL affects
2Public school attendance is used as a proxy of socioeconomic status. In Section 2, I give more details
about public schools and how they compare to their private counterparts.
3Details on the Brazilian tertiary system also follows in Section 2.
54
Chapter 2. Does Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education Impact High Schools?
public school attendance in the expected direction, I investigate a more intriguing question.
Does this exogenous influx of ex-private school students impact the quality of public schools?
If so, in which direction? Does it spill over to original public school enrollees? Alternatively,
how this exogenous outflow of students impacts private schools? Does QL impact inequality
between the private and the public high school systems? Preliminary results show that
QL has a positive effect on public school quality. Even if the private school movers come
disproportionately from the worse private schools, they still impact positively the quality of
the public schools they move to. This effect is, however, concentrated in a small portion
of public schools: the best ones. Although additional research is needed, results suggest
that QL has a positive impact on public schools at the mean, but led to an increase in
inequality across schools within the public system. In the next version of this manuscript,
I plan to investigate whether QL generates spillover effects and if it impacts private schools
and inequality between and within the public and the private systems.
These are questions of extreme importance, especially in countries similar to Brazil, where
socioeconomic inequality is high and current and prospective resources for educational invest-
ments are limited. Brazil is the 11th most unequal country in the world.4 One of the main
roots of this inequality is, precisely, the educational system. In contrast with most developed
countries, Brazilian educational expenditures are concentrated in tertiary, in detriment of
basic education.5 Nevertheless, access to higher education (especially public) is extremely
unequal and returns are substantial.6 The adoption of QL aims, specifically, at mitigating
this issue. However, most critics of this type of policy argue that inequality in access to higher
education is generated much earlier in one’s trajectory and that such initiatives may cause
more distortions than solutions. This argument is partially correct. For example, in Brazil,
public schools overall quality is considerably lower than the one their private counterparts
(Figure 2.1). Moreover, around 15% of Brazilian students drop out of school right after 9th
grade. In this line, policies targeting the reduction of inequality in earlier cycles of education
are extremely needed. On the other hand, AA in higher education might have overall effects
that go well beyond reducing inequality in college access. If such policies are able to increase
incentives for public school attendance, they might reduce inequality in the basic education
4Brazil is the 11th most unequal country according to its Gini Index (World Development Indicators,
2019).
5Brazil spends 3.8 thousand USD annually per student in primary education, while the OECD average is
8.7. In contrast, Brazil spends 11.7 thousand USD per student in tertiary education, similarly to European
countries such as Italy (11.5) and Spain (11.8). The OECD average is 16.1, due to countries with substantially
higher average spending, such as the US (29.3) and the UK (24.5) (OECD, 2017).
6According to the population Census of 2010, the share of college enrollment for individuals aged 18 to
22 is equal to 3.7 percent in the lowest quartile and 34.2 percent in the top quartile of family per capita
income. In parallel, earnings of workers with a tertiary degree are 2.5 times higher than the ones of workers
with upper-secondary education. The OECD average is 1.56 (OECD, 2017).
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system, increasing its welfare effects. This is what I would like to ultimately understand with
this paper.
My paper is specifically related to the literature that investigates how AA in undergrad-
uate education impacts high school students’ outcomes. One strand of this literature has
focused on how such policies affect pre-college human capital investments. Bodoh-Creed and
Hickman (2018) develop a structural model of college admissions framed as a contest in which
the outcome is decided by the students’ choice of human capital. Cotton et al. (2018) use a
simple version of this model to derive testable predictions and find, through an experimen-
tal approach, that AA increases effort levels of the benefited group, while not affecting the
non-benefited students. In contrast, using a differences-in-differences framework, Antonovics
and Backes (2014) find no evidence that banning AA at the University of California affected
human capital accumulation for high school students. There are some studies that look at a
similar question in Brazil. Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2012) and Estevan et al. (2019) find
no behavioral effects of AA policies implemented in two different Brazilian universities on
pre-college human capital accumulation. In contrast, Assunção and Ferman (2015) find that
an AA policy implemented by the State University of Rio de Janeiro decreased investments
by black students, the target group. The authors argue that their results might be explained
by the aggressiveness of the specific AA policy they analyze, which differs substantially from
the other two cases.
More related to this paper, a second strand of this literature investigates how AA in higher
education affects secondary students’ choice of school and high school integration. To the best
of my knowledge, all these papers focus on the consequences of the so-called "Top-N percent
plans” in the U.S., a type of AA policy that guarantees seats in State universities for all
students ranked in the top N% of their high-schools. The contribution most related to mine
is the one by Cullen et al. (2013), who analyze the case of Texas. They find that among the
subset of students with both motive and opportunity for strategic high school choice, at least
5% enroll in a different high school to improve the chances of being in the top 10% and benefit
from AA. Estevan et al. (2019) show that, although this pre-college arbitrage is detrimental
for diversity in tertiary institutions, it increases high school integration. My paper adds to
this literature in two key dimensions. First, it provides clear evidence of the existence of this
arbitrage effect of AA in higher education in a context never studied before. In spite of some
similarities in terms of overall objectives between QL and the "Top-N percent plans”, the
two AA initiatives are substantially different, in terms of policy-design and the institutional
context in which they have been implemented. While the "Top-N percent plans” are localized
- as they were implemented at the State-level in three U.S. States -, the QL affected all 107
federal institutions in Brazil, including some of the very best universities in the country.
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Therefore, we might also expect larger results on the strategic school choice of individuals’
and on how it sequentially affects high schools. Second, I study a policy that clearly creates
incentives for public high school attendance. In the context of high socioeconomic inequality
and, consequently, of high segregation of the public and private school systems, the Brazilian
case creates an ideal scenario for testing the effectiveness of an AA policy that simultaneously
improves equality in access to higher education and the quality of public schools.
The remaining of this paper is organized as following. In Section 2, I provide a background
of the Brazilian educational system and of the implementation of QL. In Section 3, I describe
the main datasets and how I constructed the measure of 9th graders exposure to treatment. In
Section 4, I present the empirical strategy and main results regarding the individual strategic
school choice in response to QL. In Section 5, I show results related to how QL impacts quality
of public schools. Finally, in Section 6, I present concluding remarks and discuss the future
steps of this project.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Brazilian Educational System
The basic mandatory education system in Brazil is comprised of 9 years of primary, followed
by 3 years of secondary school.7 Students start first grade at age 6 and should finish high
school at ages 17 or 18, before entering university. Although the government offers universal
access to all grades of basic education, the public system coexists with a large number of
private schools. According to the Census of Basic Education of 2011, there are 63030 schools
in Brazil that offer the second cycle of primary education (grade 5-9), being 80% public and
20% private. In secondary education, there are 26973 schools, 70% public and 30% private.
Moreover, the private system encompasses 12.6% of total enrollments in the second cycle of
primary and 12.2% in secondary. Apart from size, the public and private systems are very
different in other key and more relevant dimensions. Private schools are, on average, of better
quality than their public counterparts. From the top 100 high schools in Brazil, according to
the National Standardized Exam of 2011 (ENEM), 93 are private. Moreover, from the 10077
schools evaluated, the 4799 private schools perform considerably better, as seen in Figure 2.1.
Additionally, private schools’ socioeconomic level is substantially higher, as also portrayed in
Figure 2.1.
On the other hand, tertiary education in Brazil presents a contrasting scenario. According
to the Census of Higher Education of 2014, the Brazilian Higher Education System was
7From 2013, pre-primary education for children aged 4 and 5 also became mandatory.
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comprised of 2368 institutions, 298 public and 2070 private. The public system is a mix of
Federal (107), State (118) and Municipal (73) institutions, which correspond, respectively,
to 17, 9 and 2 percent of the total undergraduate enrollment of around 6.5 million students.8
Federal and State institutions are, by law, free of any charge. Private institutions, in contrast,
charge tuition fees that may vary substantially, but were, on average, equal to 898 Brazilian
Reais per month in 2017 (or 95.8% of the minimum wage)9. Public tertiary institutions
(especially Federal) are widely recognized in the country by their average high quality. For
instance, the federal institutions scored, on average, 3.6 in a scale of 0 to 5 of the Índice Geral
de Cursos 2014 (IGC), a quality index elaborated by the Ministry of Education based on
performance evaluations of undergraduate and graduate programs. State institutions scored
2.8, and private institutions 2.6. Furthermore, among the universities only, 24 out of the
best 25 are public, being 5 of the State administration and the other 19 Federal. On an
alternative ranking - Ranking Universitário Folha 2014, elaborated by Folha de São Paulo,
the newspaper of the highest circulation in Brazil - a similar pattern appears. Among the
top 25 universities, 17 are Federal, 6 are State and 2 are private. Therefore, due to their
high quality and free tuition, public tertiary institutions usually attract a large number of
applicants.
2.2.2 The Quota Law in Higher Education
Access to public undergraduate education in Brazil is highly competitive. For example,
according to the Centralized Admission System of 2016 (SISU 2016), 2664001 students applied
to 242864 vacancies in a Federal institution, a rate of 11 students per vacancy.10 Therefore,
only students with high grades are able to successfully obtain a spot in these competitive
colleges.11 As a consequence, access to public higher education in Brazil has historically
been unequal. For instance, 85 percent of high schools students aged 16 to 18 go to a public
school, while only 51 percent of incoming students in public higher education institutions
are graduates from public high schools. Moreover, 47.5 percent of high school students are
non-white and go to a public school, while only 23 percent of first-year students in public
8Considering only undergraduate on-campus programs and students with an active enrollment status.
9According to data fromMapa do Ensino Superior no Brasil 2017, from the Sindicato das Mantenedoras de
Ensino Superior. Information available at:https://educacao.uol.com.br/noticias/2017/08/28/mensalidade-
de-curso-superior-no-brasil-custa-em-media-r-898-diz-estudo.htm .
10Considering SISU 2016.1 and 2016.2. In 2016.1 alone, the rate grows to 13.1 students per vacancy.
11Admissions processes to federal higher education institutions in Brazil are based, exclusively, on grades
in one admission exam. Today, all federal institutions offer vacancies based on grades of the National
Standardized Exam, mostly through a centralized admission system. Some of these institutions also offer
part of their vacancies based on a specific exam elaborated by them. In any case, admissions are decided
exclusively based on entrance exams, not taking into account high school performance.
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universities come from the same demographic group (Brazilian Census 2010).
In order to improve equality in access to the federal tertiary education system, the gov-
ernment of Brazil approved law 12.711 on August 29th 2012, the so-called the “Quota Law”
(QL). It establishes that 50 percent of all vacancies in each major at each federal institu-
tion has to be reserved to students that attended all three years of secondary education in
a public school. Moreover, there are subquotas, within these 50 percent, destined to racial
and economic based minorities. Figure 2.2 shows an example of how QL was implemented
in the State of Bahia. Take, for example, a major that offers 100 vacancies in the Federal
University of Bahia. From these spots, 50 are reserved to students that attended all high
school in a public school. Within these 50, 25 are reserved to public school students that
belong to a family with per capita income of less than 1.5 minimum wage. Also, within these
50, 38 are reserved to black, mixed or indigenous students (non-white). The fraction of va-
cancies reserved to non-white students vary by state, according to the share of its population
belonging to this demographic group.
By reserving 50 percent of vacancies at highly competitive institutions to public school
students, QL increases incentives for public school attendance. Moreover, by establishing
a national unique level of quotas for all federal institutions, it impacted differently each
institution, depending on their pre-reform levels of quota adoption. For example, while some
institutions already reserved as much as 50 percent of their vacancies to public school students
(e.g. Federal University of Juiz de Fora - UFJF), others had no quotas at all (e.g. Federal
University of Pernambuco - UFPE). In sum, the adoption of QL creates a quasi-experiment
for testing how affirmative action in undergraduate education impacts high school students’
outcomes and, by extension, their high schools and classmates.
2.3 Data and Variables
This paper uses data from multiple sources. First, it uses the Brazilian Census of Basic
Education (CBS) from years 2008 to 2016. This is an administrative registry individual data
of all students enrolled in primary and secondary schools in Brazil. It is collected yearly by
the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (INEP) of the Brazilian Ministry
of Education and it is publicly available. The individual-module of the CBS contains basic
demographic characteristics of students (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity) and unique individual
and school identifiers. This allows for the construction of a panel dataset both at the indi-
vidual and the school level across time. I select all individuals enrolled in the final year of
primary education - 9th grade - in year t from 2008 to 2015. Then, using the individual id,
I link students from the CBS of cohort t with their own information in year t+1 from 2009
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to 2016. This allows me to identify students that advanced to the first year of secondary ed-
ucation. Furthermore, I am able to identify whether individuals changed schools and, more
importantly, whether they moved from their original educational system (from private to
public or vice-versa).
Second, this paper uses detailed information on the adoption of AA quotas by all Brazilian
public tertiary institutions. This dataset was collected by the author based on documents of
the admission processes and on direct contact with the institutions. From this information,
I constructed variable Qu,2012, which measures the percentage of quotas at institution u of
microregion m destined to students that attended all secondary education in a public school
in year 2012, before the approval of the Quota Law. This allows me to understand how each
institution in Brazil was exogenously exposed to QL, based on their pre-reform level of quota
adoption. I, then, construct Treatu,m = 2(0.5−Qu,2012). This means that, if the institution
had no quotas in 2012 (Qu,2012 = 0), Treatu,m = 1. On the other hand, if it already had 50
percent of reserved vacancies before the implementation of the law, then Treatu,m = 0. If
0 < Qu,2012 < 0.5, Treatu,m will assume a value between zero and one.
Although I directly observe how the QL reform affects all Brazilian 107 tertiary federal
institutions, I do not know how students in the 9th grade respond to changes in these different
institutions. In order to obtain a proxy for that, I construct a measure of exposure to
treatment based on the microregion m where the individual goes to school. First, I restrict
my sample to 9th graders that reside in a microregion where there is a federal university.
Although there are 509 microregions in Brazil, there are only 50 with federal universities.12
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics comparing the selected sample (hereafter Sample 50 )
with the whole population. Sample 50 includes, generally, the larger and most developed
microregions in Brazil. They encompass 45 percent of the total population, including all the
State capitals and the Federal District (See Figure 2.3 for their location). The median student
of Sample 50 lives in a microregion where the median wage of the formal labor market is,
on average, 25.5 percent higher than in the microregion of the median student of the whole
population. Additionally, in Sample 50, 81.1 percent of 9th graders attend a public school,
compared to 86.5 percent in the population. Finally, note that, by living in a microregion
with a federal university, students of Sample 50 are more directly and clearly exposed to
treatment, being more likely to be interested to attend college. In spite of that, all results
from this paper remain robust for the complete population of 9th graders in Brazil.
I construct two different measures of exposure to treatment for students of microregion
m. These measures are based on size, quality and location of the institution.13 The first,
12In these 50 microregions, there are 94 federal institutions, out of which 59 are universities. The other
ones are smaller teaching centers and institutes.
13The rationale is that the larger the size and the quality index, more applications an institution receives,
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and simpler measure, assumes that a student in microregion m is only exposed to treatment
that occurred in institutions of the same microregion. According to the Brazilian Population
Census of 2010, only 14 percent of college-enrollees moved, after age 14, to the municipality
where they currently attend tertiary education. This suggests that students are mostly
exposed to treatment through institutions in the microregion where they reside at age 14.
Then, the first measure constructed is a weighted average of exposure to treatment of all
federal institutions of region m, weighted by a measure of size and another of quality:
Treat1m =
∑n
u=1Qualityu,mxSizeu,mxTreatu,m∑n
u=1Qualityu,mxSizeu,m
. (2.1)
Sizeu,m is the number of new vacancies offered by the institution in 2012, while Qualityu,m
is a quality level index produced by INEP.14 Note that if the microregion has only one federal
university, Treat1m = Treatu,m.
In the second measure, I incorporate the possibility that individuals might be affected by
institutions outside their microregion m. I use the Brazilian Population Census of 2010 and
restrict data to individuals aged 18 to 25 that report to currently attend college. Then, I ob-
serve the municipality where individuals used to live before college.15 Using this information,
I construct the following measure:
Treat2m = θmxTreat
1
m +
∑
r 6=m
θrTreat
1
r (2.2)
In this case, the variable Treat1m for microregion m is weighted by the percentage of
individuals that lived in m before college and keep doing so during college, θm. Additionally,
it includes component
∑
r 6=m θrTreat
1
r, where θr is the percentage of individuals that lived
in m before college and moved to r (any of the other 49 microregions) for college. Take for
example the case of the microregion of Chapecó, located in the State of Santa Catarina, south
of Brazil. From all students that used to live in Chapecó before college and that attend a
public tertiary institution, 81.2 percent do so in Chapecó. Additionally, 14.7 percent move
to Florianópolis, the capital of Santa Catarina, 1.5 percent move to Curitiba, 1.5 percent
to Juiz de Fora and 1 percent to Pelotas. Moves to all other cities are negligible (less
than 0.5 percent). Therefore, variable Treat2Chapeco is based on the weighted average that
and stronger is the general interest towards the institution.
14The index is called Índice Geral de Cursos and it varies from 1 to 5. Higher quality institutions receive
more applications if compared to lower quality ones of the same size.
15Among all the students that attend college in the Census of 2010, 66 percent report to do so in the same
municipality where they were born, while 20 report to have moved to their current city before age 14. The
remaining 14 percent of students report to have moved from age 15 on wards. These are the ones I assume
could have moved specifically for college.
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attributes 81.2 percent for the microregion of Chapecó itself and 18.8 percent to all these
other microregions, accordingly. Note that, out of the 50 microregions considered, θm for
the median one is 96.8 percent. Therefore, while Treat2m is conceptually a better measure,
results are very similar to specifications that use Treat1m, instead. For the sake of simplicity,
I only report results that consider Treat2m.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of variable Treat2m and the location of microregions
of Sample 50. First, note that the 50 microregions with a federal university are spread
in different regions of Brazil. Second, note that they are relatively far from each other,
minimizing concerns of spillover effects. Third, note that variable Treat2m is sufficiently
distributed between values zero and one. Although 20 out of 50 microregions are highly
treated (Treat2m > 0.9), 30 microregions have values of Treat2m that vary from 0 to 0.9. It is
this variation that allows for the causal identification of the effect of QL.
Finally, this paper uses microdata from the National Standardized Exam of High School
(ENEM) from years 2011 to 2015. This dataset contains information on test scores of all
students that took the exam in each year, their high school identifier and demographic char-
acteristics. It is publicly available and produced by INEP. I use it to construct measures of
school quality, as carefully explained in the Section 5 of this paper.
2.4 Strategic High School Choice
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
I use an event-study design to study how the QL reform affects school choice. My main
empirical model is:
Yimst = βt
2015∑
t=2008
Y eartTreat
j
m + γXimst + δXmt + αsm + αt + εimst, j = 1, 2 (2.3)
where Yimst is the outcome of student i, microregionm, school s and time t. The treatment
variable Treatjm defines how individual i was exposed to the QL reform, depending on the
microregion where he or she attended 9th grade, as explained in the previous section. This
variable is interacted with a dummy for each year/cohort t from 2008 to 2015. The reform
was announced in August of 2012. Therefore, the first cohort I expect to be influenced is
exactly the one finishing 9th grade in that year.16 In this specification, years 2008 to 2010
16Note that to benefit from QL, students need to stay the full 3 years of high school in a public institution.
Therefore, students already enrolled in secondary education cannot be affected
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serve as pre-periods, 2011 is the baseline year and cohorts 2012 to 2015 are treated. The
vectorXimst identifies individual controls (gender, age, ethnicity and urban status), whileXmt
are time-varying microregion controls (size of formal sector, median wage of formal sector
workers and share of college among formal sector workers). Finally, I include school fixed
effects αsm (which also absorb microregion fixed effects) and time-fixed effects αt. Standard
errors are clustered at the mesoregion level.17
The main identifying assumption for causal interpretation of parameters β2012, β2013, β2014
and β2015 is that dynamics in the outcome variable for treated and control units would have
been similar in absence of the treatment. The presence of school-microregion fixed effects
absorbs all unobservable time-invariant characteristics at school or microregion that might be
correlated with the outcome. However, the existence of time-varying unobservable character-
istics that are correlated with the outcome could still be a threat to causal identification. To
minimize this concern, I include pre-periods 2008 to 2010. If pre-trends are parallel, I expect
to find coefficients β2008, β2009 and β2010 to be close to zero and insignificant. This would
provide suggestive evidence that trends between treated and control microregions, in absence
of treatment, would likely have been parallel also between 2011 and post-reform years.
Additionally, Table 2.2 presents results of regressions of different covariates on Treatjm
in 2011, the baseline year. Although not significantly different from zero, point estimates
suggest the possible existence of difference in levels between treated and control microregions
in 2011. Note that these differences are not necessarily a problem, as long as trends between
groups are parallel.
2.4.2 Results
Tables 2.3 presents the baseline results from an OLS regression of equation 2.4. In Column
(1), I control for time fixed effects only, while, in Column (2), I add school fixed effects. In
column (3), I also control for individual characteristics and, in column (4), for microregion
characterists. Note that my results are robust and remain very similar in all specifications.
In my preferred model (Column 4), a full adoption of QL increases mobility of 9th graders
from a private to a public school by 2.5 p.p., in 2012, and by 4.5 p.p., in 2013. This represents
an increase of 16 and 29 percent, respectively, in relation to the mean in baseline. Since the
reform was approved on August 29th 2012, the cohort of 9th graders of 2012 did not have
enough time to respond to changes, if compared to later cohorts. The academic year in Brazil
goes from February to December and children need to enroll in public school by October of
17Brazil has, in total, 509 microregions (Região Geográfica Imediata) and 133 mesoregions (Região Geográ-
fica Intermediária), defined by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE). In my sample, I
use 50 microregions, located in 45 different mesoregions.
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the preceding year. Therefore, the 2012 cohort had approximately two months (September
and October) to respond to the policy change. Later cohorts, on the other hand, had over
a year to adjust. This is probably what explains the difference in magnitude between the
estimates for year 2012 and later years. Finally, note the coefficients for years 2008, 2009 and
2010 are close to zero and insignificant, corroborating the identifying assumption of parallel
trends between treated and control groups.
In Table 2.4, I study if the QL reform impacts mobility from public to private school. One
could expect that, due to larger incentives for public school attendance, QL would decrease
these movements in the transition between 9th grade and secondary education. Results show
that this is not the case. The reform has zero effect on these potential changes. This is
possibly due to the fact that, before QL, these movements were already too low. In 2011,
only 2.2 percent of 9th graders that attended a public school moved to a private school in the
following year. Results from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are portrayed graphically in Figure 2.4.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show results analogous to Table 2.3 separately by ethnicity. As men-
tioned previously, in addition to the quotas destined to public school students, the QL reform
has subquotas reserved to individuals self-declared as black, mixed or indigeneous (non-
white). Therefore, this demographic group has higher incentives for strategic school choice.
This pattern is confirmed in the results. According to Table 2.5 Column (4), a full adoption
of QL increases moves from private to public school by 6.9 p.p. for non-whites in 2013,
compared to 2.8 p.p. for whites and Asians-descendants. This is also shown graphically in
Figure 2.5.
Finally, in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, I exploit heterogeneity of results with respect to students’
school of origin. In Table 2.7, I split private schools in four quartiles of socioeconomic level,
based on an index computed by INEP (INSE 2011-201318). In 2013, a full adoption of
QL increases movements of 9th graders from private to public schools by 6.7 p.p. for the
lowest-SES schools and by 0 p.p. for the highest-SES schools. Additionally, in Table 2.8,
I divide schools into two categories based on a index of quality, also elaborated by INEP
(ENEM Escola). This index is based on grades of high-school concluders in the National
Standardized Exam of High School (ENEM) of 2011. Note that only a portion of middle
schools are evaluated based on this index: the ones that also offer secondary education and
the ones for which at least 50 percent of high-school concluders take the ENEM exam in
2011. The "Top Schools” in Table 2.8 are the ones with an index in the top half of the
distribution. The "Other Schools” are the ones classified in the bottom half and the ones not
classified, either because they do not offer high school or because less than 50 percent of their
high-school concluders take the ENEM exam. The "Other with HS” refers to schools either
18INSE stands for Índice de Nível Socioeconômico das Escolas de Educação Básica.
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classified in the bottom half or not classified, but that offer secondary education. Table 2.8
shows that a full adoption of QL increases movements of 9th graders from private to public
schools by 3.1 p.p. for the top schools and by 5.8 p.p. for the other (bottom) schools, in
2013. These results are shown, graphically, in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
In sum, the adoption of QL increases significantly the strategic mobility of 9th graders
between private and public schools, in the transition between middle to secondary education.
This is so because QL increases incentives for students to attend the full three years of
high school at a public institution. The effect is stronger for non-whites, who benefit from
additional subquotas if compared to whites, and for students coming from a low-SES and
low-quality private school. Therefore, by increasing the value of public school, QL pushes
some students from the private to the public system. These are individuals interested in
public tertiary education, but that, most likely, benefit the least from private secondary
school attendance. In contrast, students that stay in private school are the ones with a
stronger preference for this type of institution, even after QL increased the value of public
school for all individuals. These are, likely, individuals that benefit more from private-school
attendance.
2.5 Effect on the High School System
Having established that QL increases mobility from private to public schools, some additional
questions surface: does this exogenous inflow of students affect the quality of public high
schools? If so, how? Are all schools equally affected? How do the effects spill over to students
originally attending these schools? What about the quality of private schools that suffer from
a substantial outflow of students? Finally, does QL impact the inequality between the public
and the private high school systems? What about the inequality within each system? These
are questions of extreme policy-relevancy.
As mentioned previously, Brazil is the 11th most unequal country in the world and one key
root of inequality is precisely its educational system. For example, in Figure 2.1, I showed
how private schools perform considerably better than their public counterparts. Moreover,
inequality in access to high-quality public tertiary education is substantial. The QL reform
aims specifically at reducing inequality at this later stage of one’s educational trajectory.
Most critics of AA in higher education would argue that such policies have limited effects,
since inequality in college access has its roots much earlier in the student’s academic career.
In this context, it is extremely important to assess whether QL impacted the high school
system as a whole and, importantly, whether it had any distributional effects.
In this version of the manuscript, I focus on assessing whether QL affects the quality of
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public schools that receive these previously private-school kids.19 To do so, I construct a
panel dataset at school level, including only public high schools. Then, I compute variable
SharePrivpmy, which is the share of incoming students in the first year of secondary education
at public school p, microregion m and year y, that came from a 9th grade at a private school.
Due to data constraints for the quality index, I focus on cohorts of first year high school
students of years 2010 and 2011, for pre-reform periods, and of 2013 and 2014, for post-
reform. Note that, in comparison to the previous section, there is a slight change of notation.
For example, 9th graders of time t=2009 are now first year high school students of year
y=2010.
Table 2.9 presents the distribution of variable SharePrivpy for the cohort of 1st year high
school students of 2010. Its median share is 1.3 percent, the 90th percentile is 8.2 and the
99th percentile is 42 percent. This means that, from the 6443 of Brazilian public high schools
of Sample 50, the vast majority receives none or only a very small number of students that
went to a private middle school. I, then, select only the top quartile and top decile (hereafter
Top Quart and Top Dec) of the sample based on variable SharePrivpm,2010. These are the
public schools that, in pre-periods, received most of the 9th graders from a private school. I,
then, estimate the following model, for each of these sample of schools:
Ypym = βy
∑
y=2010,2011,2013,2014
Y earyTreat
j
m + αpm + αy + εmpy, j = 1, 2, (2.4)
where Ypym is the outcome for public school p, microregion m and year y. The treatment
variable, Treatjm, at microregion level, is interacted with years 2010, a pre-period, 2013 and
2014, post-reform periods. Year 2011 is the baseline in this case. The terms αpm controls
for school fixed effects (while also absorbing microregion fixed effects) and αy controls for
year fixed effects. Standard errors εmpy are clustered at mesoregion level and observations
are weighted by the number of students in each school.
Table 2.10 shows results for the outcome SharePrivpmy. Considering all public schools,
the adoption of QL increases the share of previously private school students by 1.4 percent in
2013 and by 2.0 p.p. in 2014. In contrast, focusing on the sample Top Dec, the effect of QL
is 4.7 p.p. in 2013 and 7.5 p.p. in 2014. I, then, investigate the effect of QL on school quality.
To measure quality, I rely on grades of high school concluders at the National Standardized
Exam of High School (ENEM). For each cohort of first year high school students in year y, I
19I am currently working on the additional questions I posed in the first paragraph. Specifically, in the
next version of this manuscript, I plan to investigate whether the effect QL spills over to students originally
attending public schools. Also, I plan to assess how it affects the quality of private schools. This will allow
me to have a more comprehensive understanding of how QL affects the high school system as a whole.
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obtain their average grades in the ENEM exam of year y+2, when they conclude high school.
Results from Table 2.11 show that, for all schools, the effect on quality is zero in 2013 and
around 0.04 standard deviations in 2014, although the point estimate is not significant. For
sample Top Dec, alternatively, the effect of QL is 0.03 standard deviation in 2013 and 0.08
in 2014. Most importantly, Table 2.11 presents convincing evidence that QL has a positive
effect on the quality of public schools, especially for the ones in the Top Dec sample, which
received considerably more private school students. Taken together, these results suggest
that the mobility of private school students to public schools induced by QL is an important
driver of this increase in quality.20
However, it is important to point out that this effect is heterogeneous along the distri-
bution of schools. Note that schools in each sample are very different in terms of pre-levels
of quality. In the complete sample, the average quality of public schools in 2010 is -0.26
(as measured in a standardized normal with mean zero and standard deviation 1). In the
Top Dec sample, the average is 0.13. This means that, when students decide to move from a
private to a public school, they tend to select originally better public schools than the average
one. Moreover, the QL reform seems to reinforce this pattern. It mostly increases mobility
to schools in the Top Dec sample. Additionally, it increases quality disproportionately at
these better public schools. Although additional research is needed, these results suggest
that QL increases overall quality of public schools. Yet, it seems to also increase inequality
across schools within the public system. In future versions of this manuscript, I plan to dig
more into this question and to understand whether this positive effect on quality spills over
to students originally attending the public schools.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I studied how the adoption of a national affirmative action initiative in the
Brazilian federal higher education system impacted students’ outcomes before college. In
2012, the government approved the national Quotal Law (QL), which reserved 50 percent of
all vacancies in each major and institution to students that attended all three years of high
school in a public institution. By changing incentives for admissions to the most competitive
tertiary institutions in the country, the government encouraged (unintendedly or not) public
high school attendance.
I find that a full adoption of QL increases strategic mobility from private to public schools
by 29 percent. Moreover, I find that this effect is stronger for non-whites, who benefit from an
additional subquota, and for students originally attending low-SES and low-quality private
20In the next version of this manuscript, I plan to test this directly through an IV-approach.
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schools. Moreover, I investigate how this exogenous influx of private school students affect
the quality of public schools. First, I find the these students choose to move to public schools
that are originally better than the average one. Second, I find that, even if they come from
low-SES and low-quality private schools, QL has a positive effect on public school quality.
However, this effect is concentrated on a small number of schools that were already better
than the average one. Therefore, it seems that the mobility from private to public schools
induced by QL positively affects the quality, but simultaneously increases inequality within
the public school system.
There are still many questions left unanswered, which I plan to address in future versions
of this manuscript. Is this positive effect on quality just a result of a composition effect or
does it also spill over to students originally attending public schools? What dimensions do
these possible spillover effects influence? For example, in addition to grades, I plan to look at
high school persistence, graduation and college application decisions. How are private schools
affected? Finally, what are the overall consequences of this policy for the high school system?
Preliminary results for the public school system suggest a positive effect on integration for
a small number of public schools, but an increase in segregation between these schools and
the rest of the public system. Additional research is needed to clarify such points and for a
better understanding of the overall effects of QL and, more generally, of whether AA policies
in higher education are capable to reduce inequality in the basic education system.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Private vs Public Schools
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of private and public schools in Brazil, according to a quality and a
socioeconomic index. It includes all schools that offer the second cycle of primary (grades 5-9) and secondary
education, according to the Census of Basic Education of 2011. The measure of school quality comes from
average grades in the National Standardized Exam of High School (ENEM Escola 2011). The Socioeconomic
Index (INSE 2011-2013) is computed by INEP in a continuous scale with mean 50 and standard deviation
10.
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Figure 2.2: Example of the Quota Law for the State of Bahia
Notes: From every 100 vacancies offered by each major in a federal institution, 50 are reserved to students
that attended all three years of secondary education in a public school, while the other 50 are open for
regular competitive entrance. From the vacancies reserved to public school students, half are also reserved to
individuals from families of per capita income of less than 1.5 minimum wage. Finally, the State of Bahia has
77 percent of non-white individuals according to the Census of 2010. Therefore, 77 percent of the reserved
vacancies has to be destined to the non-white. Source: own elaboration based on Law 12.711/2012.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Treatment Variable
Notes: This map shows the location of the 50 microregions in Brazil with a federal university, which I referred
to as Sample 50 in the main text. The microregions are coloured according to their level of treatment, which
can vary from zero (not-treated) to 1 (fully-treated).
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Figure 2.4: Estimate of Treatment Effects between School Systems
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Notes: In this Figure, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders to
secondary school. Private refers to movements from private to public schools and Public to movements from
public to private institutions. Year 2011 is the baseline, 2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012 to 2015 are
treated periods. CI are 95% confidence intervals. Specifications include year and school FE, individual and
microregion time-varying controls.
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Figure 2.5: Estimate of Movements from Private to Public Schools by Ethnicity
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Notes: In this Figure, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
private school to a public secondary school. Non-white refers to individuals self-declared as black, indigenous
or mixed and Whites to individuals self-declared as whites or Asians. Year 2011 is the baseline, 2008 to 2010
are pre-periods and 2012 to 2015 are treated periods. CI are 95% confidence intervals. Specifications include
year and school FE, individual and microregion time-varying controls.
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Figure 2.6: Estimate of Movements from Private to Public Schools by School of Origin
Socioeconomic Status
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Notes: In this Figure, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders
of a private school to a public secondary school. Low-SES refers to origin schools in the bottom quartile
of the distribution of socioeconomic status according to an index computed by the National Institute of
Educational Studies and Research in Brazil (so-called INSE 2011-2013). High-SES refers to origin schools in
the top quartile. CI are 95% confidence intervals. Specifications include year and school FE, individual and
microregion time-varying controls.
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Figure 2.7: Estimate of Movements from Private to Public Schools by School of Origin
Quality Index
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Notes: In this Figure, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders
of a private school to a public secondary school. The Quality Index was based on grades at the National
Standardized High-School Exam of 2011 and computed by INEP (Enem Escola 2011 ). Top refers to private
schools classified in the top half of the distribution of test scores and Bottom refers to all other schools, both
classified in the bottom-half or not classified at all. CI are 95% confidence intervals. Specifications include
year and school FE, individual and microregion time-varying controls.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Cohort Observations Median Wages Share College
All Sample 50 All Sample 50 All Sample 50
2008 2974583 1339030 11060 13405 30.4 32.8
2009 3042326 1373501 11732 13776 30.4 32.8
2010 2998554 1352048 12477 14720 30.3 32.8
2011 2972360 1346985 13273 15864 30.7 32.9
2012 2973644 1349088 14484 16625 31.5 35.1
2013 2990971 1360930 15410 17581 31.5 35.7
2014 2856323 1310270 15960 18285 31.5 33.7
2015 2722276 1224427 15471 17583 31.7 33.9
Total 23531037 10656279 13561 17015 31.0 33.7
Cohort Public School Private to Public Public to Private
All Sample 50 All Sample 50 All Sample 50
2008 88.1 83.5 16.7 15.9 1.8 1.8
2009 87.8 83.0 16.2 15.3 2.0 2.0
2010 87.1 81.9 16.0 15.2 2.0 2.1
2011 86.4 81.0 16.4 15.4 2.0 2.2
2012 86.1 80.4 18.5 17.6 1.8 1.8
2013 85.8 80.2 19.3 18.4 1.8 1.9
2014 85.1 79.3 21.0 20.3 1.6 1.6
2015 85.3 79.4 21.9 20.9 1.5 1.5
Total 86.5 81.1 18.3 17.5 1.8 1.9
Notes: This table compares descriptive statistics for the Sample of 50 microregions I use for the baseline
analysis, versus the complete population. Median Wages and Share College are, respectively, the median
wages and proportion of individuals with a college degree among the formal workers in the microregion of
the median 9th grade student. Public School is the proportion of 9th graders attending a public school, while
Private to Public and Public to Private refer to moves from one system to other, between 9th grade of primary
to the 1st year of secondary education.
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Table 2.2: Regression on Treatment Status in 2011
Treatm Standard Errors Observations
Public School -0.0436 (0.0400) 1346985
Private to Public 0.0366 (0.0300) 221604
Public to Private 0.000154 (0.0105) 811737
Log Median Wage -0.403 (0.291) 1346985
Log N Formal -0.350 (0.455) 1346985
Share College -0.135 (0.0881) 1346985
Notes: This contains results of regressions of covariates on the variable for treatment Treatm in year 2011,
the baseline. Public School is the proportion of 9th graders attending a public school, while Private to Public
and Public to Private refer to moves from one system to other, between 9th grade of primary to the 1st year
of secondary education. Log Median Wages, Log N Formal, Share College are, respectively, the log of median
wages, the log of the number of workers and the proportion of individuals with a college degree, among the
formal workers in the microregion.
77
Chapter 2. Does Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education Impact High Schools?
Table 2.3: Moves from Private to Public School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatm.2008 -0.00215 -0.00177 -0.00140 0.00418
(0.0109) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Treatm.2009 -0.0132 -0.0165 -0.0162 -0.0122
(0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.00907)
Treatm.2010 -0.0177 -0.0126 -0.0123 -0.0110
(0.0120) (0.0100) (0.00998) (0.0108)
Treatm.2012 0.0308*** 0.0292*** 0.0290*** 0.0252***
(0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.00902)
Treatm.2013 0.0603*** 0.0505*** 0.0502*** 0.0449***
(0.0205) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0128)
Treatm.2014 0.0801** 0.0752*** 0.0749*** 0.0678***
(0.0344) (0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0221)
Treatm.2015 0.0682** 0.0702*** 0.0696*** 0.0596***
(0.0292) (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0192)
N 1724125 1724080 1724080 1724080
Adj. R2 0.027 0.232 0.233 0.233
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes
Notes: In this Table, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
private school to a public secondary school. Year 2011 is the baseline, 2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012
to 2015 are treated periods. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis and are clustered at the mesoregion
level. Individual controls include gender, age, ethnicity and urban status. Microregion controls include log
of number of workers in the formal sector, log of yearly wage of the median worker in the formal sector and
share of individuals with college among formal workers in the region.
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Table 2.4: Moves from Public to Private School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatm.2008 -0.000689 -0.000865 -0.00101 -0.000546
(0.00607) (0.00620) (0.00621) (0.00649)
Treatm.2009 0.0000132 -0.000551 -0.000722 -0.000456
(0.00279) (0.00292) (0.00294) (0.00318)
Treatm.2010 -0.00280 -0.00304 -0.00317 -0.00307
(0.00237) (0.00253) (0.00254) (0.00241)
Treatm.2012 -0.00260 -0.00295 -0.00297 -0.00330
(0.00261) (0.00244) (0.00241) (0.00231)
Treatm.2013 -0.00466 -0.00513* -0.00481* -0.00475
(0.00298) (0.00279) (0.00267) (0.00288)
Treatm.2014 -0.00371 -0.00392 -0.00363 -0.00372
(0.00424) (0.00394) (0.00378) (0.00362)
Treatm.2015 -0.00292 -0.00325 -0.00307 -0.00300
(0.00419) (0.00404) (0.00383) (0.00363)
N 6348207 6348152 6348152 6348152
Adj. R2 0.008 0.050 0.052 0.052
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes
Notes: In this Table, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
public school to a private secondary school. Year 2011 is the baseline, 2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012
to 2015 are treated periods. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis and are clustered at the mesoregion
level. Individual controls include gender, age, ethnicity and urban status. Microregion controls include log
of number of workers in the formal sector, log of yearly wage of the median worker in the formal sector and
share of individuals with college among formal workers in the region.
79
Chapter 2. Does Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education Impact High Schools?
Table 2.5: Moves from Private to Public School - Non-white Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatm.2008 -0.0410 -0.00934 -0.00962 -0.0117
(0.0271) (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0274)
Treatm.2009 -0.0169 -0.00919 -0.00928 -0.0120
(0.0192) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0166)
Treatm.2010 -0.0223 -0.00705 -0.00695 -0.00632
(0.0180) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0166)
Treatm.2012 0.0548*** 0.0481*** 0.0480*** 0.0411***
(0.0184) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0147)
Treatm.2013 0.0936*** 0.0730*** 0.0731*** 0.0690***
(0.0312) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0148)
Treatm.2014 0.0952** 0.0853** 0.0853** 0.0802***
(0.0453) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0280)
Treatm.2015 0.0992** 0.0977*** 0.0977*** 0.0913***
(0.0369) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0214)
N 269836 269396 269396 269396
Adj. R2 0.047 0.255 0.255 0.255
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes
Notes: In this Table, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
private school to a public secondary school, for students self-declared as black, mixed and indigenous only
(non-white). Year 2011 is the baseline, 2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012 to 2015 are treated periods.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis and are clustered at the mesoregion level. Individual controls
include gender, age, ethnicity and urban status. Microregion controls include log of number of workers in
the formal sector, log of yearly wage of the median worker in the formal sector and share of individuals with
college among formal workers in the region.
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Table 2.6: Moves from Private to Public School - White and Asian Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatm.2008 -0.00733 -0.00241 -0.00230 0.00278
(0.0139) (0.00984) (0.00982) (0.00905)
Treatm.2009 -0.0143 -0.0150 -0.0150 -0.0104
(0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00952)
Treatm.2010 -0.0248* -0.0176* -0.0176* -0.0168*
(0.0124) (0.00979) (0.00979) (0.00959)
Treatm.2012 0.0262** 0.0215** 0.0214** 0.0199**
(0.0121) (0.00953) (0.00953) (0.00850)
Treatm.2013 0.0335** 0.0333*** 0.0330*** 0.0280***
(0.0154) (0.00942) (0.00944) (0.00868)
Treatm.2014 0.0530** 0.0571*** 0.0569*** 0.0505***
(0.0211) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0157)
Treatm.2015 0.0398** 0.0494*** 0.0491*** 0.0395**
(0.0191) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177)
N 552670 552414 552414 552414
Adj. R2 0.019 0.201 0.202 0.202
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes
Notes: In this Table, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
private school to a public secondary school, for students self-declared as white or Asian. Year 2011 is the
baseline, 2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012 to 2015 are treated periods. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis and are clustered at the mesoregion level. Individual controls include gender, age, ethnicity and
urban status. Microregion controls include log of number of workers in the formal sector, log of yearly wage
of the median worker in the formal sector and share of individuals with college among formal workers in the
region.
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Table 2.7: Moves from Private to Public School - By School Socioeconomic Level
Quart 1 Quart 2 Quart 3 Quart 4
Treatm.2008 -0.00766 -0.0146 -0.00537 0.000897
(0.0324) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.00469)
Treatm.2009 -0.0377** -0.0213 -0.0168 0.00552
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0112) (0.00577)
Treatm.2010 -0.0183 -0.0130 -0.0181** 0.00146
(0.0304) (0.0154) (0.00785) (0.00371)
Treatm.2012 0.0382 0.0478*** 0.00762 0.00564
(0.0276) (0.0162) (0.00946) (0.00524)
Treatm.2013 0.0673** 0.0539*** 0.0326*** 0.00549
(0.0269) (0.0152) (0.00909) (0.00369)
Treatm.2014 0.106** 0.0807*** 0.0613*** 0.0131***
(0.0403) (0.0207) (0.0148) (0.00448)
Treatm.2015 0.109*** 0.0772** 0.0495** 0.0186**
(0.0388) (0.0299) (0.0220) (0.00700)
N 220621 285117 329974 504639
Adj. R2 0.144 0.105 0.097 0.068
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: In this Table, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
private school to a public secondary school, by school socioeconomic status. Quart 1 refers to origin schools
in the bottom quartile of the distribution of socioeconomic status according to an index computed by INEP
(so-called INSE 2011-2013). Quart 4 refers to origin schools in the top quartile. Year 2011 is the baseline,
2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012 to 2015 are treated periods. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis
and are clustered at the mesoregion level. Individual controls include gender, age, ethnicity and urban status.
Microregion controls include log of number of workers in the formal sector, log of yearly wage of the median
worker in the formal sector and share of individuals with college among formal workers in the region.
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Table 2.8: Moves from Private to Public School - By School Quality
Top Schools Other Schools Other with HS
Treatm.2008 0.0113 0.00871 0.00865
(0.0112) (0.0238) (0.0214)
Treatm.2009 0.00645 -0.0236** -0.0301***
(0.00884) (0.0116) (0.0102)
Treatm.2010 -0.00183 -0.0163 -0.0146
(0.00683) (0.0173) (0.0176)
Treatm.2012 0.0164** 0.0337** 0.0382***
(0.00613) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Treatm.2013 0.0314*** 0.0576*** 0.0502**
(0.00792) (0.0202) (0.0209)
Treatm.2014 0.0506*** 0.0829** 0.0906***
(0.0138) (0.0320) (0.0324)
Treatm.2015 0.0461*** 0.0723** 0.0886**
(0.0133) (0.0289) (0.0359)
N 812115 911964 474467
Adj. R2 0.082 0.238 0.117
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: In this Table, I plot the estimates of the treatment effects of QL on movements of 9th graders of a
private school to a public secondary school, by school quality index. The Quality Index was based on grades
at the National Standardized High-School Exam of 2011 and computed by INEP (Enem Escola 2011 ). Top
refers to private schools classified in the top half of the distribution of test scores and Other Schools refers
to all other schools, both classified in the bottom-half or not classified at all. Other with HS refer to schools
either in the bottom half or not classified at all, but that offer secondary education. Year 2011 is the baseline,
2008 to 2010 are pre-periods and 2012 to 2015 are treated periods. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis
and are clustered at the mesoregion level. Individual controls include gender, age, ethnicity and urban status.
Microregion controls include log of number of workers in the formal sector, log of yearly wage of the median
worker in the formal sector and share of individuals with college among formal workers in the region.
83
Chapter 2. Does Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education Impact High Schools?
Table 2.9: Distribution of SharePrivpm,2010
All Top Quart Top Dec
1% 0.00 2.86 7.16
5% 0.00 3.06 7.34
10% 0.00 3.30 7.54
25% 0.00 4.00 8.62
50% 1.30 5.98 12.41
75% 4.01 10.45 19.30
90% 8.62 19.30 37.50
95% 15.27 33.06 48.62
99% 42.17 64.35 79.07
Maximum 94.51 9.82 94.51
Mean 3.76 11.20 17.76
Std. Dev. 7.81 94.51 14.38
Obs 6443 1612 645
Notes: SharePrivpm,2010 is the share of students in the first year of high school at school p that came
from 9th grade at a private institution. All contains all 6443 public schools in the sample; Top Quart only
schools in the top quartile of SharePrivp,2010 and Top Dec only the ones in the top decile. Observations are
weighted by number of students.
Table 2.10: Effect on SharePrivpmy
All Top Quart Top Dec
Treatm.2010 -0.00175 -0.00318 0.00444
(0.00237) (0.00428) (0.00613)
Treatm.2013 0.0143** 0.0273*** 0.0474***
(0.00581) (0.00890) (0.0143)
Treatm.2014 0.0200** 0.0393*** 0.0747***
(0.00822) (0.0135) (0.0214)
N 26045 6323 2519
Adj. R2 0.881 0.865 0.850
Average Baseline 0.038 0.112 0.178
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: SharePrivpmy is the share of students in the first year of high school at school p that came from
9th grade at a private institution. All contains all 6443 public schools in the sample; Top Quart only schools
in the top quartile of SharePrivpm,2010 and Top Dec only the ones in the top decile. Standard errors in
parenthesis are clustered at mesoregion level and observations are weighted by number of students.
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Table 2.11: Effect on School Quality
All Schools Schools with Participation >0.5
All Top Quart Top Dec All Top Quart Top Dec
Treatm.2010 -0.0117 -0.0237 -0.0205 -0.00735 -0.00833 -0.0265
(0.0121) (0.0178) (0.0260) (0.0169) (0.0205) (0.0300)
Treatm.2013 -0.00165 -0.0117 0.0298 -0.00586 -0.00788 0.0308
(0.0192) (0.0212) (0.0281) (0.0204) (0.0238) (0.0282)
Treatm.2014 0.0359 0.0400 0.0779** 0.0225 0.0393 0.0744**
(0.0283) (0.0281) (0.0351) (0.0275) (0.0290) (0.0364)
N 25479 6271 2499 12706 4563 2097
Adj. R2 0.900 0.951 0.964 0.949 0.962 0.968
Average Baseline -0.26 -0.06 0.13 -0.16 0.00 0.20
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: School Quality is measured by the average grade of the cohort in the National Standardized Exam
of High School (ENEM). Cohort of first year high school students of 2013, for example, take the EXAM in
2015, near completion of secondary school. All Schools involve all schools with at least one student found in
the ENEM. Schools with Participation >0.5 involve only schools in which at least 50 percent of students take
the ENEM. All contains all 6443 public schools in the sample; Top Quart only schools in the top quartile of
SharePrivpm,2010 and Top Dec only the ones in the top decile. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered
at mesoregion level and observations are weighted by number of students.
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Chapter 3
Correction Methods for Intergenerational
Mobility Estimates
3.1 Introduction
The estimation of the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) ideally requires complete income
series for two generations of fathers and offspring for the construction of lifetime incomes.
However, it is rare to find this ideal setting in empirical applications. What we observe,
instead, are snapshots of data that contain a limited number of income observations in the
life cycle. If those income snapshots do not mimic lifetime incomes, we have the so-called
lifecycle bias. The literature has proposed different methods to address this issue, which
can be classified into two alternative approaches. One option is to formulate an errors-in-
variables model that formalizes the relation between between (observed) annual and (typically
unobserved) lifetime income. For example, the generalized errors-in-variables model proposed
by Haider and Solon (2006) is based on the intuition that for two individuals with different
incomes trajectories, there will nevertheless exist an age at which the difference between their
annual incomes equals the difference between their lifetime incomes. An alternative option is
to directly model the income process that determines the relation between annual and lifetime
incomes, and to predict lifecycle profiles and lifetime incomes from partially observed profiles.
For example, Vogel (2007), Hertz (2007) and Creedy (1988) predict income growth based on
observable characteristics, such as education or occupation.
In this paper, we use uniquely long series of Swedish and simulated data from a calibrated
income process for the U.S. (Guvenen, 2009) to provide evidence on whether and why these
correction methods reduce lifecycle bias, and to propose a more comprehensive way to esti-
mate the IGE with incomplete income data. First, we analyze the key components of the
income process that affect intergenerational estimators: (i) income growth explained by ob-
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servable characteristics; (ii) transitory noise and (iii) unexplained income growth. In Section
3.3, we document that there is strong heterogeneity in income growth among individuals with
similar observable characteristics, and that this heterogeneity relates systematically – and can
be predicted by – parental background. Within each educational or occupational group, sons
with fathers in the top income quartile have substantially steeper income growth, but lower
initial incomes. These differences are sizable. For example, managers from high-income fa-
thers tend to have lower income in their late 20s, but nearly 30 percent higher incomes around
age 40 than managers from less well-off families. These findings contribute to a wider debate
on the properties of income processes, supporting the argument that (residual) income grows
at an individual-specific and deterministic rate. Because this individual heterogeneity relates
systematically to parental income, it also represents an important obstacle for empirical work
in the intergenerational literature.
We then analyze the most popular correction methods in Section 3.4, studying how they
address these key components of the income process. Most intergenerational studies base their
empirical strategy on the generalized errors-in-variables model (GEIV) proposed by Haider
and Solon (2006), whose slope coefficient captures how differences in log annual income
map into differences in log lifetime income. While properties of the income process are
not explicitly considered, they inform the model’s errors-in-variables assumptions. Its key
prediction is that lifecycle bias can be minimized by measuring incomes at some age around
midlife. However, the exact age at which bias is minimized is not known in applications.
Table A.1 lists a number of recent papers, and how measurement error has been addressed in
each of them. Most applications relate to the GEIV model in an informal way, as motivation
for the use of income averages at some age. However, the chosen age range is limited by
data availability and varies considerably across studies. For example, Chetty et al. (2014)
use a 2-year average of offspring income around ages 29 to 32 (finding an IGE of 0.34), while
Mazumder (2016) uses an 11-year average centered at age 40 (finding an IGE of 0.66). Such
age variation is problematic as intergenerational elasticity estimates can vary substantially
with the exact age at measurement.1 An errors-in-variables model can therefore minimize
lifecycle bias, but large biases are likely to remain.
An alternative approach is to estimate the income process itself. In this approach, re-
searchers do not simply construct income averages from the observed snapshots, but use
them to deduct the likely shape of an individual’s profile in the unobserved age range. Vo-
gel (2007), Hertz (2007) and Creedy (1988) each proposed methods that explicitly model
key components of the income process. Vogel (2007) and Hertz (2007) allow for unobserved
1Consistent with the standard implication from the Mincer equation that age-earnings profiles diverge
over age (see Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2006)
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individual heterogeneity in the level of income (i.e. individual fixed effects) and observed
individual heterogeneity in income growth as explained by personal characteristics (such as
education or occupation). However, we find that even conditional on those characteristics,
children from high-income parents tend to have steeper income growth. As a consequence,
these methods are still sensitive to the age at which income is being measured, and can-
not eliminate lifecycle bias. The problem is likely to extend to the estimation of mobility
trends, an issue that we return to below. The correction by Creedy (1988) does account
for both observable and unobservable determinants of individual-specific income growth, but
does not explicitly account for the influence of transitory income shocks. In sum, the three
approaches capture important aspects of the income process, but neither captures the three
key properties as illustrated in Section 3.3.
Based on these insights, we propose a new "lifecycle estimator" for estimating the IGE in
incomplete income data, which exploits the available income information more fully. We aim
to combine the strengths of previously proposed methods, while addressing its key limitations.
In a first step, we estimate income profiles based on observable characteristics such as age and
education, and individual fixed effects (similarly as Vogel 2007 and Hertz 2007). However,
we introduce additional sources of heterogeneity, to account for the fact that children from
high-income families tend to have steeper slopes even conditional on those observables. We
avoid estimating an individual-specific growth rate for each individual, which would result in
noisy estimates of the overall profile and lifetime incomes. Instead, our preferred specification
allows for individual slopes to vary with parental characteristics or – if these are unobserved
– with income levels. We can thereby capture one of the key insights from Creedy (1988),
that income profiles tend to "fan out" over age, so that individuals with higher income levels
also tend to have higher income growth over their life cycle.
We show that this lifecycle estimator yields substantially better results, with estimates
of the intergenerational elasticity fluctuating closely around the benchmark estimate based
on long-run incomes. Moreover, the estimator performs well even when there are only very
few (as low as two) income observations available for each person. The method promises,
therefore, to be applicable in a wide range of data settings. In contrast to current practice,
the method exploits all the available income information in the data, and can be used even
when incomes around midlife are not directly observed for the child generation.2
In addition to this lifecycle estimator, we present a "standardized" errors-in-variables
model. It is similar to the generalized errors-in-variables model proposed by Haider and Solon
2We plan to adapt this method also for the estimation of lifetime incomes in the father generation. Its
application to the parent generation is not straightforward because classical measurement error does not
affect intergenerational estimates if occurring on the left-hand side (the child generation), but it will cause
attenuation bias if occurring in the right-hand side variable (the parent generation).
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(2006), but based on standard moments of the income process that might be more readily
estimable in applications. Compared to the classical error-in-variables model, it accounts for
the signal-to-noise ratio but also the fanning out of income profiles over age. Our objective
underlying either of the two methods is to move beyond the simple rule-of-thumb approach in
the current literature, and to enable more targeted corrections of intergenerational mobility
estimates.
Our paper relates to an extensive and growing literature on intergenerational mobility that
has attempted to measure the levels and trends of the IGE in different countries (see Solon
(1999), Black and Devereux (2011) and Jäntti and Jenkins (2015) for reviews). Specifically,
it contributes to the literature on measurement error in intergenerational mobility estimates.
The earlier papers in this literature focused on classical measurement error from incomplete
income data for fathers (Atkinson 1980, Solon 1999). This wave of studies recognized that
lifecycle variation should be accounted for, but assumed that the inclusion of age controls
in the intergenerational regression would solve the issue. More recently, the literature has
focused on non-classical measurement error and lifecycle bias. First discussed in Jenkins
(1987), the problem gained attention with the generalized errors-in-variables (GEiV) model
proposed by Haider and Solon (2006), and applications in different institutional contexts (e.g.
Grawe (2006) for the US, Canada and Germany, Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) for Sweden,
Nilsen et al. (2012) for Norway). More recently, Nybom and Stuhler (2016) have shown that
the GEiV model does not fully eliminate lifecycle bias. In parallel, Creedy (1988), Vogel
(2007) and Hertz (2007) have suggested an alternative approach to deal with this problem,
by modelling how the income profile varies with observable characteristics such as education
or occupation. Related, Chau (2012) and Jäntti and Lindahl (2012) consider lifecycle models
with heterogeneous intercepts and slopes.3
We contribute to this literature in two dimensions. First, we link it to the large literature
on income processes (see Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for a recent review). This link is
interesting in both ways. One the one hand, a formal consideration of the income process
and its key components allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the advantages
and disadvantages of the previously proposed correction methods in the intergenerational
literature, and informs the steps to be taken to better address the measurement problem.
On the other hand, the intergenerational perspective contributes to the ongoing debate on
the role of unobserved heterogeneity in the literature on income processes.4 A controversial
3In light of the measurement problems in estimating the IGE, some recent studies focus instead on the
intergenerational correlation in income ranks. A prominent example include Chetty et al. (2014). Correction
methods for measurement error in ranks are proposed in Nybom and Stuhler (2017) and Kitagawa et al.
(2019).
4We use the term "unobserved heterogeneity" to describe systematic variation in income growth that is
not explained by standard individual characteristics, not in the more specific econometric sense.
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question is if (residual) income grows at an individual-specific and deterministic rate (HIP) or
follows a random walk (RIP). These two models are difficult do distinguish, and standard tests
based on the covariance structure of income growth may not be very informative (Guvenen
2009). We argue that the type of intergenerational data that we use here is informative about
this question, and provides direct and transparent evidence in favor of the HIP hypothesis –
within educational or occupational groups, sons from high-income families have substantially
steeper income growth than those from low-income families, in particular in the early stages
of their career.
Second, and most importantly, we develop two new approaches to improve the IGE es-
timation in absence of complete income data for two generations. We aim to account for
systematic differences in income growth between high- and low-income families, without try-
ing to estimate fully heterogeneous slopes for each individual, which would yield noisy results
in short income data. Although more research is needed for a thoroughly understanding of
the data requirements for the adequate use of the proposed methods, our preliminary anal-
ysis suggest that our proposed lifecycle estimator performs fairly well in the most common
scenario faced by practitioners: the one with a short panel with young sons and old fathers.
The proposed methods could be particularly useful for comparative work on mobility
varaition across countries or over time. The observation that income inequality correlates
positively with the intergenerational elasticity of income across countries (Blanden 2011,
Corak 2013) and across regions within countries (Chetty et al. 2014) has received much
attention. However, it is difficult to estimate the IGE in comparable ways in these settings.
If the shape of income profiles differs across countries, a simple rule-of-thumb prescription
to measure incomes around midlife is likely to introduce different biases in each country.
This measurement problem has been particularly problematic for the estimation of mobility
trends. Existing work is somewhat conflicting. Earlier work has found no evidence of shifts
in mobility in the U.S. for the cohorts born between 1952-75 (e.g. Hertz 2007, Lee and
Solon 2009), or later cohorts (Chetty et al. 2014), a finding that has received much attention
given the large increase in income inequality over this period. However, more recent work
argues differently. Davis and Mazumder (2019) show that the IGE declined sharply for
cohorts born between 1957-64, in comparison with the ones born between 1942-53. Consistent
with this, we demonstrate that prior methods do not reliably capture mobility trends in
the Swedish registers, suggesting that lifecycle bias will be one important reason for these
conflicting results. The explicit consideration of the income process may help to produce
more comparable estimates.
The remaining sections of this paper are divided as following. In Section 3.2, we describe
the Swedish registry data and our sample of analysis. In Section 3.3, we discuss the properties
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of income process and show evidence of each of its key components in the Swedish data. In
Section 3.4, we analyze the current correction methods for the IGE estimates in light of the
income process properties. In Section 3.5, we present our new correction methods and, in
Section 3.6, we conclude.
3.2 Data
We use Swedish administrative panel data from the Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market
and Education Policy (IFAU). The main population is comprised of individuals aged 16-64 at
any point between years 1960-2013 (born 1896-1997). The income data consists of information
on labor earnings. We use income data for the complete population for the years 1968, 1970,
1971, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1982 and 1985-2013. We also have a rich set of individual
characteristics, such as education, occupation and family links. To abstract from female
participation decisions, and as is standard practice in the intergenerational literature, we
focus on father-child pairs in our estimation. Using data of the complete population, we first
remove time effects. Specifically, we run a regression of log earnings of all individuals on year
dummies that vary by educational group, controlling for age fixed effects. We then predict an
earnings measure that is cleaned of the time fixed effects.5 This is useful to obtain lifecycle
profiles and mobility estimates that abstract from the business cycle conditions.
To observe nearly complete income trajectories for the offspring generation, we then
restrict our sample to cohorts born in 1952-60. We only have continuous income data for the
full population from 1968 onwards. We keep information for fathers born from 1927 on, such
that we observe parental income between ages 41-65 for all fathers in our sample. Because
young fathers are over-represented in our sample, our estimates are not representative for the
Swedish population. This is not a concern for our analysis, as long as we observe a sufficiently
heterogeneous sample to study lifecycle patterns in income. We impute data from the gap
years with neighbor observations and we bottom code income in the first percentile of each
cohort. Finally, we use all the data available on earnings to create a measure of lifetime
income for both fathers and sons. For sons, we construct the lifetime income with data from
25-53 years old and for fathers with data from 41-57.
Our final sample of analysis is comprised of 201,063 father-son pairs, distributed across
cohorts as shown if Table 3.1. Unsurprisingly, individuals belonging to younger cohorts are,
on average, more educated, have more educated fathers and occupy higher-level position in
5We estimate the regression Yigat = βgDg + βaDa + βgt(Dg ×Dt) + εigat, where Yigat is the log income
of individual i, educational group g, age a and time t ; Dg are dummy variables for the seven educational
groups, Da are age dummies, and Dg ×Dt are dummy variables interacting all observable years (except the
first year) with education. We then predict Yigat − βˆgt(Dg ×Dt), where βgt is the group-specific time-slope.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Sample
Cohorts All 1952-54 1955-57 1958-60
Father-son pairs 201,063 38,265 67,738 95,060
Father’s Age at Birth of Son 25.7 23.7 25.3 26.8
Log Lifetime Income of Sons 12.26 12.22 12.26 12.28
Percent of Zero Income Obs of Sons 7.2 6.7 7.0 7.5
Log Lifetime Income of Fathers 12.14 12.09 12.13 12.18
Percent of Zero Income Obs of Fathers 5.0 5.7 5.5 4.3
Education Level of Sons
Primary 21.9 27.5 22.8 19.0
Short High School 39.3 35.6 39.2 40.9
High School 24.7 24.8 24.0 25.2
College 14.1 12.1 14.0 14.9
Occupation level of Sons
Less than post-sec required 46.4 47.4 46.8 45.8
Post-secondary required 16.5 17.0 16.3 16.4
Professionals 20.2 19.2 20.2 20.6
Managers 17.0 16.3 16.7 17.3
Number of Missings 67,111 13,950 22,776 30,384
Education Level of Fathers
Primary 52.7 58.3 53.6 49.7
Short High School 20.9 19.5 20.8 21.5
High School 18.8 17.0 18.3 19.9
College 7.7 5.2 7.3 9.0
Number of Missings 11,677 1,923 3,863 5,891
Notes: Log lifetime income variables abstract from time-fixed effects, as described in Section 3.2.
the labor market. This translates into a slightly higher log lifetime income of both sons and
fathers.
3.3 The Income Process: Swedish and Simulated Data
Income fluctuations over the life cycle are the primary source of bias in intergenerational
estimates. We illustrate here some properties of the income process that appear important
in the intergenerational context. Our evidence will be based on actual income series as
observed in the Swedish data, and on income series from simulated data calibrated to the
U.S. economy. This evidence will then help us to characterize the advantages and limitations
of the different correction methods (next section), and to develop those methods further
(Section 3.5).
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A large literature on income processes has studied the shape of income profiles over the
life cycle, and decomposed its most important properties parametrically.6 While the main
properties of income processes are well established, two contrasting viewpoints exist about
the idiosyncratic components of income growth over the life cycle. The restricted income
profile (RIP) model views income as the sum of a mean-reverting component, which reflects
"transitory shocks" that vanish over age, and a random-walk component, which reflects
"permanent shocks" (see MaCurdy 1982). In contrast, the heterogenous income profile (HIP)
model assumes that individual income is not subject to permanent shocks, but instead grows
at an individual-specific and deterministic rate (see Guvenen 2009).
Following Guvenen (2009), let log income for individual i with experience h at time t be
given by
Y ih,t = g(θt, X
i
h,t) + y
i
h,t (3.1)
where g(θt, X ih,t) captures the part of variation that is explained by observable characteristics,7
and
yih,t = α
i + βih+ zih,t + φtε
i
h,t (3.2)
is the individual-specific income unexplained by those characteristics, where zih,t = ρzih,t−1 +
pitη
i
h,t is a persistent and εih,t a transitory shock. Persistent and transitory shock compo-
nents are scaled by time-specific coefficients, as there have been important changes of those
components over time (see Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995).8
The income process described by Guvenen (2009) has three key important components
for our setting: (i) g(θt, X ih,t), the income growth explained by observed characteristics; (ii)
εih,t, the transitory noise; and (iii) αi + βih, the unexplained income growth.9
In Figure 3.1, we show evidence for the importance of each of these components in the
Swedish data. Panel A illustrates that individuals’ income profiles vary systematically with
6This evidence has been used explicitly in studies of the causal effect of parental income (e.g. Carneiro
et al. (2015), but used mostly for motivational purposes in descriptive studies (an exception is Heidrich 2016).
7In Guvenen (2009)’s baseline model, the observable characteristic considered is a cubic polynomial in
experience h. Yet, more generally, we could think as Xit as observables that could include education, gender,
age, etc. The vector θt are the estimated coefficients, which are common to all individuals.
8Additionally, let ε ∼ (0, σ2ε), η ∼ (0, σ2η), z0,t = 0 and(
αi
βi
)
∼ [0,
(
σ2α σαβ
σαβ σ
2
β
)
]
9Note that observed characteristics are the ones available in the data used by the practitioner, which
include, in the most common scenarios, education or occupation. The unexplained income growth, instead,
reflects variables that are unobserved by the researcher. These variables could include, for example, parental
education, occupation or lifetime income. In the Swedish data, however, we do observe such characteristics
and, therefore, can test whether these usually unobserved variables are important predictors of lifetime
income.
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Figure 3.1: Components of the Income Process
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Notes: Panel A shows income trajectories by type of occupation. Panel B focus only on managers, who are
split in four groups, according to their annual income at age 35. Category Q1 refers to the bottom quartile
and Q4 to the top. In Panel C, managers are divided in four groups, according to fathers’ lifetime income.
Finally, in Panel D, managers whose fathers belong to the top quartile of lifetime income are divided in two
additional groups: college-educated fathers and fathers with only primary school.
observable characteristics, such as occupation. Accounting for observable heterogeneity in
gender, age, education or occupation is, therefore, important. Panel B illustrates that the
level of income and subsequent income growth are negatively correlated. Specifically, we split
individuals that work in a manager position into four quartiles of their annual income at age
35. Individuals in the bottom quartile have substantially stronger income growth in the
following years, and individuals in the top quartile experience the lowest growth. Transitory
shocks can rationalize this pattern, which matters because researchers often try to impute
individual lifecycle profiles based on income levels at a particular age.
Panel C provides evidence on a more controversial question, namely if residual income
yih,t grows at an individual-specific and deterministic rate (HIP) or follows a random walk
(RIP). The panel plots the average income profiles of managers by the quartile of their
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fathers’ lifetime income. We find that within each occupational group, sons’ with fathers in
the top income quartile have substantially higher income growth, but lower initial incomes.
Managers from high-income fathers tend to have lower income in their late 20s, but nearly
30 percent higher incomes around age 40 than managers from less well-off families (Figure
3.1, Panel C). We find similar evidence within educational groups (Figure A.1, Panel C),
or when considering other dimensions of family background. For example, in Panel D we
consider managers whose fathers’ income is within the top quartile in their generation, and
plot their mean income trajectory by fathers’ education. We find that among managers with
high-income fathers, those with more educated fathers have steeper income profiles than
those with less educated fathers.
The role of unobserved heterogeneity has remained controversial in the literature on in-
come processes, because empirically it is difficult to distinguish from stochastic processes
with high persistence. However, a consideration of family background yields direct, visual
evidence on this question. Income growth varies systematically with parental characteristics,
even after controlling for an individuals’ own characteristics, such as gender, education, oc-
cupation, age and cohort. Because parental characteristics are predetermined with respect
to, and potentially observed by the child, this pattern is more readily interpreted as a deter-
ministic factor instead of a stochastic shock that would come as a surprise to the individual.
As Guvenen (2009), we find that initial incomes and income growth are negatively corre-
lated. Those with the highest lifetime income have the lowest initial incomes, and much
steeper growth at early age. However, the individual-specific component of income growth is
assumed to be linear in age in Guvenen (2009), while Panel A in (Figure 3.1) suggests that,
in the Swedish context, unobserved heterogeneity matters most at young age, in the 20s and
early 30s.
The fact that children from high-status parents tend to have steeper income profiles
needs to be taken into account when estimating the intergenerational mobility of income.
Researchers commonly predict income growth based on the observable characteristics of a
child, such as his or her education and occupation. Panels C and D of Figure 3.1 suggest
that accounting only for child’s characteristics will be insufficient. To avoid a systematic
bias with respect to parental income, parental characteristics need to be taken into account
when predicting the likely paths of income growth among their children. We show below that
failure to do so can lead to substantial bias in estimates of income mobility.
As an alternative way to evaluate different mobility estimators, we study their perfor-
mance in simulated data. Motivated by the observation that income growth varies systemat-
ically with parental income in the Swedish registers, we simulate income profiles based on the
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HIP process described in Guvenen (2009).10 The process is calibrated to match moments of
the income distribution in the United States, according to parameters estimated in Guvenen
(2009) and reproduced in Appendix Table A.2. We use this calibrated process to simulate
age-income profiles for a large set of individuals. Important for our purposes is how the
various parameters of the income process correlate between parents and children, which does
not follow from the existing literature. We therefore consider two different ways to model
parental lifetime income for each simulated individual. In the first scenario, parental income
is assumed to correlate with all sources of lifetime income, such that log parental lifetime
income is simply a linear projection of the child’s own log lifetime income. In the second
scenario, parental income correlates only with the deterministic and individual-specific slope
of income growth over the life cycle. We focus on evidence from the first scenario here.
3.4 Correction Methods in the Intergenerational Litera-
ture
The correction methods proposed in the literature can be classified into two alternative ap-
proaches, which vary in the specificity in which the income process is being considered: (i)
errors-in-variables models that formalize the relation between (observed) annual and (typ-
ically unobserved) lifetime income, and (ii) models of the income process that indirectly
determine this relation. Table A.1 lists recent applications and the correction methods on
which they are based on. Most applications are motivated by the generalized errors-in-
variables model proposed by Haider and Solon (2006), which yields the simple rule-of-thumb
to measure incomes around midlife. Other studies instead predict individual-specific income
profiles based on observable characteristics, as proposed by Creedy (1988), Vogel (2007) and
Hertz (2007). We review these approaches in this section, and argue that they reduce but do
not eliminate lifecycle bias from intergenerational mobility estimates.
3.4.1 Modelling Errors-in-Variables
Most work in the literature addresses the measurement problem by means of an errors-in-
variables model that links (observed) short-run to (unobserved) lifetime income. Properties
of the income process are not explicitly considered, but inform the errors-in-variables as-
sumptions. These assumptions can therefore be interpreted as a reduced-form representation
10While our evidence supports the HIP model, other evidence speaks in favor of the RIP model (Hryshko
(2012)). The distinction is important for the income process literature, but many of our arguments relate to
properties of the income process that are common to both to models.
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of those properties of the income process that are most important for mobility studies.
The Generalized Errors-in-Variables Model
In the classical errors-in-variables model as considered by Atkinson (1980) or Solon (1999),
inconsistencies in the IGE are limited to attenuation bias caused by measurement error in
the lifetime income of fathers. Jenkins (1987), Haider and Solon (2006) and Grawe (2006),
however, show that the association between current and lifetime income varies systematically
over the life cycle, contrary to a classical errors-in-variables model in which the errors are
independent of true values. Haider and Solon (2006) therefore extend the classical into
a generalized errors-in-variables (GEiV) model, in which this association is formalized.11
Focusing on left-hand side measurement error, we estimate the linear projection
ysit = λsty
∗
si + usit, (3.3)
in which ysit is the son’s of family i short-run or annual (log) income at age t, y∗si is son’s
(log) lifetime income, and y∗si and usit are uncorrelated by construction. Estimated at each
age t, we obtain a series of λˆst. We then estimate
ysit = βty
∗
fi + εsit, (3.4)
where y∗fi is parental lifetime income, obtaining a series of βˆt. Under the assumption that
Corr(y∗fi, usit) = 0 we have
plimβˆt =
Cov(ysit, y
∗
fi)
V ar(y∗fi)
= βλst, (3.5)
where β is the true IGE based on measures of long-run income for both parents and children.
A key implication from equation (3.5) is that the use of short income spans in the child
generation would not bias IGE estimates, if measured at an age in which λst is close to one.12
Haider and Solon (2006) note that λst tends to be around one in midlife, such that estimates
will be less biased when the data is drawn from that age range. This simple generalization
of the classical error-in-variables model captures the relation between annual and lifetime
incomes remarkably well. As shown in Table 3.2, the insight that λst will increase over
11The GEiV model has been extended further in subsequent work. Lee and Solon (2009) adapt it for the
study of mobility trends. An et al. (2017) implement it within a non-parametric framework that allows for
the IGE to be heterogeneous.
12The underlying intuition is that for individuals with different income trajectories there will nevertheless
exist an age t∗ at which the expected difference between individuals’ (log) annual incomes equals the expected
difference between their lifetime incomes.
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age and be close to one around mid-age holds both in registry data from Sweden (see also
Böhlmark and Lindquist 2006) and in simulated income series calibrated to the U.S. labor
market.
Table 3.2: Lifecycle Bias and the Generalized-Errors-in-Variables Model
Sweden U.S. (simulated)
Son’s Age λst βt Son’s Age λst βt
31 0.810 0.208 41 0.896 0.461
32 0.869 0.224 42 0.958 0.470
33 0.940 0.243 43 0.997 0.506
34 1.007 0.258 44 1.036 0.518
35 1.072 0.273 45 1.047 0.525
True 0.254 True 0.497
Notes: Estimates of λst and βt are based on equation (3.3) and equation (3.4), respectively. The income
process for the U.S. is based on Guvenen (2009).
However, the pattern reported in Table 3.2 also illustrates two problems with this ap-
proach. First, lifecycle bias may not be fully eliminated at the age at which λst is equal
to one, because the shape of income profiles varies systematically with parental background
(see Figure 3.1) in ways that are not fully captured by the son’s own lifetime income. The
GEiV model’s underlying assumption that Corr(y∗fi, usit) = 0 can therefore be violated (Ny-
bom and Stuhler (2016)), and even exact knowledge of the lifecycle pattern of λst would not
eliminate lifecycle bias.13
Second, and more serious in practice, is that the age at which λs,t ≈ 1 is typically not
known, as its estimation requires data on lifetime incomes. The applications listed in Table
A.1 instead use the errors-in-variables model to motivate the rule-of-thumb to measure income
at some point in midlife. But Haider and Solon (2006) warn that the optimal age is likely to
vary across countries, and Table 3.2 demonstrates that even slight deviations from the optimal
age t∗ yield substantially different estimates of the IGE. In the Swedish data, estimates of
the IGE vary by 29 percent (from 0.21 to 0.27) within the five-year window between age 31
and 35. This issue is not specific to the Swedish source. In simulated data based on moments
of U.S. labor earnings (see Section 3.3), the IGE varies by about 15 percent (from 0.46 to
0.53) within a five-year window centered at the optimal age. As reported in Table A.1, the
age at measurement varies considerably across studies. Estimates from the current literature
are therefore likely to contain large biases, with unknown direction.
13This problem can be partially addressed by extending the generalized errors-in-variables model with
covariates, see Nybom and Stuhler (2016).
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The Generalized Errors-in-Variables Model and Mobility Trends
Lee and Solon (2009) provide an extension of the generalized errors-in-variables model for
the estimation of mobility trends. They find that the IGE has remained quite stable in
the U.S. income data during the 1980s and 1990s, a result that has received considerable
attention, given the rise in income inequality over the same period. An important question
is whether the issues discussed above only affect the estimated level of the IGE, or also its
estimated trend over time. While the GEiV model may not fully eliminate lifecycle bias in
the estimated level of the IGE, this bias would not affect the estimation of mobility trends
over birth cohorts (or years) if that bias remains stable (i.e. if λst and Corr(y∗fi, usit) remain
constant over cohorts).
Figure 3.2: Trends in Lambdas and IGE Estimates
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However, the structure of income profiles has changed over time in the U.S. (Guvenen,
2009) and other countries, suggesting that the age-profile of λst may also change over cohorts.
Panel A of Figure 3.2 shows that it indeed shifted over the cohorts contained in our Swedish
sample. Measured at age 35, estimates of λ vary between 1 and 1.2 over a cohort range of
less than one decade. According to equation (3.5) , estimates of the IGE based on short-run
income will vary by a similar amount. These magnitudes are large compared to the type
of mobility shifts that we may expect over time. To illustrate this point, Figure 3.2 Panel
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B plots the "true" mobility trend in our Swedish sample (as based on long series of income
for both parent and child generations) as well as the estimated trend when son’s income is
only observed at a particular age (at age 30, 35 or 40, respectively). The estimates based on
annual data capture the direction of the trend, but misstate its magnitude. The IGE increases
over our observation period (black line), but it appears to increase twice as much when child
income is measured at age 35 (red line). This observation reflects the fact that income
distributions, and therefore the value of λ, can change substantially with macroeconomic
conditions (such as the recession that Sweden experienced in the early 1990s).14 We therefore
argue that mobility estimates based on short-run income measured around a fixed age will
not be a good approximation of gradual trends in mobility over time (but may still identify
sudden and large shifts in mobility).
3.4.2 Modelling the Income Process
An alternative is to directly model the income process. After estimating individual profiles
based on observable characteristics and income, we can predict an income measure for each
person, and use in the intergenerational estimation. The key issue is that typically only
short income spans are available, so their extrapolation to the complete life cycle requires
parametric assumptions on the shape of age-income profiles.
We review methods by Hertz (2007), Vogel (2007), and Creedy (1988), who propose
different solutions to this problem. They capture important properties of the income process,
but neither attempts to capture each of the three key properties highlighted in Figure 3.1.
The approach by Creedy (1988) accounts for both observable and unobservable determinants
of individual-specific income growth, but does not account for the influence of transitory
income shocks. The approaches by Vogel (2007) and Hertz (2007) allow for unobserved
individual heterogeneity in income levels (i.e. individual fixed effects) and observed individual
heterogeneity in income growth as explained by own characteristics (such as education or
occupation). However, even conditional on those characteristics, children from high-income
parents tend to have steeper income growth (see Panel C in Figure 3.1).
The resulting estimates of mobility levels or trends therefore still contain some lifecycle
bias. Specifically, our evidence suggests that previous work may have understated the degree
to which the intergenerational elasticity has increased in the United States. This implication
is significant, as an increase in the elasticity should have been expected based on theoretical
14In the absence of direct data on lifetime incomes, it is less clear if this observation extends to the US
case. Lee and Solon (2009) note the rise in income inequality over their sample period, but argue that the
signal-to-noise ratio in log current income as a proxy for log long-run income may have remained stable
(according to the estimates in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), and Haider (2001)). In contrast, Hertz (2007)
argues that age-income profiles have not remained stable.
100
Chapter 3. Correction Methods for Intergenerational Mobility Estimates
arguments, and based on the substantial increase in the variance of income in the child
generation. Our results imply here that methodological improvements might be required to
make a more definitive statement on the time trend of the intergenerational elasticity in the
U.S. or other countries.
Observable Heterogeneity with Individual Fixed Effects
A common approach is to model the income process as a function of age, observable charac-
teristics, and individual fixed effects. Hertz (2007) and Vogel (2007) propose slightly different
implementations of this approach, but their starting point is similar. In a first step, we esti-
mate income profiles with individual fixed effects and growth rates that depend on education
(and possibly other variables). For example, the age-correction in Hertz (2007) is based on
the equation:
log(Yict) = αi + Aictβ + AictZicγ + εict, (3.6)
where t is the period of observation, c is the year of birth, αi are individual fixed effects;
Aict represents a quadratic equation on age; and AictZic represents the interaction of each
of the age variables with a vector of predictors of the shape of the age-earnings profile.15
The corresponding first-step equation in Vogel (2007) is similar.16 Because Hertz’ primary
objective is to estimate mobility trends, this equation is estimated separately for each cohort
in the sample, relaxing the assumption of a constant age-income profile across cohorts.
However, intergenerational studies tend to observe children at young age, while parents
are observed only at older age. It is therefore not straightforward how to estimate complete
lifecycle profiles based on equations (3.6) or (3.7). Hertz (2007) and Vogel (2007) address
this problem in different ways. Hertz predicts the income for each person at one particular
age, such that incomplete profiles do not need to be extrapolated over the entire age range.
Vogel instead aggregates incomes over the complete life cycle. To address that only part
of the life cycle is observed in either generation, he assumes that the shape of age-income
profiles remains similar in the two generations. One can then pool the income information for
parents and children for estimation of the first-step equation (3.7), predict income log(Yˆict)
at each age, and construct measures of lifetime income for each individual. The predicted
15Hertz stresses a number of advantages of this two-step procedure as compared to the errors-in-variables
approach as implemented in Haider and Solon (2006) and Lee and Solon (2009); (i) it permits the inclusion
of individual fixed effects for the age-income profile, and (ii) it takes into account other observable sources of
heterogeneity, such as education. If education affects the shape of age-income profile even after conditioning
on parents’ income, this omission is a source of inconsistency.
16Vogel (2007) estimates
log(Yict) = αi +Aictβ + γt+ εict, (3.7)
separately for each education group. The main differences are the inclusion of a quartic instead of quadratic
in age, and the inclusion of a linear time trend (vs. separate estimations by cohort.)
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lifetime incomes (Vogel) or age-specific incomes (Hertz) are then used for estimation of the
IGE in a second step.
By modelling important determinants of the income process such as education or occupa-
tion (see Panel A in Figures 3.1 and A.1), these methods will reduce lifecycle bias in mobility
estimates. However, income growth varies also within education or occupation groups, and
these differences are also systematically related to parental lifetime income (see Panel C in
Figures 3.1 and A.1). We show next to what degree this unobserved heterogeneity affects
estimates of level and the cohort trend of the intergenerational elasticity. We illustrate our
arguments based on actual income series from the Swedish sample, but they likewise hold in
simulated income series drawn from the income process described in Guvenen (2009).
Estimating Levels
In Table 3.3 Panel A, we report how the approach by Hertz (2007) performs in the Swedish
sample. The row "True” reports our baseline estimate for the IGE. The row "Annual”
reports the IGE estimate when sons’ income are measured at age 25, 30 or 35. Measurement
at a too early age leads to large downward biases, while estimation at a late age generates
an upward lifecycle bias. The other rows then report the IGE estimate based on different
implementations of equation (3.6), varying (i) the sampling range for this first-step estimation
(from 25-30 to the full 25-53 range) and (ii) the age at which incomes are predicted for the
second-step estimation (age 25, 30 or 35).
Application of Hertz’ method reduces the lifecycle bias compared to raw annual esti-
mates.17 However, estimates based on this method still exhibit a clear lifecycle pattern,
increasing systematically with respect to (i) the age range on which the first-step equation
(3.6) is estimated, and (ii) the age at which individual incomes are then predicted. For ex-
ample, the estimate shrinks from 0.167 to 0.143 or 0.071 when the sampling range shrinks
from the full range to age 25-40 or 25-30, respectively.
The intuition here is that the estimates of the fixed effects depend on the age range
included in the profile estimation. In particular, when observing only early ages, we are
understating the lifetime income of those with low initial incomes but steep profiles. The
issue is illustrated in Figure 3.3 Panel A. Suppose the blue line is the true income trajectory
of individual i with a steeper than average profile, while the red line is the mean estimated
income, before adjusting with the individual fixed effect. Now, suppose we only observe sons
from 25-40. In this case, the green line will represent the adjusted estimated income for
individual i, which is nothing more than the red line plus a negative individual fixed effect.
17The reason is that the fixed effects in the first-step prediction can partially capture the substantial
variation of incomes within education groups.
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Table 3.3: Lifecycle Estimators in the Swedish Data
Observed Range Panel A: Predict at Age Panel B: Predict
25 30 35 Complete Profile
25-53 0.197 0.235 0.254 -
25-45 0.167 0.206 0.234 -
25-40 0.143 0.192 0.234 0.255
25-35 0.109 0.175 0.241 0.235
25-30 0.071 0.181 - 0.218
True 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.254
Annual 0.030 0.193 0.273 -
Notes: This table reports estimates from the methods proposed by Hertz (2007) and Vogel (2007) in the
Swedish data. In Panel A, we implement the method proposed by Hertz (2007) . The observed range refers
to the age range of annual incomes used in the first step (equation 3.6 or (3.7). Age of prediction refers to the
age at which income is predicted in the second step (e.g. age 25 in Hertz 2007). In Panel B, we implement
the method proposed by Vogel (2007), in which incomes are instead predicted over the entire lifecycle.
Due to the negative fixed effect, we understate the the lifetime income of those with steeper
profiles, and therefore, the intergenerational elasticity. The shorter and earlier the age range,
the more we are understating the elasticity, as we can see from Table 3.3.
A similar issue affects the approach proposed by Vogel (2007). Again the approach under-
states the lifetime income of sons (observed early in life) with steeper than average profiles,
and overstate the lifetime income of fathers with steep profiles (observed late in life). This
argument is illustrated in Figure 3.3 Panel B. In red, we have the estimated average profile
from one educational group and, in blue, we have an example of the true income for indi-
viduals with steeper profiles. Suppose we observe sons only earlier in life (ages 25-40 in the
picture) and fathers only later in life (ages 40-55). Such individual heterogeneity can only
be captured by the fixed effects, so the father will have a positive fixed effect and the son a
negative fixed effect. As a consequence, we would be understating the lifetime income of sons
(green line), overstating the lifetime income of fathers (gray line), and therefore, understating
the intergenerational elasticity. This argument is illustrated in Table 3.3. As explained con-
ceptually, the estimate of the IGE understates the true value when using income observations
at a young age (e.g. 25-30 and 25-35), and overstates the true value when using observations
at an old age (e.g. after age 40).
Estimating Trends
As explained in Hertz (2007), such lifecycle bias may be less problematic if our objective is
to understand the trend in mobility instead of its level. As long as the remaining lifecycle
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Potential Problems with Fixed Effect Estimators
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Notes: In the Figure, the blue line represents the income trajectory of individuals with steeper than average
profiles, while the red line represents the estimated average income profile. The green line is the average
income adjusted by a negative individual fixed effects, while the gray line is the adjustment by a positive
fixed effect.
bias remains similar across cohorts, we may correctly capture that trend. Hertz keeps the
age at which incomes are predicted constant over cohorts, eliminating variation of the IGE
estimates across the horizontal dimension of Table 3.3. However, estimates of the IGE vary
also with the age range for estimation of the first-step equation, because the estimates of
the fixed effects depend on the age range included in the profile estimation (as illustrated in
Figure 3.3). The shorter and earlier the age range, the more we are understating the IGE,
as we can see from Table 3.3.
This observation is important, because applications rarely hold the age range of the sample
constant when estimating mobility trends (given the limited availability of data for the more
recent cohorts). For example, the younger cohorts in Hertz (2007) are estimated on a shorter
and earlier age range (see Table 2 in Hertz 2007), and suffer then from a stronger downward
bias. To illustrate the potential magnitude of this problem, we replicate it in the Swedish
sample in Figure 3.4. In black, we plot the "true" trend based on our baseline estimate, which
suggests that the IGE has been increasing in our sampling period. In red, we plot estimates
based on predicted incomes at age 25, as based on the first-step estimation of equation (3.6)
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in income from ages 25-45 (blue line) or age 25-35 (red line). While their levels are off, these
estimates do replicate the increasing trend in IGE estimates. However, these results were
based on a fixed sampling range, while the sampling range varies in many applications. If we
reduce the age range for the more recent cohorts, the increase in the trend is substantially
understated (green line). Our findings therefore suggest that the preferred estimates in Hertz
(2007) and similar applications understate the cohort-trend in the IGE in the United States.
Figure 3.4: Estimation of Trends in the IGE
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Notes: In this Figure, we plot trends in the IGE using the Swedish data. In black, we plot the true IGE.
In blue and in red, we plot the IGE corrected by the Hertz method using, respectively, ages 25-45 and 25-35
as the age-ranges for estimation. Finally, in green, we plot the yearly adjusted estimates, similar to the one
implemented in Hertz (2007). Here, the age range for estimation reduces as the cohorts become younger. For
the 1952 cohort, the age range for estimation is 25-43, for the 1953 cohort, the range is 25-42, and so on. For
the 1960, the youngest cohort, the age range is 25-35. As in Hertz (2007), the age used for prediction is 25.
Extrapolating from Observable Profiles
An alternative approach is to adjust annual incomes based on information on average age-
earnings profiles obtained from external data sources (e.g. Atkinson 1980, Jenkins 1987).
Creedy (1988) expands on this idea, developing a correction method based on the insight
that the dispersion of earnings tends to increase over age, even conditional on education
or occupation (see Figure A.2). Instead of estimating a separate income profile for each
individual, he assumes that growth rate depends on the rank of the individual in the income
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distribution. An important advantage of this method is that it can be implemented in cross-
sectional data sources.
In a first step, we estimate how the mean and the variance of log income vary over age
within each occupational or educational group. Following Creedy (1988), we estimate
log(Yij) = β0 + β1ageij + β2age
2
ij + uij, (3.8)
separately by each occupational or educational group j, where Yij is the income of individual
i and group j. Then, we predict µˆtj, which is the average income by each occupational group
j and age group t. The variance of log income σ2tj is also computed within each group. Then,
we estimate:
σ2tj = β0 + β1agetj + tj, (3.9)
and obtain predicted values for σˆ2tj. Alternatively, one can obtain these measures from ex-
ternal sources.
In a second step, these predicted values are used to rescale individual incomes to a common
base year. First, compute the standardized value of an individual’s log-earnings,
zt = log(Yt)− µˆtj/σˆtj. (3.10)
Then, rescale these standardized incomes according to the occupation or education-specific
age-earning profile to compute adjusted log earnings at a common age t* :
log(Yt∗) = µˆt∗j + zσˆt∗j. (3.11)
Those adjusted earnings depend on a single observable income at age t and on the values of
µˆt and σˆt that were predicted within the educational and/or occupational group. Finally, we
have adjusted income observations for different ages, computed based on a single cross-section
observation and scaling factors. Creedy proposes to either use adjusted earnings directly or
to compute an aggregated discounted lifetime earnings measure for the estimation of the
IGE.
We implement this method in the Swedish data. We combine the first-step estimates of
(µˆtj) and σˆ2tj with an individual’s earning at a certain age, to obtain his predicted income
from ages 25-53 (which are then used to construct lifetime incomes). We therefore obtain a
different measure of lifetime income, and a different estimate for the IGE, depending on the
age at which we measure sons’ income. We plot the resulting estimates of the IGE in Panel
A of Figure 3.5. We compare estimates based on the "true" lifetime income of sons (black
line), estimates based on annual incomes (green line), and two versions of Creedy’s proposed
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Figure 3.5: Extrapolating from Observable Profiles
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Notes: In the Figure, we compare the implementation of the Creedy method in the Swedish versus simulated
data. The green line represents annual estimates, the blue line the estimates after Creedy’s correction using
true values of the mean and variance of income and the red line the Creedy implementation with linear
estimates for the mean and the variance, according to equations 3.8 and 3.9.
estimator. In the first, we approximate the profiles of (µˆtj) and σˆ2tj with a linear function
in age (red line). In the second, we use their non-parametric age profile as observed in the
sample (blue line).
The comparison demonstrates that estimates of the IGE can be significantly improved by
taking the dispersion of income growth over age into account. The corrected estimates are
within 20 percent of the benchmark over the age range 30 to 50, even if the age profiles of
µˆtj and σˆ2tj are approximated linearly. The correction is not as good as in Haider and Solon
(2006), but it is also based on substantially less ambitious data – only the age pattern of
the variances and means is required. As Creedy discusses, the statistics that are necessary
for the correction can potentially be estimated from a single cross-section. However, Figure
3.5 also shows that the correction method works only imperfectly, and tends to overstate
the IGE over most of the age range. We study the performance of this method further in
income series based on U.S. data (see Section 3.3), in which we can more exactly point to
the components of the income process that can or cannot be accommodated by this method.
Creedy’s correction does not work well in this simulated data, as shown in Panel B of Figure
3.5.
A key limitation is that equation (3.11) rescales incomes based on the assumption that
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individual’s rank in the widening income distribution remains stable over age. That is, it is
assumed that individuals with high rank in annual incomes have higher income growth in the
future. This is not the case in simulation or data, as illustrated in Panel B of 3.1. Because of
the presence of short-term noise (i.e. the AR(1) process in the simulation), annual incomes
are instead mean-reverting – individuals with high income rank at age t tend to have lower
income growth in the next few years. In short, the method proposed by Creedy (1988) does
not address for the presence of transitory noise. In the HIP process proposed by Guvenen
(2009), for example, incomes at early ages are dominated by shocks and HIP intercepts, but
incomes at late ages and log lifetime incomes are dominated by growth rates. As a result,
the imputation in equation (3.11) overstates the variance of lifetime incomes, and thus tends
to overstate the IGE (if applied to offspring on LHS of equation). The method performs
performs better the more important the heterogeneous growth rates are compared to the
transitory shock component.
3.5 New Correction Methods
In this section, we propose two distinct methods to address lifecycle bias in the estimation
of the intergenerational elasticity. In the first method, we propose a lifecycle estimator that
extends previous work by explicitly allowing for children from high-income parents to have
steeper income profiles than their peers. In the second method, we consider a "standardized"
errors-in-variables model, which relates the generalized errors-in-variables model proposed by
Haider and Solon (2006) to moments that are more directly estimable in practice.
3.5.1 The Lifecycle Estimator
In this section, we consider estimation of the intergenerational elasticity by means of a "life-
cycle estimator". In a first step, we estimate the shape of individual income profiles over
the life cycle. This allows us to predict the complete lifecycle profile, and therefore lifetime
income, for each person. In the second step, we estimate the intergenerational elasticity
based on the predicted lifetime incomes. This lifecycle estimator uses the available income
information more fully than the rule-of-thumb implementations based on income averages
that are prevalent in the current literature. We illustrate that the estimator can be applied
in a wider range of data scenarios, and that it provides more robust and more comparable
estimates than the estimator based on income averages.
Our estimator builds on existing methods to predict lifecycle income profiles based on
observable characteristics (Vogel 2007 and Hertz 2007) or income ranks (Creedy, 1988). As
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shown in Section 3.4, these estimators perform substantially better than naive estimators
based on annual incomes, but still suffer from systematic lifecycle biases. No existing method
addresses the three key components of the income process described in Section 3.3: (i) income
growth explained by observable characteristics; (ii) transitory noise and (iii) unexplained
income growth. By combining the relative strengths of previously proposed methods, we
hope to account for all three components, and to address lifecycle bias more fully.
In a first step, we estimate individual lifecycle profiles. We allow for income profiles
to vary with observable characteristics such as age and education, and allow for individual
fixed effects (as Vogel 2007 and Hertz 2007). We however also account for the fact that
children from high-income families tend to have steeper slopes, even conditional on their own
observable characteristics (see Figure 3.1 in Section 3.3).18 Specifically, we estimate
log(Yict) = αi + Aictβ + AictZicγ + AgeictPicδ + εict, (3.12)
where t is the period of observation, c is the year of birth, αi are individual fixed effects, Aict
represents a quadratic equation on age; AictZic represents a linear interaction of age with a
vector of the individual’s own characteristics (such as education); and AgeictPic represents a
linear interaction of age with family characteristics or other predictors of the shape of the
age-earnings profile among individuals with similar observable characteristics.
In a first specification (the 2-step parental estimator), Pic contains parental income and
four indicators for parental education. This specification controls rather directly for variation
in income growth by parental background. However, parental education and/or income
will not always be observed in the data at hand. We therefore consider also alternative
specifications that do not require the observation of parental characteristics.
In a second specification (the 2-step FE linear estimator), we allow individual slopes to
vary systematically with the level of an individual’s own income. The underlying intuition
is that individuals from high-income families have both higher levels and steeper slopes than
those from low-income families (see Figure A.1, Panel C). In settings in which we cannot
directly control for parental background, we may therefore still be able to capture some of
the systematic heterogeneity in slopes by considering their co-variation with income levels
(which are partially observed).19 To implement this idea, we first estimate equation (3.12)
18Such heterogeneity can potentially be captured by (i) estimating separate slopes for each individual (see
Jäntti and Lindahl 2012), or by (ii) estimating how individual slopes vary with parental background. We
do not pursue the first option, as direct extrapolation from partially observed slopes may produce unstable
predictions of lifetime income if only few income observations are available per person (as is typically the
case in the intergenerational context). Instead, we allow for individual slopes to vary systematically with
parental characteristics or an individual’s own income history.
19This estimator is inspired by the observation of Creedy (1988) that income profiles tend to "fan out"
over age, and that individuals with higher income levels tend to have higher income growth. By measuring
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without the AgeictPic interaction, to yield estimates of the individual fixed effect αˆi. We
then re-estimate the equation with the AgeictPic interaction, setting Pic = αˆi.20 Finally,
we consider a variant of this strategy in which we interact the fixed effect with a quadratic
instead of linear function in age (the 2-step FE quadratic estimator). The choice of quadratic
interaction is motivated by the observation that income growth varies more strongly in the
early career than later in life.
Three conceptual issues arise in the estimation of lifecycle estimators, such as equation
(3.12). First, the estimation consists of two or even three steps, which affects inference and
the estimation of standard errors. However, sampling uncertainty is not a major concern in
our setting, since our samples are very large. We therefore ignore uncertainty from the first
stage. Second, the child generation is typically only observed at young age, so the shape
of income profiles need to be extrapolated over the non-observed age range. This issue can
be addressed in different ways, depending on data availability and context.21 We therefore
abstract from the issue here, exploiting the fact that we do observe long income profiles in
our main sample. Specifically, we split each income profile in our child generation into two
copies, with income for the "younger" copy assumed to be observed only up to some age
threshold, and the "older" copy being observed thereafter. We thereby focus on the problem
of missing income information for any given person, while abstracting from the issue that
certain age ranges might not be observed for any comparable individual in the population.
A third conceptual issue is that the dependent variable in equation (3.12) is the loga-
rithm of annual income. For the construction of (absolute) lifetime income, the predictions
from this model need to be converted to absolute incomes, which gives rise to a well-known
re-transformation problem: while the fitted values from the regression have mean zero by con-
struction (E[εˆict] = 0), their mean will be positive after the transformation (E[exp(εˆict)] > 0).
To our knowledge, this issue has so far been ignored in the intergenerational literature. In
itself, a non-zero mean is not problematic for intergenerational estimators. If the term is
constant across individuals, it would be linearly separable in log lifetime income and there-
fore only affect the intercept of the intergenerational regression, not the intergenerational
an individual’s position with the fixed effect αi (instead of the individual’s annual income or income rank)
we however avoid the issue that annual incomes tend to be mean reverting because of transitory noise (see
Section 3.3).
20In general, the individual fixed effects from this second regression will not coincide with the fixed effects
as estimated from the first regression. To reduce these deviations we could estimate the equation multiple
times, updating Pic = αˆi after each regression. We do not implement this procedure here, as it appears to
have only a negligible effect on estimates of the IGE.
21Potential solutions are to extrapolate based on functional form assumptions, to pool the child and parent
generation based on the assumption that the shape of income profiles are sufficiently similar (as proposed by
Vogel 2007), or to use an auxiliary data set in which a single generation is observed over a sufficiently long
time period, or in which individuals of different ages are observed around the same time period.
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elasticity. However, exp(εˆict) tends to have a larger mean for individuals with low lifetime
income in our data, because their incomes tend to be more variable over the lifecycle. This
systematic variation would bias estimates of the intergenerational elasticity upwards. Be-
cause the re-transformation problem is a generic problem that affects any estimator based
on log annual incomes, we abstract from it when constructing our estimators.22
We present evidence on the performance of our proposed lifecycle estimators in Table 3.4.23
To probe their performance in different data settings, we consider different age thresholds,
assuming that child income is observed only between age 25 and 27 (first row), age 25 and
30 (second row), and so on. In column (1), we report our benchmark estimate (i.e. the
direct estimate based on lifetime incomes for both child and parent generation), which is
approximately βˆ = 0.26.24 In column (2), we report an estimate based on annual incomes
for the child generation. Specifically, we measure annual incomes at the median age within
each age bracket (e.g. age 26 in the first row, and age 28 in the second row). As shown
previously, the estimated elasticity is very sensitive to the age at measurement. It is as low
as βˆannual = 0.08 when incomes are measured between age 25 and 27, and generally deviates
substantially from the benchmark estimate.
In columns (3) to (6) we implement the lifecycle estimators. In column (3), we report
a baseline lifecycle estimator that is based on estimating the first-step equation (3.12). We
estimate this equation separately for four education groups (as defined in Figure A.1), instead
of including education as a separate predictor. This estimator corresponds closely to the
estimator proposed by Vogel (2007), and performs accordingly. While performing much
better than the naive estimator based on annual incomes, it still deviates substantially from
the benchmark estimate, and also varies systematically with age. The estimates are still as
low as βˆbaseline = 0.17 when incomes are measured between age 25 and 27.
In column (4), we report the 2-step parental estimator, in which we allow for income
growth to vary systematically with parental education and income. The estimator performs
better than the baseline lifecycle estimator, in particular when incomes are only observed
at very young ages. The estimates are βˆparental = 0.21 when incomes are measured between
age 25 and 27, and are within 10 percent of the benchmark estimate when income at older
ages are observed. In columns (5) and (6), we report the 2-step FE linear and 2-step FE
22Specifically, we estimate a complete life cycle profile of each individual in the child generation, based
on a quartic in age and individual fixed effects, and then construct SMic =
∑53
t=25 exp(εˆict) as a measure
of the individual income variability around the mean tendency. We use this adjustment factor to adjust
predicted lifetime income for each of the lifecycle estimators. See Wooldridge (2006), for a discussion of the
re-tranformation problem and its potential solutions.
23These estimates are based on a random 50% draw of our main sample. We will replace them with results
from the full sample in the final manuscript version.
24Because we hold our sample constant across all estimators, and because because some individuals may
not be observed in certain age ranges, the benchmark estimate varies slightly with the chosen age threshold.
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quadratic estimators. They perform slightly better than the 2-step FE parental estimator.
This finding suggests that systematic variation in income growth by parental background can
be addressed without observing parental characteristics, simply by taking into account that
individuals with higher income levels also tend to have higher income growth.
The 2-step FE quadratic estimator is therefore our preferred specification. Estimates
from this approach are generally within 5 percent of the benchmark estimate, with a slight
larger understatement of the intergenerational elasticity when incomes are observed only at
very young ages far below age 30. The estimates are otherwise remarkably insensitive to the
age at which incomes are measured, fluctuating around the benchmark without any apparent
systematic lifecycle bias. This estimator therefore promises to yield precise estimates of the
intergenerational elasticity, irrespectively of the type of income snapshots that are observed
for the child generation. Moreover, it yields estimates that are quite comparable even when
the underlying samples are observed for very different age ranges.25
Finally, we test how the performance of the lifecycle estimator varies with the number of
income observations that are available for each individual in the child generation. In Table
3.5, we report estimates from the 2-step FE quadratic estimator in different data scenarios.
Specifically, we randomly select 6 income observations for each person within the indicated
age range, and then (randomly) drop income observations until only 2 annual incomes are
observed per person. Reducing the number of income observations increases the noise in the
estimation of equation (3.12), and the noise in the predicted lifetime incomes. The regression
R2 therefore decreases when fewer income observations are available. However, estimates of
the intergenerational elasticity remain remarkably stable. There is no clear pattern when
incomes up to age 35 are observed. The estimates appear to decrease slightly when incomes
are observed only up to age 30, presumably because the estimate generally tends to slightly
understate the intergenerational elasticity when income is observed only at very young age
(cf. Table 3.4).
Overall, the lifecycle estimator appears to perform very well. It can nearly eliminate
lifecycle bias in our data, with estimates fluctuating closely around the benchmark. Moreover,
the approach yields estimates that appear quite insensitive to (i) the age range in which
income is observed, and (ii) the number of income observations available for each person.
Such properties would the estimator particularly attractive for comparative purposes, such
25The estimator is however still subject to two key limitations. First, we are considering only left-hand
side measurement error here, i.e. estimating the lifetime incomes in the child generation. Additional steps
would be necessary to adapt the estimator when also the income of parents is not well observed. Second, we
assumed that individuals in all age ranges are observed in the estimation of equation (3.12). If the cohorts
of interest are not observed over their entire lifecycle, researchers need to approximate the overall shape of
their lifecycle profiles via other means. These additional steps are likely to differ across applications, which
would then again reduce the comparability of estimates.
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Table 3.4: The Revised Lifecycle Estimator
Direct estimator Lifecycle estimator
Lifetime Annual Baseline Parental 2-step FE 2-step FE
(Linear) (Quadratic)
Son’s Age N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age ≤ 27 188,260 0.257*** 0.084*** 0.165*** 0.207*** 0.198*** 0.213***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
R2=0.056 R2=0.005 R2=0.023 R2=0.036 R2=0.019 R2=0.017
Age ≤ 30 187,432 0.259*** 0.129*** 0.197*** 0.225*** 0.232*** 0.252***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
R2=0.058 R2=0.011 R2=0.038 R2=0.049 R2=0.034 R2=0.032
Age ≤ 33 186,490 0.259*** 0.186*** 0.206*** 0.223*** 0.233*** 0.246***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
R2=0.059 R2=0.022 R2=0.046 R2=0.053 R2=0.042 R2=0.040
Age ≤ 36 185,508 0.257*** 0.200*** 0.215*** 0.237*** 0.240*** 0.251***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
R2=0.059 R2=0.024 R2=0.050 R2=0.061 R2=0.047 R2=0.045
Age ≤ 40 183,886 0.255*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 0.273*** 0.261*** 0.262***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
R2=0.059 R2=0.030 R2=0.056 R2=0.078 R2=0.051 R2=0.052
Age ≤ 45 181,594 0.254*** 0.280*** 0.243*** 0.274*** 0.266*** 0.260***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
R2=0.060 R2=0.031 R2=0.061 R2=0.076 R2=0.058 R2=0.059
Notes: The table reports the slope coefficient from a regression of son’s income on father’s lifetime income.
The measure for son’s income is lifetime income in column (1), the annual income at the median age betwee
age 25 and the indicated upper age bound in column (2), or the predicted lifetime income from a lifecycle
estimator applied to the indicated age range in columns (3) to (6). See main text for a description of each
estimator. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
113
Chapter 3. Correction Methods for Intergenerational Mobility Estimates
as the comparison of intergenerational estimates across countries. In future extensions we
plan to also study its performance in the estimation of mobility trends.
Table 3.5: The Lifecycle Estimator with Few Income Observations
Lifecycle estimator (2-step FE, Quadratic)
Son’s Age N ≤ 6 obs. ≤ 5 obs. ≤ 4 obs. ≤ 3 obs. ≤ 2 obs.
Age ≤ 30 187,432 0.242*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.233***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2=0.033 R2=0.033 R2=0.032 R2=0.031 R2=0.028
Age ≤ 35 185,848 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.237*** 0.244***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R2=0.041 R2=0.041 R2=0.038 R2=0.035 R2=0.034
Notes: The table reports the slope coefficient from a regression of son’s income on father’s lifetime income.
The measure for son’s income is the predicted lifetime income from a lifecycle estimator (2-step FE estimator,
interacting the first-stage individual FE with a quadratic in age) applied to the indicated age range. The
top row indicates the maximum number of income observations used for each person in the child generation.
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
3.5.2 The Standardized Errors-in-Variables Model
A simple bias correction follows from a standardized version of the classical errors-in-variables
model. Rewrite annual incomes as
yst = δst (y
∗
s + ust) , (3.13)
where δst is a scaling factor that may vary with age t, while the term in brackets is the
classical errors-in-variables model with Cov(y∗s , ust) = 0.26 Under this errors-in-variables
model, the slope coefficient in a regression of (log) annual income for sons ys,t on lifetime
income of fathers y∗f ,
plimβˆt =
Cov
(
yst, y
∗
f
)
V ar
(
y∗f
) = βδst, (3.14)
is biased by the scaling factor δst. As noted by Haider and Solon (2006), this factor can be
estimated by the slope coefficient in a regression of (log) annual on lifetime income. However,
individual-level data containing both annual and lifetime incomes are rarely available, so most
26If we assume that the variance of the error ut does not depend on age this represents a restriction with
respect to the“generalized” errors-in-variables model proposed by Haider and Solon (2006). This restriction
is equivalent to the assumption that the signal-to-noise ratio in annual income as a proxy for lifetime income
remains stable over age.
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applications simply measure incomes at an age at which the parameter δst is hoped to be
close to one.
We propose to improve on this rule-of-thumb by extracting information from the short
snapshots of income that are available in most applications. First, note that the ratio between
the variance of annual and lifetime incomes can be expressed as
V ar(y∗s)
V ar(yst)
=
V ar(y∗s)
V ar(δst (y∗s + ust))
=
1
δ2st
V ar(y∗s)
V ar(y∗s) + V ar(ust)
which in turn implies that
δst =
(
V ar(yst)
V ar(y∗s)
) 1
2
(
V ar(y∗s)
V ar(y∗s) + V ar(ust)
) 1
2
(3.15)
The bias term δst can therefore be decomposed into two components, the (i) ratio between the
variances of annual and lifetime income, and (ii) the signal-to-noise ratio in annual incomes
(or reliability ratio). Accordingly, replacing sons’ annual incomes ys,t by their standardized
values
ystdst = yst
(
V ar(yst)
V ar(y∗s)
)− 1
2
(
V ar(y∗s)
V ar(y∗s) + V ar(ust)
)− 1
2
would eliminate the bias in equation (3.14).
This decomposition is useful if these two components can be approximated from short in-
come spans, or be imported from external sources. First consider estimation of the reliability
ratio V ar(y
∗
s )
V ar(y∗s )+V ar(ust)
. If the error ut in equation (3.13) is not serially correlated, this ratio can
be estimated by regressing an income observation on its lag (requiring only the observation of
two income observations per person). With serial correlation in the transitory component of
the income process its estimation becomes more involved, but remains feasible if sufficiently
many income observations are available (see e.g. Mazumder 2005). The reliability ratio will
therefore be estimable in many applications.27 Estimation of the ratio between the variances
of annual and lifetime incomes is more challenging. However, researchers will often be able
to make an educated guess, for example by comparing the variance of annual incomes in the
parent and child generation, or can report estimates of the IGE under different assumptions
on this variance ratio.
Figure 3.6 illustrates how this standardized errors-in-variables model performs in the
27Moreover, the signal-to-noise ratio tends to be relatively stable over age, and can potentially be imported
from external sources. For example, Björklund (1993) finds that this ratio (which is equal to the correlation
between annual and lifetime incomes) tends to be around two thirds (0.82) after age 35 in Swedish sources.
Given this stability, external evidence on this ratio might provide a good approximation of its actual size in
the data under question. Alternatively, researchers could estimates of the IGE β under a plausible range of
the signal-to-noise ratio.
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Figure 3.6: A standardized errors-in-variables model in Swedish Data
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True IGE SEIV (True RR) SEIV (Estimated RR)
Notes: In this Figure, we implement the standardized errors-in-variables model in the Swedish data. The
green line represents the implementation using the true reliability ration. The orange line uses the estimated
reliability ration using a regression of one’s income on the fourth lagged variable.
Swedish data. We report two bias-corrected series. We abstract from measurement error in
V ar(yst)
V ar(y∗s )
by directly estimating it in our data. In the first implementation, we estimate the
correlation between annual and lifetime income to derive a “true” estimate of the reliability
ratio V ar(y
∗
s )
V ar(y∗s )+V ar(ust)
(blue line). In a second implementation, we instead estimate the relia-
bility ratio in short income spans, by the correlation between annual income and its fourth
lag (orange line). We choose the fourth lag to reduce the influence of serial correlation in
transitory shocks. The method performs well over the age range 30 to 50, with either bias-
corrected series being within 5-10 percent of the true IGE. Importantly, the bias-correction
performs nearly as well when based on a reliability ratio estimated from annual incomes as
when based on the true reliability ratio. Only in the late 40s the “true” measure performs
measurably better than the “estimated” version.
The standardized errors-in-variables model aims to capture the the strengths of previously
proposed correction methods, while addressing its weaknesses. It shares the same motiva-
tion as the method proposed by Creedy (1988), that annual income observations should be
adjusted by their age-specific variance. However, equation (3.15) clarifies that incomes need
to be scaled by both the variance ratio and the reliability ratio, to account for the influence
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of transitory shocks. Both components are captured by the generalized errors-in-variables
model proposed by Haider and Solon (2006), but they can be estimated and corrected for
separately.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The estimation of the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) ideally requires information on the
complete income trajectory of parents and offspring. Yet, such ideal datasets are not available
for practitioners, who, therefore, use snapshots of income for the IGE estimation. If these
snapshots do not mimic lifetime incomes, the resulting estimate would suffer from the so-
called lifecycle bias. A large literature has focused on analyzing, discussing and providing
some solutions to this measurement issue. One strand of this literature has proposed errors-
in-variables models, based on the intuition that there is an age - usually around midlife -
in which differences between parental and offspring annual incomes mimic the difference in
lifetime income. Most empirical applications (see Table A.1) use this intuition and average
income around midlife to reduce lifecycle bias. A second strand of the literature proposes to
directly model individuals income trajectories based on incomplete profiles and, then, predict
lifetime income.
In this paper, we use nearly complete income profiles of two generations of parents and
offspring from Sweden to test how the previously proposed correction methods perform. To
do that, we establish a link between the intergenerational and the income process literature,
which helps in the assessment of why these methods improve IGE estimates if compared to
annual incomes, but still fail to completely eliminate lifecycle bias. Generally, we find that
while accounting for important aspects of the income process, each of the methods fail to
account for one of its key components: (i) transitory noise, (ii) income growth explained by
observable characteristics and (iii) unexplained income growth that nevertheless correlates
within families.
Then, we propose two distinct methods to address lifecycle bias in the estimation of
the IGE. First, based on the insights from Vogel (2007), Hertz (2007) and Creedy (1988), we
introduce a new lifecycle estimator. In our preferred version of the estimator, the practitioner
should follow two steps. First, estimate an equation of log annual income on age and other
available controls (e.g. education, occupation) and on individual fixed effects. Differently
from previously proposed methods, we allow for individual slopes to vary systematically
by individual. For that, in the second step, we re-estimate the equation incorporating an
additional term: an interaction between the predicted individual fixed effect and a quadratic
in age. We test our estimator in the Swedish data and find that it works remarkably well.
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Estimates are generally within 5 percent of the benchmark IGE, fluctuating around it without
any apparent systematic lifecycle bias. The estimator is fairly insensitive to the age range
available for the first step estimation and to the number of income observations available for
each individual (as long as there is a minimum of two). These properties make the estimator
attractive for a large number of applications, and for comparative purposes, both across
different countries and across time. In the future, we plan to assess the performance of our
estimator in the measurement of mobility trends.
Second, we propose a standardized errors-in-variables model (SEiV), which relates the
generalized errors-in-variables model (GEiV) proposed by Haider and Solon (2006) to mo-
ments that are more directly obtained from the short income snapshots that are typically
observed in practice. Instead of the slope coefficient in a regression of annual on lifetime
incomes, as required by the GEiV, the SEiV’s adjustment requires two different objects: the
ratio between the variance of annual and lifetime income, and the reliability ratio at the
age at which incomes are observed. The advantage of this decomposition is that these two
components can be more easily approximated from short income spans, or be imported from
external sources. Without serial correlation, the reliability ratio can be directly obtained by
regressing an income observation on its lag. The ratio between the variances of annual and
lifetime income, although more challenging, can, for example, be reported under different as-
sumptions, or under an educated guess. This method also performs well, producing estimates
within 5-10 percent of the true IGE.
In sum, both of our proposed methods offer promising alternatives for the measurement
problem of the intergenerational literature. Their applicability in different data needs to
be studied and tested more thoroughly. However, our results suggest that the methods can
be applied in a wide range of settings, and that the IGE can be estimated based on short
snapshots of income and simple observable characteristics, such as education or occupation.
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Appendix
3.A Additional Figure and Tables
Figure A.1: Components of the Income Process
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B: Income of College−level Sons by Quartile of Annual Income at Age 35
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C: Income of College−level Sons by Fathers’ Lifetime Income
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D: Income of College−level Sons of Fathers’ in Top Inc Quart by Fathers’ Education
Notes: Panel A shows income trajectories by educational category. Panel B focus only on college-educated
sons, who are split in four groups, according to their annual income at age 35. Category Q1 refers to the
bottom quartile and Q4 to the top. In Panel C, college-educated sons are divided in four groups, according
to fathers’ lifetime income. Finally, in Panel D, college-level sons whose fathers belong to the top quartile of
lifetime income are divided in two additional groups: college-educated fathers and fathers with only primary
school.
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Table A.2: Moments of Income Process in Guvenen (2009)
Moment Value
ρ 0.821
σ2α 0.022
σ2β 0.00038
corrαβ -0.23
σ2η 0.029
σ2ε 0.047
Figure A.2: Variance of Income by Group
.
5
1
1.
5
Va
ria
nc
e
25 30 35 40 45 50
Age
Primary School Short High School  
High School College
Panel A: Variance by Educational Group
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Va
ria
nc
e
25 30 35 40 45 50
Age
Other Post−sec required
Professionals Managers
Panel B: Variance by Occupational Group
Notes: In this Figure, we plot how the variance of income varies by age, in the Swedish data. In Panel A,
we graph it for different educational groups and, in Panel B, for different occupational groups.
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